

whom Hitler said goodbye just before closing the door to the room where he committed suicide behind him and Eva Braun. So, according to

Junge, Günsche heard one shot. And when

Günsche, Goebbels, Bormann, Axman - the head of the Hitler Youth, Ambassador Hevel and the personal chauffeur of the Fuhrer Kempk (there is no valet Linge in the list of Junge) entered the room, they found that Hitler had bitten through the ampoule and shot himself in the mouth.

According to Günsche, "the skull flew apart and looked terrible," and Eva Braun simply took the poison. If

Günsche told Junge the truth, then the fragment with a neat bullet hole in the back of the head is indeed a later falsification. But even if this is so, this does not change the main thing - the fact of the death of the Fuhrer in the bunker on April 30, 1945.

According to Junge, Günsche also took part in the burning of corpses. Junge writes that she did not doubt Günsche's words for a minute, then reasonably remarking that "no one could have portrayed such a shock, and he, a simple muscular young man, even more so" ...

"Where else could the Fuhrer be?" Junge wondered and continued: "No plane, no train nearby, no underground secret passage leading from the bunker to freedom. Hitler couldn't even walk".

Junge was right, because if there were secret passages from the bunker, they would have been used, if not by the Fuhrer, then by others. Including - and Junge herself, who was part of a very trusted circle (it was she who took shorthand, and then printed out three copies of the Fuhrer's will).

Perhaps the most convincing evidence that Hitler committed suicide in the bunker of the Imperial Chancellery is the fate of the Goebbels family and himself. With Hitler alive, Goebbels would not have taken such a step.

On May 31, 1945, Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Ivan Serov sent a letter to People's Commissar Beria with attached acts of forensic medical research and acts of identification of "the corpses of Hitler, Goebbels and their wives that we presume", protocols of interrogations of "Hitler and Goebbels' close associates" and photographic documents.

Despite the fact that Serov used the word "supposed", he himself reported that "there is no doubt that the corpse of Hitler supposed by us is genuine." On June 7, 1945, Beria

imposed a resolution on the letter:

***"Send t.t. Stalin and Molotov. L. Beria.
7.VI.45".***

And even before that, on June 4, 1945, employees of the KP department "SMERSH" ("Death to spies") of the 3rd shock army, led by the head of the KP army department, Colonel Miroshnichenko, reburied a number of high-ranking corpses of Hitler, Eva Braun, stored in the army department of the KP, Goebbels, Magda Goebbels, General Krebs and Goebbels' children. "Reburial"

because the first burial was made near the city of Buch, but in connection with the relocation of the department, the corpses were seized and finally buried near the city of Rathenow in wooden boxes at a depth of 1.7 meters. The corpses of Hitler's dog and Eva Braun's dog were also buried with them in a separate basket. In February 1946, on the

instructions of the head of the SMERSH counterintelligence department of the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany, Lieutenant General Zelenin (guided, presumably, by Moscow's instructions), all the corpses were finally reburied in Magdeburg at a depth of 2 meters in the courtyard of house No. 36 along Westendstrasse . This is on the one hand. On the other hand,

on June 10, 1945,

Pravda reported that on June 9, at a press conference of the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR Vyshinsky and Marshal Zhukov, Marshal, in response to a question from the English correspondent Alexander Werth about the fate of Hitler, said, in particular:

"The situation is very mysterious ... We did not find the identified corpse of Hitler. I cannot say anything in the affirmative about the fate of Hitler. At the very last minute, he could fly out of Berlin, as the runways allowed him to do so.

Such a statement could, of course, only add fuel to an already hot burning fire of stunning rumors. And it poured.

And what about

Stalin? Today, it is sometimes argued that, although he was confident in the death of the Fuhrer, he "was in no hurry to make his conclusions public," because he "calculated his political moves for many years to come." Like, at a meeting with the representative of the American President Harry Hopkins on May 26, 1945, Stalin, already knowing everything, stated that "Bormann, Goebbels, Hitler and, probably, Krebs fled and are currently hiding

Not sure if the sources reporting this are true, or at least completely accurate. However, we must not forget that on May 26, 1945, Stalin did not yet have reliable operational information about the fate of the Fuhrer - Serov sent an official letter to Beria only on May 31, Beria addressed it to Stalin and Molotov on June 7, and it is unlikely that Stalin read this letter before 9-10 June 1945. At the same time, even after

reading it, Stalin, of course, did not immediately rush to the HF apparatus in order to immediately inform Zhukov about the reliably established facts about Hitler.

Therefore, both Stalin on May 26, 1945, and Zhukov on June 9, 1945, without stating anything for sure about Hitler, were by no means

disingenuous. They were just discreet and expressed as they should have been then, presumably. "But why didn't

Stalin make everything public later?" the reader may ask. After all, even in January 1946, the Agence France Presse disseminated information from the newspaper France Soir that "Hitler's corpse was allegedly discovered on December 19 by the Russian command, but this fact is kept secret in order not to interfere with the arrest of the Nazis who took part in burial."

And TASS on January 2, 1946 reported this.

And a member of the Nuremberg Tribunal, an officer of the American Navy, Captain Michael Musmano, in late 1948 and early 1949, published a series of articles in the Swiss newspaper Di Nation under the heading "Is Hitler alive?".

I cannot point out the exact reasons for the silence of the Soviet authorities. Although today one can dispute the very assertion that

The Soviet Union was very much hiding its belief in the death of the Fuhrer. In particular,

it can be said that if a certain "conspiracy of silence" took place, then not only Stalin was involved in it, but also, for example, Churchill and a number of people close to him. And that's why...

Churchill arrived in Berlin - for the beginning of the Potsdam Conference - no later than July 16, 1945, and immediately toured the destroyed Berlin. In his memoirs about the war, first published in 1950, in the chapter "Potsdam" Churchill describes, among other things, this "excursion" of the victor through the capital of the vanquished.

At that time, the disengagement of the allied and Soviet troops in the determined zones had not yet been carried out, and even with the zones it was not all clear. Accordingly, the Allies have not yet been let in by us in Berlin. At that time we were full and sole masters in the German capital, and only Soviet representatives could show Churchill everything and everywhere.

They accompanied Churchill everywhere. So, Churchill recalled how he and his companions wandered for a long time among the dilapidated corridors and halls of the Imperial Chancellery, and then, Churchill continues, "the Russians accompanying us took us to Hitler's bomb shelter."

Churchill went down to the very bottom and saw the room in which Hitler and Eva Braun committed suicide, and when he went upstairs, he was "showed the place where his corpse was burned."

"From people in the know, we heard the most detailed story that could be heard at that time (**highlights are mine everywhere. - S.K.**) about these final scenes," Sir Winston concluded.

The English prime minister is not an employee of the Soviet SMERSH, he did not give a non-disclosure agreement on military and state secrets of the USSR. So Churchill, having learned from the Russians about the burning of the corpse of the Fuhrer, could immediately notify the press about the sensation. However, he did not inform.

On the other hand, among the Russians accompanying Churchill there was not a single one who would not repeatedly put his signature under various kinds of similar obligations. And why talk in vain with Churchill - in order to better please him and please him - none of the Russians accompanying him would. And if so, they

could inform the British about the death of the Fuhrer, indicate the place of his burning and tell "about the final scenes" only with the sanction of the higher leadership.

Considering the rank of "tourist", the initial sanction for only Stalin could give the Soviet "guides" frankness with him.

But Churchill, I repeat, for some reason did not immediately "phone" about what the Russians had told him, in all corners of Berlin, at press conferences and in London's Hyde Park.

Further ... Already during the Potsdam Conference, at its 11th meeting on July 31, 1945, when discussing the issue of the trial of the main war criminals, an interesting exchange of remarks took place between Stalin and the new British Prime Minister Attlee, who replaced Churchill. Molotov said that the Soviet delegation

agreed to accept the English draft document as a basis, but proposed to supplement it after the words "major war criminals" with the words: "such as Goering, Hess, Ribbentrop, Rosenberg, Keitel and others." Attlee found it difficult to answer positively, and discussion began. Further

- according to the transcript: "**Attlee**. I don't think that listing the names will strengthen

our document. For example,

I believe that Hitler is alive, but he is not in our

list.

Stalin. But it is not in our hands either.

Attlee. But you give the names of the main criminals as an example.

Stalin. I

agree to add Hitler (general laughter), although he does not is in our hands. I make this concession (general laughter)..."

Laughter was common, but it is unlikely that everyone present understood all the subtlety and humor of the situation.

By then, Stalin knew that Hitler was dead. And since the Fuhrer was already in the hands of the Lord God, in Russian hands he

could not be. What Stalin openly declared to everyone.

Yes, Stalin did not directly dissuade Attlee about his belief that Hitler was alive, but Attlee - if he had a sharp mind - could himself figure out that if Hitler is not on the list proposed by the Russians, then in the USSR they do not believe that ***Hitler alive***.

In fact, Molotov, in announcing our list, gave a direct basis for such a question, for example, by Attlee, or the new US President Truman, or US Secretary of State Byrnes, or British Foreign Minister Bevin: "Marshal Stalin, why is there no main war criminal on your list? — Hitler? Doesn't this mean that you have accurate information that Hitler is no longer alive? I am sure that Stalin himself in such a situation would have caught the subtle moment and would have asked the question that suggests itself. After all, Stalin was a rare clever girl. He probably expected such a question from his

"colleagues". He, most likely, proposed an addition to the English document through the mouth of Molotov in order to conduct a kind of test of the mental abilities of the new British prime minister, the new American president and their closest associates.

And at the same time, as I guess, Stalin was not averse to having fun. He didn't just have a sense of humor. He possessed this feeling in all its nuances, not understanding jokes only when they offended his dignity as the leader and head of Russia.

If his interlocutors had caught the "salt" of the situation and asked the right question, I don't think that Stalin would have begun to evade direct response.

He would give it. Why not? But since you guys are stupid, then Comrade Stalin will not enlighten.

Of the military "Big Three" by that time, only Stalin himself retained his status. Roosevelt died, the British "rolled" Churchill in the elections. Compared to the deceased Roosevelt and the departed Churchill, Stalin's new main partners were people of such a smaller caliber - in everything that Stalin could not help treating them with humor.

And this moment was subtly and covertly manifested in the above-described collisions.

There is one more circumstance that allows us to assume that those **who need it** in the West were informed by us about Hitler's death in real time, albeit in an unofficial - so as not to cause a stir - order. The proof is that the "undiscovered" Hitler never appeared in the "Nuremberg" list of the main war criminals, although the "undiscovered" Bormann also got there, because his fate was then unknown to us, in the USSR.

Let me remind you that the main defendants at the Nuremberg trials were Goering, Ribbentrop, Keitel, Kaltenbrunner, Rosenberg, Frank, Frick, Streicher, Sauckel, Jodl, Seyss-Inquart, who were present and sentenced to death, and also absent from the trial and sentenced to death in absentia Bormann. Hess, Funk and Raeder were sentenced to life

imprisonment, Schirach and Speer to 20 years, Neurath to 15, Dönitz to 10 years in prison. Ley committed suicide, the case of the paralyzed Krupp was suspended, Fritzsche, Papen and Schacht were acquitted. That is, the entire cash "head" of the Reich visited the dock, including

Bormann, who was considered "on the run", "sitting" on this bench symbolically. But then it would be logical to judge Hitler in absentia if he was also listed as **the leadership**, and not the press, of the allies "on the run", like Bormann.

Hitler led the Reich, he should have led the list major war criminals. But, as we see, he did not lead. Judging

by all of the above, Stalin did share the available information with competent Western circles, but he did not share it officially, but in a "working" manner, not considering it necessary to play along with the sensationalist Western public and those Western journalistic brethren who, smelling "fried", lost all dignity and, in search of "strawberries", climbed onto the tables, under the tables and almost into her underpants.

All this ruffraff did not deserve respect, and Stalin could not help treating it with the deepest contempt. So why then, one wonders, did the Soviet Union have to appease the inclinations of some in the West to unhealthy "sensations"? Moreover, the fate of Hitler did not represent a special secret. We, according to Churchill himself, informed Churchill about it right on the spot. In real time. And the fact that they did not "call" the whole world about it? Well, at that time the Soviets had their own pride, and it was hardly necessary to pay much attention to such a small thing - by that time

- question.

In the USSR, after all, they did not chase after sensations. In the USSR, they preferred to create them: having survived in 1941 and 1942, single-handedly taking Berlin in 1945, in a matter of years restoring the destroyed country, detonating the first atomic bomb in 1949 and hydrogen in 1953, launching in 1957 year the world's first artificial Earth satellite and the world's first astronaut in 1961-m...

That is why, without unnecessary noise, without reporter blitzes and without sensational caps in the newspapers, on April 4 and 5, 1970, the operational group of the KGB of the USSR held the "Archive" event near the city of

Magdeburg. In accordance with the action plan approved in Moscow on March 26, 1970, on the territory of the military camp on Klausenerstrasse (formerly Westendstrasse) near house number 36, on the night of April 3-4, "the burial of the remains of war criminals was opened."

Until the morning of April 5, 1970, the box with the remains was under the protection of operational workers, and in the morning the remains were destroyed. In a handwritten act signed by the head of the Special Department of the KGB military unit, field mail 92 626, Colonel Kovalenko, it was said:

"The destruction of the remains was carried out by burning them at the stake in a wasteland near the town of Schönebeck, 11 km from Magdeburg.

The remains burned out, together with coal they were crushed into ashes, collected and thrown into the Biederitz River, about which this act was drawn up.

Thus was put the last point in the story, which began on April 30, 1945 in the underground bunker of the Imperial Chancellery with the end of the Fuhrer's life.

Was Hitler an anti-Bolshevik on April 29, 1945?

At first glance, such a question may make the reader think - is the respected author out of his mind? And yet, today—after decades of lies—the question at the head of this section is worth asking.

However, let the reader judge for himself. In 1964, the Publishing House of Political Literature (Political Publishing House) published a small book by Lev Bezymensky "In the footsteps of Martin Bormann", which included the following lines: "In the first post-war years, in all countries of the world, they thought and wondered: is there a testament of Hitler? At first, the answer to this question was not clear. Now the situation has become more than clear. Yes, there is a will, in addition there are several of them

For Lev Bezymensky, the indefinite numeral "a few" for some reason becomes synonymous with the exact numeral "two", since further Bezymensky himself reports that there were only two wills of Hitler - personal and political.

Now we are going to talk about the second document. Bezymensky unreasonably calls him "talentless and fanfaron" and claims that "from the "testament" the world should have learned that, it turns out, Hitler did not want the war, that he fell "a victim of international Jewry" and "Bolsheviks" ... "

However, the last statement is nothing more than a lie! The following excerpts from Hitler's political testament, drawn up by him in the bunker of the Reich Chancellery on the eve of his suicide, I will quote from the text placed in volume 15 (4–5) of the 1995 edition of the Russian Archive: Great Patriotic War: Battle for Berlin (Red Army in defeated Germany)", publishing house "TERRA" together with the Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. The source, as you can see, is solid. So, in Hitler's political

testament, words like "Jews", "Jewishness", etc. occur 7 (seven) times. The word "Bolsheviks" - never. I ask the reader to consider...

Here is the most tragic moment of Hitler's fate - he dictates his political testament. The moment when the most cherished - in the literal sense of the word - thoughts and feelings are trusted to paper. And at this moment of truth, Hitler did not even mention Bolshevism ***in a hint.***

The day before his death, April 29, 1945, at 4.00 am, in the presence of witnesses Joseph Goebbels, Martin Bormann, Wilhelm Burgdorf and Hans Krebs, Adolf Hitler signed a political testament. Here's a snippet of it:

“It is not true that I or anyone else in Germany wanted war in 1939. It was wanted and arranged exclusively by those international statesmen who either were of Jewish origin or worked in the interests of the Jews. (...) Centuries will pass, but from the ruins of our cities and historical monuments, hatred will be resurrected against the ultimately responsible people to whom we owe all this: international Jewry and its accomplices. Three days before the start of the German-Polish war, I proposed to the British ambassador in Berlin a solution to the German-Lola problems But it was rejected because the ruling circles in English politics wanted war, partly because of lucrative deals, partly spurred on by propaganda organized by international Jewry. But I have no doubt left that if the peoples of Europe are again regarded only as blocks of shares in these monetary and financial conspirators, then the people who are the true culprit of this murderous war will also be brought to justice: the Jews!..”

The last words of the will were:

"I oblige the leadership of the nation and subordinates, first of all, to strict observance of racial laws and to merciless resistance to the world poisoner of all peoples - international Jewry."

The capital of the Reich was stormed by people, overshadowed by the banners of Lenin. It was the Russia of the Bolsheviks that led the Fuhrer to the last stroke of the pen. Nevertheless, he, who rejected the common path with them of opposing the power of Capital, who did not keep the agreement with them, did not find any accusatory words for the Bolsheviks. They were completed for him by post-

war "stenographers" like Bezymensky. "In his will, Hitler commemorates not only international Jewry, but also its accomplices! the reader may notice. "By accomplices, he meant the Bolsheviks."

However, this cannot be so, firstly, because if the Fuhrer had in mind the Bolsheviks, then he would have written directly about it - why should he be embarrassed !?

Secondly, it is clear from the context that collaborators here refer to the circles that set the tone in **English** politics, who wanted war.

And after all, such circles really existed on both sides of the ocean. And on **the other** side of the ocean they were even more numerous, united and powerful than on **this one**. And the anticipation of "lucrative deals" mentioned by the Fuhrer did not deceive these circles. During World War II, the second golden "rain" in the twentieth century was constantly falling over America from the "clouds" that gathered in Europe from tears, blood and smoke

from conflagrations. The first such "rain" was shed over America by the First World War, as well as the Second World War, organized by the same

America. So we do not replace the word "accomplices" with the word "Bolsheviks" right.

And here the fun begins! Further, I will quote a number of testimonies of high-ranking figures of the Reich or persons who, by their official position, are close to the personality of the Fuhrer and fell into Soviet captivity. I will quote, and

the reader, I hope, will be surprised as he gets acquainted with these testimonies.

Because there is something to be surprised about! First, I will give - almost completely, except for the postscript I already cited earlier, a statement of personal

representative of Grand Admiral Dönitz at Hitler's headquarters, Vice Admiral Voss. I

remind you that it was handed over by Foss on May 2, 1945
commander of the 3rd shock army, Colonel General Kuznetsov.

“In the last days before the death of the Fuhrer, it was repeatedly discussed whether the best outcome for Europe is an orientation towards England and America or towards Russia **(the emphasis is mine everywhere. - S.K.)**. The Führer saw in Marshal Stalin the most powerful of his opponents, and in recent days in conversations with me he often spoke about the stern and uncompromising strong-willed personality of this adversary. Since he, due to the complete cessation of communication, during the last 14 days was unable to inform the Grand Admiral about this change in his views, despite the fact that an attempt was made to convey the corresponding notice through couriers, the Fuhrer, shortly before his death, instructed me to personally convey this point of view to his successor, Grand Admiral Dönitz... I was

especially devoted to the Fuhrer and Grand Admiral. In view of the fact that the grand admiral would consider an expression of will unknown to him, transmitted by some other person, a provocation, while he himself, as a sailor, has until now been politically oriented to the West, I consider it necessary to inform him personally and ask you to give me the opportunity accompanied by a Russian officer to orient him. At the same time, I would like

to convey to him the last words of gratitude to the Fuhrer for his and my fidelity and to describe the last hour [(of the Fuhrer)] as I myself experienced it. Please do not publish this statement.

PS (...)

Vice Admiral FOSS

Translated:

Beginning of the investigative unit of the RO (intelligence department. - S.K.) of the headquarters of the 3rd shock army, captain ALPEROVICH True: assistant to the beginning. on using the experience of the war of the headquarters of the 3rd shock army of the guard captain DMITRENKO.

Since no one was going to conduct any negotiations with Dönitz, appointed by Hitler in his political testament as the new Chancellor of the Reich, and the position of the Grand Admiral no longer had any political significance and weight, the statement of 48-year-old Vice Admiral Hans Eric Voss remained without consequences.

However, it was. And it was not the only evidence of a complete revision by Hitler in April 1945 of his position regarding Russia and Stalin.

So, on May 17, 1945, the personal adjutant of the Fuhrer Otto Günsche gave extensive testimony, of which I will give only a small part that is important for us now:

“... The door to the Fuhrer's private rooms was slightly ajar, and a strong smell of almonds (potassium cyanide) came from there. I looked through the door, but did not go inside, but again went to the meeting room. Major General Monke of the SS troops was also there ... I heard that Reichsleiter Bormann wanted to try to get through to Grand Admiral Dönitz at all costs in order to acquaint him with the Fuhrer's last thoughts before his death. I do not know what thoughts were discussed ... Then Major General Mohnke approached me and said that based on the statements of the Fuhrer, without him, only cooperation with Russia could save Germany to some extent. (...)

SS-Sturmbannführer Günsche

Translated:

*pom. chief Investigation Department of
the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army*

Guard Captain Shirokov.

And here is an extract from the handwritten testimony of the 34-year-old commander of the Adolf Hitler division, the head of the Central Defense District of Berlin, Wilhelm Mohnke, given to him in Moscow on May 18, 1945: "... General

Krebs took the floor ... He said something like the following (I can't remember the exact words):

1) Berlin can no longer be held ... 2) ... in no case can one count on victory as a whole. 3) Recently, he was about ***the following: The only person with whom Germany may be able to agree is Stalin, because he is independent and independent; it pursues its political and military aims with clear consistency. Churchill and Roosevelt are dependent on their parliaments and capitalism, their policy is uncertain and untruthful. However, personally, he, Adolf Hitler, cannot negotiate with Stalin.***

Thus, it was possible, General Krebs continued, that the Fuhrer, by his suicide, wanted to give a chance to improve relations with Russia (...) From the

conversations of the leading people, I then learned that the proposal for consent to surrender should be made only to Russia ... "

The last Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, General of the Infantry Krebs (perfect, by the way, who knows both Russia and the Russian language) really made such an attempt and personally met with the commander of the 8th Guards Army, Colonel General Chuikov. But it was already an unsuccessful attempt.

Nevertheless, the following phrase from Monke's testimony about Krebs's statement is also interesting:

"Russia and Germany are two states that perfectly complement each other economically."

All this is certainly true. True, if only because Hitler could not help but understand that of the entire "Big Three" only

Stalin is completely independent of the international financial circles of the

West. However, Hitler could not but see the virtual impossibility for himself of personal contacts with Stalin - not, of course, because of the Fuhrer's continued anti-Bolshevism, but because of his guilt and shame in front of Stalin. And it remains only to

regret that Hitler and Ribbentrop departed in 1941 from the position that they had declared in the summer and autumn of 1939. In the memorandum of the German Foreign Ministry dated August 15, 1939 (I cited its full text in my book *Russia and Germany: the Path to the Pact*), then much was said that was true, in particular:

“1... different worldviews do not exclude reasonable relations between... the two states and the possibility of restoring good mutual cooperation...

2. There are no real contradictions in the interests of Germany and the Soviet Union. The living spaces of Germany and the USSR touch each other, but in terms of their natural needs they do not compete with each other. As a result, from the very beginning there is no reason for the aggressive tendencies of one state against another ... The same applies to the German and Soviet national economies, which complement each other in all directions. 3 ... Both peoples in the past were always

good,
when they were friends, and bad when they were enemies.

4. It is true that Germany and the USSR, as a result of the ideological enmity that has existed between them in recent years, are currently mistrusting each other. Much accumulated debris will still have to be cleared away... 5. Based on their

experience, the German government and the government of the USSR must take into account the fact that the capitalist Western democracies are irreconcilable enemies of both National Socialist Germany and the Soviet Union. At the present time they are again trying, by concluding a military alliance, to incite

Soviet Union at war with Germany. In 1914 this policy had bad consequences for Russia. The interests of both countries demand that the mutual tearing apart of Germany and the USSR for the sake of the Western democracies should be avoided forever.

Already in his prison cell, the former Reich Foreign Minister Ribbentrop wrote of Hitler:

"There can be no doubt that Adolf Hitler had only one goal in life: to serve the German people. He lived completely selflessly, sacrificed his health and until the last moment did not think about anything other than the future of his nation. The fact that he was defeated, the Fuhrer, speaking to me, called fate. Why exactly he was defeated - history will decide ... "

Well, a sober and honest look makes it quite possible to understand why Hitler was defeated. He correctly identified the worst enemy of both his country and humanity - international Capital. But he was wrong about Russia. Rather, it was not the irony of history, but its tragedy

that manifested itself in the fact that Hitler could not come to power without the help of Capital. However, the finances of Capital became for him only starting blocks, and, pushing off from them, he jumped to such a national height where his talents and abilities were visible to all Germans.

Capital provided Hitler with the chair of the Chancellor of Germany as an anti-communist. But his success among the masses was due to the fact that the Germans perceived Hitler as a patriot, nationalist and antagonist of Capital. Hitler

constructively changed the position of Labor in the Reich. And at the same time, he did not change in his rejection of Soviet Russia as a manifestation - in his view - of "Jewish Bolshevism", while Bolshevism in Russia acquired an increasingly national state, Stalinist, internationally revolutionary, "Trotskyist" meaning.

A Not

The anti-communist Hitler was doomed, while the consistent nationalist Hitler would have been obliged to come to an understanding of the prospects for Germany of only one alliance - with Russia. Hitler came to this

understanding in 1939, but in 1941 he broke down, which resulted in the fire of 1945, on which both the Fuhrer's Reich and the Fuhrer himself burned down. May 20, 1945 head of

Hitler's bodyguard, 48-year-old
SS Gruppenfuehrer Hans Rattenhuber testified during interrogation in Moscow:

“I remember ... a conversation with Hitler during
stay in Vinnitsa in the autumn of 1942.

Hitler, enraged by the failures of our troops ... declared in
my presence to General Schmutzdt, adjutant from the main
command of the armed forces, that the German troops ... were
stopped because the Red Army was fighting with unsurpassed
bitterness and stubbornness ... We did not take

into account, continued Hitler, that the peoples of Soviet
Russia and The Red Army has unlimited confidence in Stalin.
After a pause, he called Marshal Stalin -
giant...”

This was not an attempt by the vanquished to flatter the victors—the
tone and substance of Rattenhuber's testimony rules out such an
assumption. Elsewhere, his
testimony can be read:

“All my life I will remember one of the evenings at the end of
April 1945, when Hitler, having come from the next meeting,
broken, sat at his desk, intently looking at a map of Berlin with
the operational situation on it.

I went to him to report on urgent measures to protect the
headquarters ...

Getting up from the table, Hitler looked at me and said: “The
Red ***Army is in Berlin ... Only Stalin could do this.***”

Thinking, Hitler returned to the table. I quietly left
rooms."

Being himself to the marrow of his bones imbued with the awareness of himself as a brilliant personality (in which he was not so wrong), Hitler considered the arrival of Russians in Berlin primarily as the result of the efforts of another, undoubtedly brilliant, personality - Stalin.

Now, at the end of April 1945, everything powerful in Russia was associated for Hitler with him - the Supreme Commander of the Red Army. Hitler did not understand, perhaps, that Stalin's strength

was in his complete ideological, spiritual and business unity with the most developed and creative part of the working majority in Russia, and indeed in the world. That Stalin always lived and acted in the name of the development of this **working** majority. Hitler did not fully realize this, as I guess. But in the end, he understood a lot about Russia

and its first Bolshevik, Stalin. And this is no longer guesswork, but, as we see, a provable historical fact! Therefore, when Hitler passed away, he cursed not the Bolsheviks who came

to Berlin and thereby forced him to leave his life, but those who **initially** waged war both in

Europe and in Berlin. And the Fuhrer's belated dying epiphany can be attributed to the most impressive historical lessons of 1945. I am aware that all of the above is likely to come as more than a surprise to

almost any reader of this book. I myself at one time, when I first got acquainted with the documents that I quoted here, was dumbfounded.

But facts are stubborn things.

In addition, there is reason to believe that in the spring of 1945 a radical reassessment of their views was carried out not only by the Fuhrer of the Germans, but also by the Germans themselves. Not all of them, of course, but above all those of them who were accustomed to respecting facts, were able to analyze them

and, as a result, draw correct conclusions from the analysis. In this regard, it is very interesting, in my opinion, a certain roll call of moods, which is seen when comparing

Hitler's dying views on the importance of Russia for Germany and the post-war position of the fifty-year-old professor at the University of Leipzig, Robert Georg Döppel (Doppel).

On July 12, 1945, Döppel, a former participant in the German uranium project, who later participated in Soviet atomic work, wrote an extensive letter to Professor Kapitsa, where for our topic it is not the specifically "atomic" part that is interesting, but some general Döppel's reasoning. The skepticism expressed

in the letter about America was to a certain extent explained, perhaps, by the fact that Döppel's wife, Maria Renata, also an atomic physicist, died on April 6, 1945 during the bombing of Leipzig University by Anglo-American aviation. However, this tragic fact of Döppel's personal fate could only increase his rejection of the Anglo-Saxons, and not give rise to this rejection. In his assessment of the role of Russia, Döppel was, no doubt, sincere and gave it without regard to worldly feelings. At the same time, I do not rule out that Döppel's views were not of ancient

origin, but were the result of reflections, the course of which was similar to the course of thought of Hitler, who had reached a dead end.

One way or another, Döppel wrote, in particular, this is what:

"... I am of the opinion that every sane German politically should be guided by Russia. For the same reasons, I evaded the action carried out by the Americans shortly before the entry of Russian troops into Leipzig to export to West Germany all the employees of the Faculty of Natural Sciences with auxiliary personnel and

families...

The progress of internal capabilities towards the development of the peoples inhabiting Europe depends, from my point of view, on the ability to unite ... these peoples into a single closely connected state system ... America,

naturally, would have the necessary power and confidence to restore such order [but] it can only exercise an outwardly lasting influence in

Europe ... by ... pushing European forces against one another. Russia is the only state

that, by virtue of its geopolitical position, the size of its territory, its military and political strength, its mineral and internal wealth, is called upon to create real order in Europe. America will, in any case, regard Germany as a barrier ~~opposite~~ ^{bring} to the East, and her measures will pursue the military side of the matter. Russia, on the contrary, is in a position to later consider a transformed Germany as a source of strength in Europe, which will consciously join the pan-European organism. Therefore, if a German can make a political choice...then his decision must be unconditionally for Russia."

This is the opinion of a smart and extraordinary German with a difficult fate. Almost a boy, after graduating from university, he went to the front of the First World War, then returned to science, taught, worked on a German bomb with Heisenberg, then on a Soviet bomb with us, in 1949 he was removed from conducting closed work for violating the regime and sent at the Rybinsk Mechanical Plant of the "atomic" First Main Directorate, taught at Voronezh University, and later headed departments at German universities. A difficult, dramatic, but interesting fate, which fully reflected the dramatic relations between Russians and Germans, Russia

and Germany. But these relations were extraordinary reflected in the fate of Hitler. He could become not only a great unifier of the Germans, but also a great friend of Russia, and

ended up bringing Russia unprecedented grief and devastation even in its history, already dying, he realized that a beneficent historical chance for the Germans could only give them an alliance with Russia. And here there is something to think about for both today's Germans and today's Russians.

You can - to reinforce such thoughts, give one more double evidence. Double because it reflects not only the opinion of a German, but also, albeit indirectly, the opinion of an outstanding Russian person - Marshal Chuikov. After all, Vasily Ivanovich for some reason included the confession of a German officer in his memoirs "From Stalingrad to Berlin", published by the Military Publishing House in 1985. I already wrote once that Chuikov cited in these memoirs the opinion of a lieutenant colonel of the German General Staff, who was taken prisoner in January 1945. In a conversation with General Chuikov at the time, the German,

a completely convinced Nazi, said: "Peace is needed not only by the Germans, but also by the

Russians. Your allies are unreliable. We Germans can come to an agreement with you and be reliable neighbors, and maybe allies against your current allies.

- Why, then, in the forty-first Germans, violating the non-aggression pact, attacked our peaceful country, which did not threaten anyone? asked Vasily Ivanovich. And the general staff officer answered: - The

rapid growth of the Land of Soviets inspired fear in us, we were afraid that you would be the first to attack us. Hitler decided to get ahead of you, which made the biggest mistake ...

Without assessing the true potential of Russia, the German General Staff miscalculated, like Hitler himself.

Alas, it took 1945 for Hitler to understand this, at least at the end of fate, having outlived the anti-Bolshevism that ruined him and Germany.

About the Vlasovites, who "liberated" Prague, and the Yankees, who did not liberate Prague

Already in very old times, deaf rumors roamed the country that Prague, it turns out, had been liberated by the Vlasovites. And if, they say, not they, there would be only firebrands left from the "Golden Prague". This is

also one of the myths of the 45th year, although units of the Russian Liberation Army (ROA) Vlasov did enter Prague in May 1945 and even fired at the German units sent to suppress the Prague uprising. However, everything is in order. On April 30, 1945, English Prime Minister

Churchill wrote to the new
American President Truman:

“There can be little doubt that the liberation by your troops of Prague and as much of Western Czechoslovakia as possible can completely change the post-war situation in Czechoslovakia and may well

also influence neighboring countries.

I cannot say exactly what Churchill meant by Western Czechoslovakia? Then - as, by the way, and now - the state with the name "Czechoslovakia" did not exist in nature. There was a separate imperial protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, or, if you like, the Czech Republic, and separately - the Slovak Republic.

So it is the place to be in our days - without any Hitler and "Munich agreement": the Czech Republic - separately, Slovakia - separately.

But if Churchill meant the Czech Republic, then the "neighboring countries" for her were - as they are now - Austria, Slovakia and Poland. Germany then was, of

course, not counted. The situation in all three

"neighboring countries" was not the best for the USA and England. And an allied presence in the Czech Republic, and even in Prague, would be a tasty option for Churchill (and not for him alone!)

Interfered, as always, "tyrant" Stalin. On

May 4, 1945, General Eisenhower turned to the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, General A.I. Antonov with a proposal to develop the offensive of American troops to the western banks of the Vltava and Elbe. This meant the occupation of Prague by the Americans, but contradicted the decisions of the Yalta Conference and did not correspond to the dividing line established there.

Antonov categorically rejected the proposal, saying that a grouping of Soviet troops had already been created to solve these tasks. And it was true. Troops of the 1st, 4th, 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts fought against Army Groups Center and Austria, and already during the Berlin operation, the Stavka decided to conduct the Prague operation.

The total number of the German grouping in the Czech Republic was more than 900 thousand people, armed with up to 10 thousand guns and mortars, over 2200 tanks and assault guns and about 1 thousand aircraft. Three Soviet fronts

were to advance along converging directions to Prague from the Dresden region and from the region south of Brno. The troops involved in the operation included more than 1 million people, more than 23 thousand guns and mortars, about 1800 tanks and self-propelled guns and more than 4 thousand aircraft.

The offensive was to begin on 7 May. On

May 2, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command sent directives to the commanders of the fronts to organize the offensive. So, in the directive to Marshal Malinovsky - the commander of the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front - it was, in particular, said:

"In connection with the withdrawal of the enemy in front of the 4th Ukrainian Front, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command orders:

1. "Turn the main forces of the front troops to the west and strike in the general direction on Jhlava, Prague, with the task of capturing the line no later than May 12-14: Jhlava, Ulatinch, Gorn, and then reach the river. Vltava and take possession of Prague.

2. Part of the forces of the right wing of the front to continue the offensive in the direction of Olomouc ...

Headquarters of the Supreme High Command

I. Stalin A. Antonov»

That is, the question of the occupation of Prague and the complete liberation of the Czech Republic was at the beginning of May 1945 a matter of a few days. And there could be no doubt about the complete success.

However, on May 5, 1945, a national uprising broke out in Prague. And it is unlikely that we will ever know for sure why the Czechs, who sat ***like a quiet mouse*** in their imperial protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia from the spring of 1939 to the spring of 1945 under the presidency of the same Gakha, who was president of Czechoslovakia in 1939, suddenly flared up such burning hatred for the invaders that they could not endure for a maximum of a week and a half before they were liberated by the Soviet troops. Or why the Czechs couldn't at least wait a little while until the Red Army units got close enough to Prague, which would have happened in

just a few days anyway. There was no strong German garrison in the city itself at that moment, the Germans were not going to destroy Prague, they did not carry out mass repressions. The uprising began on the morning of May 5, and by the evening the radio

building, the post office, the central telephone exchange, the most important bridges across the Vltava, almost all stations, the Skoda, Avia, and Walter factories were captured. On

the night of May 6, up to 1600 barricades were built, and the number of rebels increased to 30 thousand people. Radio Prague called: "Ore Armada - to the rescue"! And everyone in the USSR knew about it. But to be precise, it must be reported that Prague called

for help from the Americans in the same way.

Why did it happen? Wouldn't it be desirable for someone in May 1945 to repeat in Prague, but already - without collapse - the "Warsaw" version of August 1944?

The commander of the Army Group "Center" Scherner ordered to suppress the uprising in Prague by all means. Troops moved towards Prague from three sides: from the north - the Reich Panzer Division, from the east - the Viking Panzer Division, from the south - a reinforced regiment of the Reich Division.

But the Soviet tank armies were already moving towards

Prague ... On May 6, after conducting reconnaissance in battle, the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Marshal Konev, launched an offensive with the main forces.

On May 7, the 2nd Ukrainian Front of Marshal Malinovsky began to attack, as well as the 4th Ukrainian Front of General of the Army Eremenko. At dawn on May 9,

tankers of the 4th and 3rd tank armies of Generals Lelyushenko and Rybalko started fighting on the streets of Prague. At about

10 o'clock on May 9, a mobile group of the 4th Ukrainian Front entered Prague: the 302nd division in vehicles and the 1st Czechoslovak tank brigade.

At 1 p.m. on May 9, the 6th Guards Tank Army and the infantry of the 24th Guards Corps of the 2nd Ukrainian Front entered Prague, and later the 7th Mechanized Corps from the cavalry-mechanized group of General Issa Pliev.

Air support was provided by the 5th Air Army and part of the forces of the 17th Air Army of the 3rd Ukrainian Front.

In hot pursuit, the commander of the armored and mechanized troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front reported on the actions of his troops in the Prague operation. Here is an excerpt from this extensive and dynamic report:

"4 Guards. that (**guards tank army. - S.K.**) 10 guards. shopping mall (**tank corps. - S.K.**), developing the offensive in the direction of Premsdorf, Olderish, overcoming mountain passes in the Nikolub region, went to the region of Dukhtsov, Ledvitsa and at 3.00 9.5.45 advanced units reached the sowing. - app. outskirts of Prague. At 14.00 09.5.45, the

main forces of the PO (**forward detachments. - S.K.**) of the corps entered Prague and fought to clear the city from individual enemy groups.

6th and 5th Guards. MK (***mechanized corps***. - S. / S.), breaking the resistance of the enemy, fought over the pass. On the night of 9.5.45 guards. mk 16 and 15 guards. MBR (***motorized rifle brigade***. - ***S.K.***) from 22 Sabr (***self-propelled artillery brigade***. - ***S.K.***) in the region of heights 757.0, 689.0, 414.0, southeast. Yanov in the region of heights 265.0, 259.0 continued to develop the offensive in the direction of Yanov, Most, Launy, Prague and at 12.30 9.5.45 entered Prague, occupying the southern and south-western. outskirts. 5 Guards MK successively took possession of Saida, Postoloprty, Most, at 9.00 9.5.45 entered Prague and, together with units of the 10th Guards. tk fought with the enemy ... "

On May 9, 1945, the commander of the 3rd Guards Tank Army, Rybalko, reported to the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Marshal Konev:

"[At] 06.00 09.5.45 [in] the afternoon (***as in the text***. - ***S.K.***) the first to enter the city were 69 motorized rifle brigade, the commander of the guards brigade. Colonel Vaganov, 50th MCP (***motorcycle regiment***. - ***S.K.***), regiment commander of the guards. lieutenant colonel Kalinin, 16 Sabr, commander of the brigade guards. Colonel Popov. On May 9, 1945, by March 17, the city was completely

occupied, contacted the military and civil authorities. Power in the city belongs to the National Rada, Professor Albert Prazhak.

The military staff of the uprising is the commander of the uprising, Captain Georgy Nezhansky. Order has been restored in the city. The operational

group of the army (***headquarters of the army***. - ***S.K.***) - sowing. outskirts of Prague.

P. Rybalko Melnikov Bakhmetiev.

On the same day, the commander of the 4th Guards Tank Army, Lelyushenko, also reported to Marshal Konev:

“At 4.00 9.5.45, the 10th Guards. Tk entered the city of Prague and went out to its northeastern outskirts, eastern and southwestern outskirts.

6 Guards mk - to the southern and southwestern outskirts of Prague. 5 Guards mk - to the western outskirts. Many prisoners and trophies were captured. Those who resisted were destroyed. Communication with the rebels - through Brigadier

General Vedravba. There are no American troops. There are no neighbors. I conduct reconnaissance in the north-eastern part, south direction. I am tidying up. I'm with the task force - on the western outskirts of Prague.

D. Lelyushenko.

After the liquidation of pockets of resistance in the Prague region, the troops of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts continued their offensive in order to connect with the Americans and on May 11, 1945, met with them at the line of Chemnitz, Karlovy Vary, Pilsen. Where a

horse with a hoof, there is a cancer with a claw. On the same days, the 1st division of the ROA under the command of "General" Bunyachenko, a former colonel of the Red Army, was in a hurry to Prague. Its number reached 20 thousand people. At the same time, it would be more correct to call the First Division of the ROA the first and last division of the "Russian" "Liberation" "Army". In any case, the first and last relatively combat-ready.

ROA Vlasov is also largely a myth, since only on September 16, 1944, Vlasov met with Himmler and received the latter's consent to the formation of two divisions. Just! In the middle of September 1944! It is believed

that Vlasov was dissatisfied with the number "two", because he allegedly counted on ten divisions. However, the point was not only that a compact military unit at the army level, consisting, albeit of traitors, but -

Russians, in the situation of the end of 1944 - the beginning of 1945, the Germans

did not need anything. The fact was that Vlasov, even in the best of times, could not have recruited decent personnel for ten divisions, and even at the turn of 1944 and 1945 ... One

way or another, the former commander of the 389th Rifle Division, who went over to the Germans on December 17, 1942 division of the Red Army Bunyachenko managed to form one full-blooded (in terms of numbers) division of the ROA.

In 1942, Bunyachenko was sentenced to death by a tribunal of the Northern Group of Forces of the Transcaucasian Front for creating a threat of encirclement for the 9th Army and the entire group - with a replacement of 10 years in prison and the opportunity to serve his sentence in the Army in the Field. However, he preferred direct betrayal to atonement. The 1st division of the ROA (600th "Panzer Grenadier Division") began to form in Musing in November 1944. Vlasov with the 2nd division (650th according to German numbering) was located 60 kilometers southwest - in Heuberg. After a short, unsuccessful and

chaotic participation in the hostilities against our troops, the 1st division reached Dresden and came under the command of Field Marshal Scherner, commander of the Center Forces Group.

Bunyachenko did not get along with Scherner, and on April 27, 1945, the 1st division moved towards the Czech Republic. But why?

To strengthen Scherner's group? What
a Scherner! To help
Prague? Dismiss!
There

was no question of any altruistic motives, from any point of view. In addition, at the end of April, everything was calm in Prague, and not only an anti-German uprising, but no unrest was expected - they began on the morning of May 1. What could twenty thousand people

do, starting to decompose as a military community and quickly turning into ten thousand? Moreover, against the backdrop of the mighty tank "skating rinks" Rybalko and Lelyushenko, who were ready to throw. Even if not a demoralized division, but a cohort of heroes,
was moving towards Prague, it would

would not have survived and would not have helped the citizens of Prague. But Bunyachenko's "eagles" did not fly high. They would have to get to the troops of General Eisenhower - and then good luck.

Actually, that's why Bunyachenko went to the combat zone, that the path to the places of deployment of units of the 3rd American Army ran through it. The rushing Vlasov also rushed to the Yankees. But even the

Americans, who were beginning to pick up the

German anti-Soviet cadres remaining idle, did not need Vlasov - he was very odious even for the Yankees.

In addition, there were also interstate agreements regarding the extradition of this kind of public. The Czechs, having seen on their territory

a military formation in German uniform, but with Russian speech, at first were delighted. Czech partisan detachments made contact with the Vlasovites. On May 2, 1945, the 1st ROA division stopped 50 kilometers from Prague, and a delegation of Czech

army officers arrived at its location from the capital - an interesting moment - and asked for support. On May 5, 1945, the uprising began, and the rebels turned to

radio calling for help to everyone at once, including the Americans.

On the evening of May 5, Bunyachenko was in the suburbs of Prague, and on May 6, the Vlasovites took part in a clash with SS units, sent to put down the rebellion.

The ROA division entered Prague in the expectation that they would fit there Yankees, and there ...

Well, the main thing was to surrender to the allies or to settle somehow differently with them, and not with the Soviet command. It was this that predetermined the decision of Vlasov, who was at the location of the division, and Bunyachenko to join the rebels. However, by the evening of May 6, in the negotiations between representatives of the

Vlasov KONR (Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia) with representatives of the leadership of the uprising, the latter stated that the Czechs of Vlasov did not ask for help, that the rebels who had previously turned to Vlasov for help were not representatives of either the Czech people, nor the government that two-thirds of the newly formed Czech government are communists, and they advise divisions

KONR surrender to the advancing Rude Armada, that is, the Red Army. That is, if the

Prague Uprising was not initiated by the communists, then the communists were able to quickly seize the initiative from the pro-American Czech leaders and lead the uprising, since it started.

On May 7, the ROA division left Prague to surrender to the Americans. On the way, it turned out that part of the Vlasov command: "Major General" Trukhin, "Major General" Boyarsky, "Major General" Shapovalov and "General" Blagoveshchensky were captured by Czech Red partisans. Boyarsky was shot, Shapovalov was hanged, Trukhin and Blagoveshchensky were handed over to the Red Army. The agony of ROA, KONR and their "tops"

began. On May 12, 1945, Vlasov was captured in the zone of location of the 25th tank corps of Major General Fomin. I could cite the full report of General Fomin to the Military Council of the 1st Ukrainian Front on how this happened, but, frankly, I don't see much point in it. I think this is enough to close the topic.

"help" of the ROA to the citizens of Prague, who are dying under SS bullets.

In addition, there were not very many bullets - the situation was changing so rapidly that the Germans had no time for "cleansing". They themselves were not averse to quickly finding themselves in the position of American troops in the position of prisoners of war.

It would seem that with Vlasov everything has been very clear for a long time. Therefore, I only marginally touched on the topic of Vlasov and believed that it was over with in this book. However, after sending the manuscript to the publisher, I accidentally got acquainted with a simply ridiculous version of Vlasov's story and I cannot but mention this version. By the way, I do not consider it tactless or heartless to use the word "ridiculous" in relation to a fate that someone might consider tragic. Judas is not tragic, they are - at all times, in all epochs and among all peoples - only disgusting.

But here in one of the Moscow weeklies (solely because of some respect for him I do not indicate the exact coordinates) at the end of 2009, a strip material about General Vlasov appears, where his whole story is presented as an allegedly multi-way combination

The NKVD, allegedly sanctioned personally by Stalin, to ensure control over the process of creation by the Germans of military units from Soviet prisoners of war. Like, this process was thwarted by "setting up" the Germans Vlasov as a secret "agent of influence" of the Kremlin.

In order to "introduce" Vlasov, the following was allegedly done ... Allegedly, solely in the calculation of the imminent capture of Vlasov by the Germans, the lieutenant general was allegedly "delivered" (!?) to the headquarters of the 2nd shock army, which was on the verge of encirclement. And allegedly delivered personally by Lavrenty Beria and Kliment Voroshilov. And this, they say, was the first act of the covert operation planned by the Headquarters. It is surprising why the publishers did not entrust the "responsible mission" of "delivering" Vlasov to

German captivity on Comrade Stalin personally? Lie so lie! I had to read a lot of frank pseudo-historical **nonsense** in all our "muddy" years, but I don't remember something that, in an attempt to "build" a sensation, a historical fact was so intrepidly shredded, and then re-sewn with rotten threads, unambiguous to the obvious. Even Bormann, as a "Soviet agent", looks pale against the background of "loyal Stalinist intelligence officer Vlasov". Goebbels believed that in order for a lie to be believed, it must be monstrous. In this case, the lie about Vlasov, as an alleged "hero" and "strategic agent of the NKVD"

behind enemy lines, can only amuse. And I brought this amazing interpretation of the Vlasov story, even in our amazing times, not only to make the reader laugh, but also to show how low the modern level of historical falsifications can be.

Let us return, however, to the allies and to the Prague

Uprising. As already mentioned, after the insistence of the Soviet General Staff on compliance with the agreements reached at the Crimean (Yalta) Conference in February 1945, the 3rd American Army was forced to stop at the Karlovy Vary, Plzen, Ceske Budejovice lines. A simple glance at the

map of the Czech Republic and Central Europe shows that by the time the Prague Uprising began, the Americans were closest to Prague. At that moment we were further away - in the region of Dresden and Brno, more distant from Prague than the same Pilsen.

The Americans, of course, even without Churchill's hints, understood all the strategic benefits of occupying Prague. However, it was not so rude for Washington to violate previously reached agreements without special need - the Russians were still needed against Japan. After all, it was still unclear with the atomic bomb - it was first tested only on July 16 at the Alamogordo test site in the desert state of New Mexico. The Americans limited

themselves to probing - an armored reconnaissance column was sent to the Prague area, and the American captain commanding it even met with the commander of the First Regiment of the First Division of the ROA "Colonel" Arkhipov.

The captain explained that he was not the vanguard of the advancing troops, but only had to assess the situation and was not going to enter Prague. However, there is

reason to believe that the question of the possible occupation of Prague by American troops before the Czech capital is transferred to the approaching Soviet troops, on that day - May 6, was still open to the Yankees. Perhaps this option would have

"passed" if the Prague Uprising had been choked with blood. But since the rebels were doing well, the captain and his scouts went home.

Yes, the Americans did. But then and there "stung". I wanted the same thing that the

Americans and some

people in the Czech Republic wanted. But these desires in

May 1945 were not at all worth taking into account. As a result, only the

Red Army units occupied Prague. But not everything is clear here. Soviet

sources give the initiative to prepare an uprising to the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. Like, on April 29, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia discussed the issue of the uprising and distributed among the members of the Central Committee the responsibilities for leading it, after which a detailed plan of the uprising was developed.

Nevertheless, many questions arise today... If the

Prague uprising, which began on May 5, was prepared by the communists, then why did it come as a complete surprise to Moscow? After all, the tankers of the armies of Rybalko and

Lelyushenko had to urgently break through to Prague without the cover required by the charters - at the maximum possible speed!

And all this haste was the result of a strange, not initiative of the citizens of Prague coordinated with us.

And what if we proceed from the fact that the communists were really preparing an uprising, hoping to set it up by the time our units reached the approaches to Prague, that is, somewhere on May 10-11, and the pro-American forces in the Czech Republic forced the deadlines?

And forced by agreement with Washington. And the Yankees authorized the uprising in the expectation that the Russians in an acute situation would falter and agree to the advance of the 3rd American army to the Vltava and Prague. Even if later I had to return to the former line of demarcation, the Yankees would have had a political profit on a campaign against Prague.

Firstly, the return of Prague would be a concession to Russia - albeit a prearranged one, but a concession. And concessions must be paid for with concessions.

Secondly, by entering Prague first, the Americans could influence the development of the situation in the Czech Republic in a more favorable direction for them, since by that time it had developed in the opposite direction. Finally, an American entry

into Prague would have disrupted the enormous political, propagandistic and agitational effect that the Soviet Union obtained by liberating Prague on its own. After all, Soviet troops were advancing through the liberated city in a sea of people and flowers! We were not met in any European capital as in Prague. Did America need it? I am sure that the Americans took some covert actions in early May

1945 in Czechoslovakia.

Let me remind you: on May 4, Eisenhower - certainly with the sanction of Washington - carried out a sounding of the Soviet position, suggesting that Antonov, the chief of our General Staff, agree with the advance of American troops to the western banks of the Vltava and Prague. Moscow firmly refuses Washington, and **the next day** Prague rises. And already on May 6, the New York Times reports

an uprising in Prague.

The Americans ask us again, and we again refuse. And the situation develops as it develops, gradually naturally "turning to the left" and "blushing". However, there are still a lot of ambiguities. Let's recall some details of the reports of our tank commanders... General Rybalko: "The power in the city belongs to the National Rada, Professor Albert

Prazhak. The military staff of the uprising is the commander of the uprising, Captain Georgy Nezhansky ... "

General Lelyushenko: "Communication with the rebels - through Brigadier General Vedravba." A

strange discrepancy - either the captain leads the uprising, or the general. And Professor Albert Prazhak does not look like an ally of the communist Klement Gottwald. And where are the members of the underground Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia - the leaders of the supposedly communist - according to Soviet sources - uprising? They should have been get in touch with the Soviet communist generals in the first place, they would have been let through to them faster. From a historical

distance, and in the light of everything we know today about that war, it can be assumed that the Yankees provoked a premature uprising in Prague in the same way that the British provoked a premature uprising in Warsaw in the summer of 1944.

And the motives in both cases were similar - the fear of a final seizure of power in Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia by leftist forces, and even - God forbid! - communists.

But 1945 is not 1944. If eight months earlier the Warsaw Uprising was drowned in a sea of blood, then the Prague Uprising was drowned in a sea of flowers and smiles. It is characteristic

that on May 9, 1945, Marshal Konev was forced to give the following combat order to the commander of the 4th Guards Tank Army, Lelyushenko:

"I order to immediately take Benesov (20 km southeast of Prague).
Prevent the Germans from withdrawing
connection with allies.

Stop celebrating in Prague. 06
performance to convey.

Konev

Krainyukov.

In its originality and meaning, this is, in a way, the most remarkable document of 1945. And in it, in the happiest way, the last military concerns of Konev's soldiers and their already peaceful fun were mixed up. In Warsaw, in the

summer of 1944, it could not be so, but the fault of the Russians in there was no volume - the Poles fell victim to their own provocation.

Now times have changed dramatically, and this determined the completely different fates of the two uprisings in the two Slavic capitals.

Where were the liberated sent?

prisoners of war

In recent years, in many honest books, the topic of prisoners of war, allegedly sent "to Siberia" without exception, has been considered and, it would seem, closed. However, the "democratic" "dodder" has so densely entangled many "Russian" brains that something on this subject can be said here. Moreover, I will give below a number of extracts from such documents, which are unlikely to be widely familiar to the reader.

Already in 1941, as in the subsequent years of the war, a filtration point or NKVD test camp became a common intermediate point for the encircled and former Soviet prisoners of war. Is it necessary to prove for a long time that

the testing of prisoners of war and their filtration in wartime were necessary from all points of view? For example, readers who are familiar with the excellent, in fact documentary, book of the Hero of the Soviet Union, Chekist Colonel Dmitry Medvedev, commander of the Pobediteli special squad, should remember how many problems the German agent, the traitor Naumov-Naumenko, who was sent to the detachment along with the group, brought to Medvedev's partisans prisoners of war and not exposed in time. This is a literary example, so to speak. Here is an example

from the archives. On June 9, 1944, the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Stalin was forced to issue order No. 0023 regarding an emergency in the echelon with marching replenishment at the Krasnoarmeyskaya station.

A group of Red Army soldiers from the 6th Reserve Rifle Division picked up an unexploded mine and began to smash boards with it to make a fire. The mine exploded, 4 people were killed, 9 injured. Further on the text of the order:

“... The criminal elements that were part of the echelon, taking advantage of this incident, involved the unstable Red Army soldiers in violating military discipline, disarming and beating the officers.

The investigation established: 1.

The command of the 6th reserve rifle division reacted negligently to the formation of the echelon with marching reinforcements, appointing to the marching reinforcements a significant number of unverified people with a criminal record, who lived in the occupied territory and were captured and surrounded (emphasis mine. - **С.ў.**)... (...)... During the stop at the Krasnoarmeiskaya station, where the train stood for three days, despite the

fact that a large number of speculators had accumulated at the station, no measures were taken to restore order. As a result of this, the Red Army soldiers arbitrarily left the echelon for the city, sold uniforms and, communicating with speculators, allowed drunkenness ...
"

This is what those who, it would seem, should have been burning with the desire to atone for the stigma of captivity, but ... But - did not burn, having completely other desires.

And this is not at the front, but in the deep rear.

No, checks and filtering were needed. And the attitude towards those being tested was quite reasonable - after all, the bulk of them were in the future the same front-line soldiers as all the others who were already at war.

A typical example ... On February 12, 1943, the head of the logistics of the North Caucasian Front, Major General Yermilov, issued directive No. 050 on the organization of a collection and transit point (SPI) of the front for former prisoners of war of the Red Army. Noting that "the

sanitation of former Red Army servicemen who were in captivity and left the encirclement arriving at the point was not organized" and that this "indicates insufficient attention on the part of the supply departments and Directorates of the SCF," General Yermilov ordered the quartermaster of the front to find a room for SPP, to allocate kitchen utensils and so on, and to the head of the Sanitary Department - to immediately organize sanitization through the train-bath.

Sick and malnourished, requiring hospitalization, "immediately withdraw, referring to the appropriate hospitals for cure."

This is how former Soviet prisoners of war were accepted into the Red Army even in 1943 - in times that were still difficult and harsh. As our successes grow, the situation with the checks of former prisoners of war is only softened.

And in general, the repressive severity softened. So, on October 29, 1944, Stalin, by order of NPO No. 0349, disbanded the barrage detachments "in connection with a change in the general situation on the fronts." The personnel of the disbanded detachments were sent to replenish rifle divisions.

I note that the Germans during this period, on the contrary, increasingly resorted to the formation of barrage detachments. As you can see, we have rigidity decreased.

Here is another typical example ... On December 9, 1944, the commander of the 43rd Army, Lieutenant General Hero of the Soviet Union Beloborodov, issued order No. 0326 on organizing assistance to the representative of the Commissioner of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR for repatriation at the Military Council of the 1st Baltic Front.

The order spoke about catering, sanitary and medical care, and so on, but paragraph 5 of the order is interesting for our topic: "To the head of the army collection and

transit point No. 9, all Soviet citizens arriving at the point should be sent: suspicions - in 186 AZSP (**army reserve rifle regiment**. -

S. / S.), and suspicious ones - in the special camps of the NKVD ... "

That is, by the end of the war, most of the former prisoners of war did not go through filtration and verification at all. At the same time, the minority that ended up in the filtration camps of the NKVD did not stay there for long. The main part after the check was also sent to replenish the front-line units.

I will give one more document - extracts from the Directive of the chief of logistics of the Red Army on the procedure for organizing the reception, material support and transportation of former prisoners of war and Soviet citizens No. 1 240 646 dated January 18, 1945:

"In pursuance of the resolution of the GOKO No. 6884s of November 4, 1944 and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 30-12s of January 6, 1945, the following procedure is established in organizing the reception, material support and transportation of former prisoners of war and Soviet citizens:

Citizens of the USSR released by the Soviet troops send: a) Red

Army servicemen (rank and file and non-commissioned officers) who are in enemy captivity - to the army assembly and transit points of the active fronts. After checking in accordance with the established procedure, persons who do not cause suspicion should be transferred to army and front-line spare parts; those who served in the German army and in special combatant German formations, "Vlasovites", policemen and other suspicious persons, should be immediately sent to the special camps of the NKVD; officers who were in captivity should be sent to special camps of the NKVD; b) citizens from among non-military personnel - to front-line collection and transit points or border filtration points of the

NKVD of the USSR, from where, after checking the military draft ages that do not cause suspicion and are found fit for military service of the Red Army, transfer to front-line spare parts and spare parts of military districts.

Those liable for military service who are not fit for military service, as well as persons of non-conscription ages and women, after an appropriate check, are sent, as a rule, to places
permanent residence..."

etc.

This is a quality picture. As for the quantitative picture, the data of the historian-archivist V. Zemskov on the number of repressed, repatriated, and including

including prisoners of war.

I do not consider all the data reported by V. Zemskov to be satisfactorily correct. His attempts to "stand above the fray"

sympathizing rather with the "whites", they themselves allow us to assume in it not objectivity, but tendentiousness. However, if his data refute some anti-Soviet fabrications, then there can be no doubt that the data are accurate. Therefore, below I will give the figures of V. Zemskov and I apologize in advance to those readers who are familiar with this report and which, perhaps, is already stuck in their teeth.

So, as of October 1, 1944 (in 1945, there could not have been any qualitative - structural and percentage - changes here), 354,592 former Soviet prisoners of war and encirclement passed through the special camps of the NKVD.

1. Of this number, checked and transferred to the Red Army - 249 416 people,

including:

- to military units through military registration and enlistment offices - 231,034 (of which officers - 27,042);

- for the formation of assault battalions - 18,382;

2. Transferred to the industry by regulations

State Defense Committee - 30,749;

3. Transferred to the formation of escort troops and guards special camps (! - S.K.) - 5924;

4. Arrested by SMERSH bodies - 11,556 people, of which: - enemy intelligence and counterintelligence agents - 2083;

5. Departed for various reasons for all the time (in hospitals, hospitals, died) - 5347;

6. They are in special camps of the NKVD of the USSR: - in check - 51,601 (including officers - 5657) people.

As you can see, the vast majority of those tested in special camps of the NKVD simply returned to the front, and someone even ended up in the escort

troops of the NKVD. That is, the special camps of the NKVD, through which the former prisoners and encircled were passed, were not repressive structures, but check-filtration. It was impossible to do without them in wartime, and smart people, having got into such camps, understood this and were not offended by the check, although such checks did not bring joy to honest soldiers and officers already because many would prefer not to wipe their pants on the bunk beds of the special camp and wait for the end of the check, and quickly be at the front in a combat unit.

However, official checks were by no means always an obligatory part of the life of those who returned and were released from captivity or left the encirclement. Many simply received weapons and fought again. Yes, there were those who ended up in

Siberia ... But who! With a few unfair

exceptions - during periods of social cataclysms, alas, inevitable - those who were destined to go there ended up in Siberia: obvious traitors, policemen, members of the German army from among former Soviet citizens, "Vlasovites" and others like them. Actually, already during the war, and even more so after its end, tens, if not hundreds of thousands of those

who, according to the laws of wartime or simply according to Soviet laws, deserved the death penalty were forgiven to one degree or another. Most often they shot the "top" - former White Guard generals such as Shkuro or Krasnov, who stained themselves with

cooperation with the Germans, as well as the "generals" of the former Lieutenant General Vlasov. However, to be precise, if traitors were executed, they were not shot, but hanged. As a rule, everything was limited to terms of imprisonment or several years

in a special settlement.

That is why during the operation of the NKVD for **resettlement** (and not for airborne / resettlement or, moreover, **deportation**) from Crimea, Tatar women cried not only from grief, but also from happiness, realizing that their men were only being resettled with them, and they are not led to execution, which they fully deserved **according to the law** - for the total desertion in 1941, for serving in the protection of prisoner of war camps, for torturing and killing Soviet people. Finally, at the end of this topic,

I will report on three specific fates from the "highest", so to speak, "echelon" of Soviet

prisoners of war.

Commander-6 Ivan Nikolaevich Muzychenko began the war courageously, but during the Kyiv defensive operation in August 1941 in the Uman region he was taken prisoner by the wounded. At first he was kept in a Rovno prison, then in camps in Novograd Hammelsburg, Mosburg. Volynsky,
Gogelstein,

Released from captivity by the Americans, on April 29, 1945, he was sent to Paris, to the Soviet Commission for Repatriation.

The military fate of Major General Potapov, the former commander of the 5th Army of the Kyiv Special Military District, and Lieutenant General M.F. Lukin, commander of the 19th Army of the Western Front, who was seriously wounded and taken prisoner on October 14, 1941, west of Vyazma. The war for all three

generals was described by the same short formula: "Front, captivity, Paris, Lubyanka", because all three underwent a special check at the NKVD of the USSR in Moscow from May to December 1945. And all three December 31,

1945 were returned to active service in the Red Army.

The former Lieutenant General of the Red Army Vlasov at the same Lubyanka at that time testified, completing the inglorious fate of a traitor and traitor to the Motherland.

About the "drunk" to death Secretary of the Central Committee Alexander Shcherbakov

May 9, 1945 became Victory Day. May 10, 1945 Alexander Sergeevich Shcherbakov died suddenly.

Very hardworking, modest, born in 1901, he was born in a working class family in Ruza near Moscow, he began working early - in Rybinsk as an apprentice in a printing house. In 1917 he joined the Red Guard, participated in the suppression of kulak revolts in the Yaroslavl region, since 1918 - a member of the RCP (b). In the same 1918, he began working in Komsomol and party bodies. So -

personnel "apparatchik"? Yes. But the

apparatchik is sensible and dynamic. Here is the geography of his then "transfers" in the 30s: Moscow, Turkestan, Gorky, Balakhna, Murom, Leningrad, Irkutsk, Stalino (Donetsk). And here is how he

grew up: -

1936-1937 - Second Secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee VKP(b) (under First Secretary Zhdanov); - 1937-1938 - First Secretary of the East Siberian

(Irkutsk) Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks;

- in 1938 - the first secretary of the Donetsk (Stalin)

Regional Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine.

Such a "geography" of his biography proves that he was constantly in demand, and the peak was the appointment of Shcherbakov in 1938 as the first secretary of the Moscow city and regional committees of the CPSU (b). Since 1941, he

became in parallel the secretary of the Central Committee for ideology and a candidate member of the Politburo. Since 1942 - head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, since September 1943 - Colonel General. The fact that he

was the brother of Zhdanov's wife is unlikely to have affected his career - Shcherbakov had long been in Stalin's field of vision. He worked in the apparatus of the Central Committee from 1932, in 1934 he became the first secretary of the

Soviet writers. And in the career growth of Shcherbakov, everything depended on Shcherbakov himself. Since 1939,

Shcherbakov has been a member of the Central Committee and a member of the Orgburo of the Central Committee, since May 4, 1941, in parallel, the secretary of the Central Committee, and since July 21, 1941, a

candidate member of the Politburo. From June 1942 to 1945, as already mentioned, he was the head of the Glavpur of the Red Army, in 1942-1943 he was deputy people's commissar of defense of the USSR Stalin, in 1941-1945 he was the head of the Soviet Information Bureau, in 1943-1945 he was the head of the international information department of the Central Committee.

All this - by the age of forty-four. However,

Shcherbakov also had "vices" about which the Jewish "publicist" Arno Lustiger wrote, for example, the following:

"Stalin's favorite and purest water anti-Semite, not knowing abroad and taking positions of Great Russian chauvinism..." etc.

Of course! As early as January 5, 1926, in the Nizhny Novgorod Commune newspaper edited by him, Shcherbakov published an article on Yesenin's death, imbued with sympathy for the poet. You can't say anything - the sin against the admirers of the poet Bialik was really

considerable.

Shcherbakov was, of course, not an anti-Semite, not a Judeophobe - a developed person cannot be one, by definition, just as he cannot be an Anglophobe, a Japanophobe, or any other "...phobe." However, the exaggeratedly disproportionate percentage of Jews in all the most important spheres of activity of Soviet society, and above all in the sphere of culture, education and science, Shcherbakov could not help but worry. After all, the situation was really abnormal, if not explained by a misanthropic racist theory about the Jews as representatives of the highest race of "black-

haired beasts", supermen! In addition, Shcherbakov had quite strong foundations in life, and at the same time, in the victorious year for Russia in 1945, he was only 44 years old and had good prospects for further growth. According to the official version, he died due to the fact that on May 8 and 9,

1945, he twice made long and tiring trips from the Barvikha government sanatorium near Moscow to Moscow, where he admired the illuminations and celebrated Victory Day.

But he did them with the consent of the deputy director of the sanatorium for the medical part R.I. Ryzhikov and doctor G.A. Kadzharduzova, who was convinced by them that such a trip would not harm his recovery! Arrested

in February 1952, Ryzhikov confessed at the Lubyanka to deliberately shortening Shcherbakov's life. Today they

write that Ryzhikov was intimidated by the arrest of his wife and children, but only a cretin will confess to the gravest crime he has not committed, taking care of the well-being of his relatives, who automatically fall into the category of "members of the families of traitors to the Motherland" as a result of the self-incrimination of the husband and father.

Moreover, to "confess" not after the arrest of relatives - which would somehow explain self-incrimination - but only under the alleged threat of such a

measure. Shcherbakov died on

May 10, 1945. But

what did he die of? With the difficult hand of Khrushchev, now sometimes they say that from drunkenness. Is this true or is it another - no longer military, but post-war - myth of 1945?

Khrushchev, in his "memoirs," reports that Shcherbakov himself "drowned strong drinks and dragged others into drunkenness to please Stalin." Khrushchev called his character "poisonous, serpentine."

But this is a lie.

However, when and where did Khrushchev tell the truth after he removed Stalin and Beria, and he no longer needed to pretend to be a worthy and faithful disciple of Comrade Stalin?

Khrushchev

stated: "Beria ... correctly said that Shcherbakov died because he drank terribly much. Got drunk and died. Stalin, however, said something else: that he was a fool - he began to recover, and then did not listen to the doctors' warnings and died at night, when he allowed himself excesses with his wife ...".

Four people are discredited here at once: Stalin, Beria, Shcherbakov and Shcherbakov's wife, who allegedly lustfully could not resist not accepting her husband who was just getting on his feet. But

what else can you expect from Khrushchev!

After all, it was Shcherbakov who replaced Khrushchev as first secretary in Moscow, and Khrushchev was vindictive and never forgot those who, in his opinion, crossed his path.

However, Shcherbakov was by no means a drunkard. First, it's just a fact.

Secondly, alcoholism was absolutely incompatible with the volume duties and daily business workload of Shcherbakov.

Thirdly, Shcherbakov could not have been a drunkard just because in that case he would never have risen in positions as quickly and successfully as he did. Stalin did not tolerate drunkards and did not have them in his inner circle. This is confirmed by the fact that all of Stalin's closest associates - Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Mikoyan - lived to a ripe old age. Alcoholics do not heal for so long in this world. Even Khrushchev, who loved to drink, did not suffer from the vice of alcoholism.

No, Alexander Sergeevich Shcherbakov died not drunk and not from sexual excesses, but because he interfered with many in the capital's "tops" at once and stood in the way of realizing the desires of the Moscow "partoplasm" and other "elites" to ensure a personal comfortable existence. After the great Victory,

seductive prospects opened up for this "partoplasm". Now there was no longer any need to be afraid that you would be sent to the front as a brigade commissar or, even worse, behind enemy lines, where power belongs not to the district committees, but to the Ortskomendatura.

Now, after the Victory, only live! Live
nomenklatura. And
then - Shcherbakov with his principles and, damn it, more
and with youth.

G.M. came to the Moscow Conservatory after Shcherbakov. Popov, who was removed in December 1949 for clamping down on criticism, lack of self-criticism and an incorrect attitude towards personnel (Popov's case began in October 1949 with an anonymous letter to Stalin "communist engineers from the Stalin Maretsky plant, Sokolova and Klimenko").

As for the alleged "anti-Semitism" of Shcherbakov, here is additional information. On January 7,

1947, the head of the agitation and propaganda department, Georgy Fedorovich Aleksandrov, and the head. Department of Foreign Policy

Mikhail Andreevich Suslov sent a note to Molotov and Secretary of the Central Committee Kuznetsov with a proposal to stop the activities of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, where, in particular, it was says:

"The Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee in the USSR began its activities in April 1942 with the permission of A.S. Shcherbakov. There was no official decision of the party and Soviet bodies on the creation of the Committee and its functions..." And here is the story of the theater critic "cosmopolitan" Boris Dayrejiev

(1902-1955). In 1950, in a letter addressed to Suslov, he

wrote:

"Dear comrade! I was hounded. I endured a year. He did not address the secretaries of the Central Committee. But I can no longer remain silent. No forces. When, after the liquidation of the RAPP, Comrade came to the V. AC Shcherbakov, he hired me as an assistant for national affairs. And he defended me in every possible way from the persecution of the former Rappovites. These two years are the only bright glimpse in my literary life. I worked hard and printed ... "

We can also recall the decision of the "xenophobe" Shcherbakov in 1944 on the note of the Agitprop of the Central Committee on the possibility of publishing the magazine "Amerika" in the USA for the USSR and distributing it in the USSR. It was Shcherbakov who gave the green light to this project. And only on July 29, 1952, by a resolution of the Central Committee, the distribution of the magazine in the USSR was stopped due to the increasingly anti-Soviet position of the United States.

The style of the young head of the Department of Cultural and Educational Work of the Central Committee Shcherbakov can also be judged from his memorandums, for example, a note to Stalin, Andreev and Secretary of the Central Committee Yezhov on the results of the work of the Main Directorate of the Film and Photo Industry in 1935 and the plan for 1936.

This document is distinguished by a good literary style, clever analysis and principles.

In 1944, on January 31, Stalin sharply criticized the director Dovzhenko for his film story "Ukraine on Fire" - by the way, quite rightly from both political and artistic points of view. Shcherbakov was also there. He later sent Stalin a note of his

report, which he himself corrected, making inserts from himself - which in itself speaks of the level of Stalin's confidence in Shcherbakov.

Shcherbakov's death against the backdrop of a huge, unstoppable, all-encompassing rejoicing on the occasion of the Victory passed almost unnoticed. Who could mourn at that moment when everything was singing in the soul of all living people - especially in

Moscow? But speaking of the evil myths of 1945, it is appropriate to place the correct point and over this mournful event of the second post-war day.

After all, May 2010 marks not only the 65th anniversary of the Victory, but also the 65th anniversary of the death of one of the faithful sons of the Motherland, who spared no effort and health to achieve this Victory.

About Marshal Beria, who "undeservedly" received the marshal's baton

When the First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria was arrested, he had the military rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union. This

title was awarded to him on July 9, 1945 by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and on this occasion today you can hear sarcastically: "Marshal, who did not win a single battle and did not see the front

at all." So did Lavrenty Pavlovich deserve the highest military rank or not? After all, for example, aircraft designers Tupolev, Yakovlev, Ilyushin were not at the front for a single day, but wore generals' shoulder straps. And Beria's contribution to the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 was enormous, truly marshal's. And he risked his head (in war as in war) no less than any of the front marshals. If we stick to dry facts, then

Lavrenty Pavlovich received the rank of Marshal simply because the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of July 6, 1945 abolished the special ranks for the commanding staff of the NKVD - NKGB, introduced on October 7, 1937, with bringing them to combined arms.

The highest special rank of the General Commissar of Security of the USSR was once equated with the highest military rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union. And Beria was the General Commissar of Security. Someone about the "Lubyansk" marshal" was ironic, but even Stalin did not fight at the front, and he deserved the title of Generalissimo without a doubt. However, today we are quite right to ask

ourselves the question: "And if Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria were not so needed in organizing the entire state life in the rear, could he quickly become a major military leader and commander?" My answer is yes! Everything that we know about

Beria's

approaches to the tasks assigned to him by Stalin and the Power convinces of the legitimacy of such

response.

I think that Beria would be a better commander than, for example, Marshal Meretskov, who bears a lot of blame for our first failures in the "Finnish" war, and for the mediocre pre-war activities of the General Staff, and for the failures of 1942 - including the ill-fated 2nd shock army of General Vlasov on the Volkhov front. I think Lavrenty Pavlovich would have commanded troops no worse than Marshal Tolbukhin. Fyodor Ivanovich Tolbukhin, who died in 1949 at the age of

fifty-five, deservedly received his marshal's star. As a front commander, he conducted the Crimean and Iasi-Kishinev operations, liberated Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, fought in Romania, Hungary and Austria. However, he did not have a particularly strong grip - especially Beria's managerial grip. And Beria was, as they say, a "fast grab"! So, perhaps, he would have been competent as a commander. Here is an example: the defense of the Caucasus! Beria conducted this defensive operation as a commander of a new type - fighting not only at the front, but also in the rear. However, the purely military then strategic decisions of Beria

seriously contributed to the fact that the German offensive in the Caucasus bogged down. So the star of the General Commissar of State

Security of the USSR, Beria could have been exchanged for a marshal's star already in 1942 - after the Caucasus! I mean it quite seriously. Yes, marshal is the highest **military** rank, which is awarded to major military leaders, generals. Usually the rank of marshal is awarded to those who successfully led some kind of strategic operation in the war. But the defense of the Caucasus in 1942, of course, refers to such operations, which is also confirmed by the establishment of a separate medal "For the Defense of the Caucasus." So, it is enough to understand the degree of Beria's participation in the defense of the Caucasus in order to agree that he

played in this strategic operation not

only an outstanding role, but also essentially a military leader.

During the acute period of the struggle for the North Caucasus and Transcaucasia, Beria was sent there by Stalin as a member of the State Defense Committee, and in fact - as a representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, that is, a leader with the military

powers! And it is no coincidence that in the battle for the Caucasus, large formations were led by a number of Beria's old associates: NKVD combat general Maslennikov, commander of the Northern Group of the Transcaucasian Front, border generals Piyashev, Khomenko.

The situation in the Caucasus by August 1942 was critical - Hitler's troops successfully carried out the Blau plan to seize the oil of the Caucasus. However, Beria, once on the direct front, played one of the key roles in the Caucasian epic and thwarted this plan. Let's remember

something... Already in Khrushchev's times, the operational situation on the North Caucasian and Transcaucasian fronts was described in the "History of the Great Patriotic War" as follows:

“The command of the German Army Group A believed that the Soviet troops in operations in the North Caucasus had lost their combat effectiveness and could no longer offer significant resistance. Therefore, from mid-August, the enemy began to regroup troops in order to simultaneously develop an offensive against Baku and Batumi ... ”

Nevertheless, the victorious march of the German 1st Tank Army, 17th Army, and 491st Mountain Rifle Corps was soon interrupted by the energetic actions of those very Soviet troops who allegedly lost their combat effectiveness.

And the main reason was, of course, the arrival of Beria in the Caucasus. He was tough, but not cruel - even such an outstanding falsifier of history as Volkogonov could not name a single name of the general shot after Beria's arrival, limiting himself to the remark: "...Tyulenev, Sergatskov got it," that is, the commander of the Transcaucasian Front and the commander of 46- and the army. Tyulenev later wrote (without mentioning Beria's name, of course):

“Some of us considered the main task of the troops to be the defense of the Black Sea coast, where the main forces of the 46th Army were deployed.

Only the intervention of the Headquarters corrected our mistake. On instructions from Moscow, we developed a new plan for the defense of the passes

The main Caucasian ridge: it was divided into areas, headed by experienced commanders and staffs.

Behind all this, as well as behind Stalin's decision on September 1, 1942, to unite the North Caucasian and Transcaucasian fronts into one Transcaucasian front, the hand of Beria

is visible. But the decisions were made by the commanders! On September 9, 1942 martial law was declared in the republics of Transcaucasia. And under the leadership of Beria, the output of military products was quickly increased at the expense of local reserves. The troops stationed in Transcaucasia now received from the industrial centers of the country only the most important types of military equipment - aircraft, tanks, guns. Mortars, machine guns, grenades, cartridges, various equipment and uniforms

were produced on the spot. Didn't Beria deserve a marshal's rank for all this? He received it according to, so to speak, formal affiliation, by changing the "table of ranks." But he deserved the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union in the victorious 1945 in

essence! And already in the same year, Marshal Beria became the chief curator of the Uranium problem. A new era was coming - the Atomic one, in which large-scale real wars were to be excluded. And taking this into account, Beria all the more deserved the title of marshal of new, previously unseen wars - virtual ones.

They were not really carried out, but even more so they required special military leadership talent, quite characteristic of Marshal Beria.

How "tyrant" Stalin "destroyed" the Polish state

First, a few figures and facts. In 1919, a state appeared on the world map, for a long time on it that existed, but then disappeared from it for a long time - Poland.

This state was formed after the First World War from three parts that were previously part of: Russia (262.2 thousand km²), Austria-Hungary (79.2 thousand km²) and Germany (47.2 thousand km²). At the same time, the Soviet-Polish war of 1920 affected the configuration of the eastern border of the "remake" Poland.

Due to the "great" "military talents" of Trotsky, Tukhachevsky and other military Trotskyists, this war became unsuccessful for the RSFSR. As a result, according to the Riga Treaty of 1921 between the RSFSR and Poland, Western Ukraine and Western Belarus were cut off from Russia - what today "Russian", Polish and other "democrats" call "Eastern regions of Poland". Although even the Entente considered these lands to be Russia, introducing the concept of the "Curzon Line".

This was the conditional name of the line recommended on December 8, 1919 by the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers as the eastern border of Poland. When developing recommendations, the allies proceeded from the fact that only ethnographically Polish regions should be included in the new Poland being recreated at

Versailles. The reason for such a reasonable decision was found not in the love of the Entente for the Russians, and even more so for the Soviet Russians, but in the fact that on the territory of Russia there were still organized **anti-Soviet** Russians in the form of the troops of Kolchak and Denikin. In order not to tease them, the allies were forced to approach the problem of state

demarcation "in good conscience." In the spring of 1920, the Soviet-Polish war began (in fact, rather continued), by the summer of 1920 it was successful for us. At a time when the Red Army was still advancing deep into Poland - on July 12, 1920, British Foreign Minister Curzon sent a note to the government of the RSFSR with a proposal to conclude with

Poland, a truce and withdraw troops to an ethnically based line, later called the "Curzon Line". The note said: "This

line approximately

goes like this: Grodno - Yalovka - Nemirov - Brest-Litovsk - Dorogusk - Ustilug - east of Grubeshuv through Krylov, further west of Rava-Russkaya, east of Przemysl to the Carpathians." Those who wish can trace this line on

the map, but I'll say right away that the "Curzon Line" after the Second World War became an approximate border between the USSR and Poland.

And in 1920, Tukhachevsky went too far, and the very idea of "Sovietizing" Poland was unrealistic. In addition, the Entente began to urgently save the Poles. A "miracle on the Vistula" happened and the "Curzon Line" was somehow "forgotten". According to the Treaty of Riga, Brest, Vladimir-Volynsky, Lutsk, Rovno, Grodno, Pinsk,

Molodechno, Baranovichi ended up in Poland ... As a result, in 1923 the

territory of Poland was 388.6 thousand km². In

1938, it was the same 388.6 thousand km². km² And in the autumn of 1939, Poland ceased to exist again - twenty years of "independent" state existence were enough for the Polish state, which smart people compared to a gunpowder factory full of crazy people, completely rotted and fell apart under the first blows of Germany.

The Soviet Union, in fact, bloodlessly - under an agreement with Germany - returned its original Western Ukrainian and Western Belarusian lands to its

composition. Before the reunification of 1939 and the annexation of Transcarpathian Ukraine in 1945, the area of the Ukrainian SSR was 445.3

thousand km². After 1945, it increased to 577 thousand km², of which about 20 thousand km² fell to the share of Transcarpathia. (In brackets, I note that by 1991 the territory of the Ukrainian SSR was 603.4 thousand km², primarily due to the transfer of Crimea from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR in 1954.)

That is, the increase in the territory of the Ukrainian SSR at the expense of Western Ukrainian lands amounted to

approximately 112 thousand km². The total area of the returned Western Belarusian regions was approximately 90 thousand km².

Having carried out simple calculations, we establish that the area of purely Polish regions of Poland in the 30s of the XX century could be estimated at about 186 thousand km².

And in 1947, the area of Poland that reappeared on the world map equaled approximately 312 thousand square kilometers.

Due to what did Poland, which "brilliantly" proved in 1939 its inability to protect sovereignty, increase the territory of the state by a good third or even more after the Second World War? In order to explain this increment of national territory,

unprecedented in the history of the world, I will have to add a number of lengthy quotations to the facts and figures. So to speak - selected passages from correspondence, if not with friends, then, in any case, with

allies.

Before doing so, however, the reader should be reminded of the main "Polish" events of 1944, which determined the events of 1945.

On the night of December 31, 1943, to January 1, 1944, the Craiova Rada Narodowa (KRN) was formed, led by the communists (they were called "Pe-erites" by the PIR abbreviation, meaning "Polish Workers' Party" in Polish). On July 21, 1944, the Craiova Rada

Narodowa formed a temporary body of central executive power - the Polish Committee of National Liberation, and on July 26, 1944, an agreement was concluded between the Soviet government and the PKNO.

On August 1, 1944, the Warsaw Uprising began, provocatively initiated from London, Moscow, for objective reasons, was not supported and the Germans brutally depressed.

And on December 31, 1944, in Lublin, the Craiova Rada Narodowa transformed the PKNO into the Provisional Government of the Polish Republic. From the

moment the Lublin government was formed, the "Polish" question acquired for Stalin, on the one hand, Roosevelt, and especially

Churchill, on the other hand, a special and mutual acuity.

In some Western illustrated biography of Churchill, one can read that de Stalin's refusal to come to the aid of Warsaw infuriated Churchill. I willingly believe, because it

completely frustrated the plans of Churchill and his masters - the masters, because Churchill was, although trusted, but still only a servant of the Golden Elite of the world. The plans were simple: as

before, to keep Poland on the anti-Soviet (read - on the anti-Russian) "leash".

Further, in the same biography, it was said that the uprising in Warsaw began when the Red Army was supposedly at a distance of a cannon shot from the Polish capital. At the same time, it is silent that the Vistula was between our troops and Warsaw, not to mention the fatigue of the Soviet troops. However, the reader is

already familiar with the history of the Warsaw Uprising. I recalled all this here because later in Churchill's biography it is reported that Stalin allegedly allowed the destruction of the rebels in cold blood in order to then "impose" on the Poles "Lublinsky Committee".

Not the Lublin government, but precisely the "committee", because the British recognized only the London Polish "government". Still would! It was in London, after all. The destruction of the

rebels **by the Germans** was due not to the cunning of Stalin, but to the cold-blooded vile "Polish" policy of Churchill. He wanted to impose his London freak show on the Poles, but Churchill and Co. broke their teeth about Stalin's tough position. Interesting evidence is found in the book of the English politician and publicist Alan Campbell-

Johnson "Sir Anthony Eden", published in 1955. Campbell-Johnson writes that on March 15, 1943, at a dinner attended by Eden and Roosevelt, Eden informed the American

President that General Sikorsky and his London government were "persisting in their claims" because they were convinced that Russia and Germany would be exhausted by the war and Poland may turn out to be the most powerful state in Eastern and Central Europe.

As you can see, the conceit of the London emigrant "company" was boundless, and political blindness was complete. And the Anglo-Saxons offered us to deal with this "company" in the future! Isn't it too

much? By the way, Eden,

who had already personally communicated with Stalin, then, on March 15, 1943, told Roosevelt, who had not yet personally communicated with Stalin, that Stalin wanted to see Poland as a strong and independent state, but which would be headed by "suitable people".

That's right! This is exactly what Stalin wanted. But Stalin meant, of course, not puppets, but above all that Russophobes should no longer be at the head of Poland, as it was before. However, one must not lose sight of the fact that for Poland (not only for it, of course, but for it especially), the concepts of "Russophobe" and "anti-Soviet" have long become identical.

Therefore, Poland, which guarantees the security of Russia with its policy, could only be pro-Soviet. Only such a Poland would be loyal to Russia. And in real time, the only option for the Polish government, "suitable" from the standpoint of ensuring Russia's security, was the Lublin government, that is, the Provisional Government of the Polish Republic, which, after the liberation of the Polish capital by the Red Army, moved from Lublin to Warsaw in January 1945.

Stalin could not and would not allow any other government in Poland. After all, Stalin was not a "Russian" "president", but a Russian leader! But for Poland, loyal to

Russia, Stalin was ready to do much.

And did.

But Churchill and Roosevelt ...

Already in Tehran, when the "Big Three" met for the first time, Roosevelt on December 1, 1943 began the afternoon Round Table by proposing to discuss questions about Poland and Germany.

We will have a separate conversation about Germany, and as for Poland, Roosevelt expressed the hope that "the Soviet government will be able ... to restore its relations with the Polish government."

Stalin replied: "The agents of the Polish government who are in Poland are connected with the Germans. They kill partisans..."

Here Churchill joined in the attempt to "work" Stalin and began, in his characteristic manner, to expand on the topic of the special importance for England of the Polish question, since, they say, "we entered the war ... because we gave a guarantee to Poland."

All this was false chatter, and the truth was that in 1943 Churchill was quite ready to "satisfy" Poland Sikorsky (by then, however, the deceased - he seems to have been removed for insufficient Russophobia) and Mikolajczyk at the expense of Germany.

Stalin did not like this version of Poland for the objective reasons mentioned above. In addition, Mikolajczyk joined Goebbels' "Katyn" slander against Russia.

Going back a little, to the time before Tehran, one can find a record of an interesting squabble between Molotov and Eden that took place on October 29, 1943 at the eleventh meeting of the Moscow Conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, the USA and England.

Eden then tried to prove to Molotov that Mikolajczyk, who had succeeded Sikorsky, who died in the catastrophe, wanted good relations with the USSR. Further down the

transcript:

Molotov. We have been hearing for a long time that they (*the London Poles. - S.K.*) want good relations, but "things are still there." Eden. Is there any money to help move the cart? **Molotov.** Maybe you brought such a tool? **Eden.** I conscientiously conveyed what I had to report."

Alas, there was nothing special to report - Mikolajczyk and his government always remained hostile to Russia, although at times they tried to hide it. Therefore, in Tehran, Stalin was more concerned about the eastern borders of Poland, that is, the preservation of the western Ukrainian and western Belarusian lands for the USSR, and not the advancement of the western border of Poland to the west.

Churchill, on the other hand, declared in Tehran that "the center of the Polish state and people should be located between the so-called Curzon line and the line of the Oder River, with the inclusion of East Prussia and the province of Opeln in Poland."

I note that it was "something", but less than what the Poles actually received in the end.

Stalin replied that the Russians did not have ice-free ports on the Baltic Sea and that Koenigsberg and Memel should go to Russia, especially since historically these were primordial Slavic lands.

"If the British agree to the transfer of the indicated territory to us, then we will agree with the formula proposed by Churchill.

Churchill immediately responded: "This is a very interesting proposal, which I will definitely study." A year and a half

has passed since then. And by the beginning of the winter of 1945, there was no particular need for Churchill to "study" Stalin's proposal. It was clear that the whole of East Prussia was about to be occupied by the Russians, so that only the Russians have the right to decide everything here.

But by that time, the general situation - only vaguely seen in 1943 in Tehran through the smoke of Churchill's and Roosevelt's cigars and Stalin's pipe - had become very clear. In particular, it was clear that Poland would also be liberated only by the Red Army and the Polish Army, subordinate to the Lublin government.

And for **such** a Poland, which was more and more clearly outlined in the winter and spring fogs of 1945, Churchill and the Yankees did not really want to cut Germany. But

Stalin was ready to do it. His fight for the powerful and territorially expanded Poland began already in Yalta.

Here too Churchill tried to drown the essence in words. On February 6, 1945, he sang the old song that Great Britain had "no material interests in Poland", that "Great Britain entered the war to protect Poland from German aggression" and that "Great Britain is interested in Poland because it is - a matter of honor for Great Britain. Stalin replied that he understood this, but added that for

the Russians the question of Poland was not only a matter of honor, but also a matter of security.

And then Stalin said so well and honestly that again I just
I'll quote the transcript:

“A matter of honor because Russians had many sins against Poland in the past. The Soviet government seeks to make amends for these sins. A question of security, because the most important strategic problems of the Soviet state are connected with Poland. The point is not only that Poland is a border

us country.

This, of course, matters, but the essence of the problem is much deeper. Throughout history, Poland has always been a corridor through which the enemy attacked Russia passed ... ”

Then Stalin asked himself the question - why are the enemies still so easily passed through Poland? And he answered it himself:

“First of all, because Poland was weak. The Polish corridor cannot be closed mechanically from the outside only by Russian forces. It can only be securely closed from within by Poland's own forces. For this, Poland needs to be strong. That is why the Soviet Union is interested in building a powerful, free and independent Poland. The question of Poland is a matter of life and death for the Soviet state.”

But that's not all! Stalin went on to say:

“Hence the sharp turn that we made with regard to Poland from the policy of tsarism. It is known that the tsarist government sought to assimilate Poland. The Soviet government completely changed this inhuman policy and took the path of friendship with Poland and ensuring its independence. It is here that the reasons why the Russians stand for a strong, independent and free Poland are rooted.

I wonder if even university professors of history know about these words of Stalin in today's Poland? And if they do, why are they silent? By the

way, I must confess that reading the transcripts of tripartite conferences during the war, and indeed the correspondence of Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill, always gives me particular pleasure. Against the backdrop of pale sickness and insanity of the current "Russian" politicians, it is so joyful to get acquainted with the murderous logic of Stalin and Molotov, which effectively opposed the Jesuit "simplicity" of Roosevelt and the flowery speeches of the "noble" Churchill. Here, for example,

how Stalin, not without subtle irony, referring to Roosevelt and Churchill, justified in February 1945, in Yalta, the validity of the eastern border of Poland, which had existed since the autumn of 1939. I will quote this part of the transcript in full and without any comments:

“First of all, about the Curzon line. He, Stalin, should note that the Curzon line was not invented by the Russians. The authors of the Curzon line are Curzon, Clemenceau and the Americans who participated in the Paris Conference of 1919. There were no Russians at this conference. The Curzon line was adopted on the basis of ethnographic data against the will of the Russians. Lenin did not agree with this line. He did not want to give Poland Bialystok and the Bialystok region, which, in accordance with the Curzon line, were to go to Poland.

The Soviet government had already retreated from Lenin's position. Why do you want us to be less Russian than Curzon and Clemenceau? That way you bring us to shame. What will the Ukrainians say if we accept your proposal? They will probably say that Stalin and Molotov turned out to be less reliable defenders of the Russians and Ukrainians than Curzon and Clemenceau. With what face would he, Stalin, return to Moscow then? No, it would be better if the war with the Germans continues a little longer, but we should be able to compensate Poland at the expense of Germany.

And immediately after that, Stalin turned to the problem of the western border of Poland, recalling his Moscow conversations (in October 1944) with Mikolajczyk. The leaders of the Polish government in exile, Mikolajczyk, Grabsky and Romer, then came to Moscow for negotiations with representatives of the Polish Committee of National Liberation Bierut, Osubka-Moravsky and Rol Zymersky. Here, too, Stalin showed himself to be a subtle politician - he did not just

express his opinion about the western border of Poland, but expressed it, referring to Mikolajczyk, who was welcomed by the Anglo-Saxons. It was done like this (according to the transcript): "During Mikolajczyk's stay in Moscow, he asked Stalin what border of

Poland in the west the Soviet government recognizes. Mikolajczyk was very pleased when he heard that we recognize the line along the Neisse River as the western border of Poland. By way of explanation, it must be said that there are two Neisse rivers, one of them flows more to the east, near Breslau, and the other more to the west. Stalin believes that the western border of Poland should go along the Western Neisse, and he asks Roosevelt and Churchill to support him in this.

However, Stalin's interlocutors were no longer enthusiastic in this regard. And this was recorded in the transcript of the meeting on February 7, 1945:

"... On the issue of moving the borders of Poland to the west, the British government would like to make the following reservation: Poland should have the right to take for itself such territory that ... it can manage. It would hardly be expedient for the Polish goose to be stuffed with German dishes to such an extent that it would die of indigestion ... "

This is how Churchill thought and spoke.

And here is Roosevelt at a meeting on February 8, 1945:

".. The US delegation agrees ... with the provision of compensation to Poland at the expense of Germany, namely Eastern

Prussia south of Koenigsberg and Upper Silesia up to the Oder. However, it seems to Roosevelt that the transfer of the Polish border to the Western Neisse is little justified.

Molotov, by the way, at the same time, answering Roosevelt, remarked

(according to the transcript): "You can ask the Poles what they think on the issue of the western border. He (Molotov. - **S.K.**), however, has no doubt that the Poles will speak out for the line proposed by the Soviet government.

The Anglo-Saxons balked. Stalin needed Poland, capable of guaranteeing the security of Russia, and the emissaries of the Golden Elite of the world, Roosevelt and Churchill, already then - even before the defeat of the Third Reich - needed Germany, which would again threaten Russia in the future. At a meeting of the Crimean Conference on February 10, 1945, Churchill stated that he "had doubts whether the Poles should have a border along the Neisse (Western) River", and added that he "received a telegram from the War Cabinet, which set out misgivings about the difficulties of resettling a large number of people in Germany. Roosevelt

immediately supported Churchill and stated that "it would be better not to say anything (*in the final communique. - S.K.*) about the borders of Poland, since this issue still has to be discussed in the Senate, and he, Roosevelt, does not have powers now make decisions on it." As a result, in Yalta,

everything ended with the fact that on the issue of the western border of Poland, in the final statement of the Conference (in the USSR it was published in Izvestia on February 13, 1945), it was said that the final determination of this border "will be postponed until the peace conference." Churchill, speaking on

February 27 in the House of Commons with a report on the results of the Crimean Conference, said: "For more

than a year since there was a decisive turn in the war against Germany, the Polish problem has split into two main questions: the borders of Poland and the freedom of Poland" . Such a passage

could immediately arouse surprise, for by the time of Churchill's speech, Poland was in fact completely liberated. But for Churchill, the "freedom of Poland" was inseparable from

in the unconditional wake of the anti-communist policy of the West. In fact, only this worried Churchill, which he, with his characteristic impudence, bordering on naivety, publicly admitted on February 27, 1945. Without giving all his verbiage, I will acquaint the reader with a couple of quite representative phrases from Churchill's parliamentary speech:

“The Chamber knows perfectly well from my speeches that the question of freedom, independence, integrity and sovereignty of Poland has always seemed to His Majesty's Government more important than the question of its actual borders.

I have always been more concerned with the creation of a free Polish state that would be a safe home for the Polish people than with the question of demarcating the frontier or moving Poland's frontiers further west." Well, frankly. For Churchill, it was not the limits of the

territory of Poland that were important, but the limits of its opposition to Russia. And borders, they say, are the tenth thing. I wonder if even university professors of history

know about such a position of Churchill in today's Poland? And if they do, why are they silent? And do modern Polish historians and politicians acquaint the Polish people

with these words of Churchill, spoken by him in London on February 27, 1945:

“If there had not been colossal efforts and sacrifices on the part of Russia, Poland would have been doomed to complete destruction at the hands of the Germans. Not only Poland as a state and nation, but also the Poles as a people were doomed by Hitler to destruction and enslavement”?

However, although Churchill was forced to say this - the feat of the Soviet people in the name of freedom and the future of Poland was very obvious in February 1945 - he did not seek to ensure a significant increase in the territory of Poland.

And Stalin had to give the Anglo-Saxons a second battle for a strong Poland - after the Victory, in Potsdam, at the Berlin Conference. On the second day of

her work, July 18, 1945, Stalin suggested to Truman and Churchill: "Let's define the western borders of Poland, and then the question of Germany will become clearer."

But here Stalin's "sworn colleagues" were stupefied. Nevertheless, Stalin was firm, and at the end of the meeting on July 20, the presiding Truman was forced to say: - The next question is about the

western border of Poland. As I understand it, the Soviet delegation has views on this issue. Stalin also showed restraint here and skillfully took a pause,

suggesting: - If my colleagues are not ready to discuss this issue, then maybe we will move on to the next issue, and we will discuss this issue tomorrow? Truman was clearly delighted with this delay and immediately agreed: - It is

better to discuss it tomorrow ... And the next day, July 21, 1945, Truman and Churchill had a hard time. No matter how much they wanted to get away from the specifics of the issue, Stalin repeatedly returned them to the February decisions of the Crimean Conference and to yesterday's (July 20, 1945) proposal of the USSR delegation, where it was said that it was expedient to establish the western border of Poland along the line "west of Swinemünde to the Oder River, leaving the city of Stettin on the side of Poland, further upstream the Oder River to the mouth of the Zap River. Neisse and from here along the river Zap. Neisse to the Czechoslovak border.

Actually, the Soviet proposal was fully consistent wishes of the Poles themselves.

Truman and Churchill tried to pose as Admiral Nelson, who, in inconvenient cases, applied a spyglass to his gouged eye and declared that he couldn't see anything, and unanimously declared that, they say, "the western border has never been officially announced." However, Stalin reminded them that "the Polish government of national unity has expressed its opinion on the western frontier."

Stalin was referring to the message of Bolesław Bierut, President of the Home Rada of the People's Rada, and Prime Minister of the Provisional Government of National Unity, Osóbka-Morawski, dated July 20, 1945. In a message addressed to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR I.V. Stalin was told:

"On behalf of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, we appeal to you, Mr. Generalissimo, on the vital issue for the Polish people of the western borders of the Republic of Poland. The Polish Provisional

Government of National Unity, expressing the unanimous and inflexible will of the entire Polish people, considers that only the border running in the south along the former German-Czechoslovak border along the Western Neisse and the left bank of the Oder, including Stettin, west of Swinemünde, can be a fair border providing the Polish people with favorable conditions for development, security in Europe and lasting peace throughout the world. Identical notes on the same day, July 20, 1945,

were sent by the Poles to Truman and Churchill, so that they pretended to be Nelson in vain. At the same time, the notes clearly expressed the hope that "the question of the western borders of Poland will be resolved positively during the ongoing negotiations of such importance." The Yankees and Britons were no more pleased with this appeal than

vinegar instead of wine, but the Poles in Potsdam had an authoritative and active "intercessor" - Generalissimo Stalin. And it all ended with the fact that paragraph "B" of Section VIII "Poland" of the official Protocol of the Berlin Conference of the Three Great Powers of August 1, 1945 defined the western border of Poland as proposed by Stalin, behind whom stood powerful Soviet Russia. Below I will give the German names of settlements - inhabited by Germans

for more than one century, including the first forty-five years of the 20th century - which were replaced by Polish names in 1945:

Allenstein - Olsztyn, Bellegard - Białogard, Beiten - Bytom, Breslau - Wrocław, Bromberg - Bydgoszcz, Brunsberg - Braniewo, Waldenburg - Wałzsbich, Gleiwitz - Gliwice, Glogau - Głogów, Graudenz - Grunin, Greifenberg - Gryfice, Grunberg -

Zielona Góra, Danzig-Gdansk, Deutsch-Krone-Walch, Deutsch-Eylau-Iława, Sorau-Zary, Kattow-Katowice, Köslin-Kaszalin, Kolberg-Kołobrzeg, Konitz-Chojnice, Kulm-Chelmno, Kustrin-Kostschin, Liegnitz-Legnica, Lissa - Leszno, Marienburg - Malbork, Morungen - Morong, Oppeln - Opole, Ortelsburg - Shchitno, Posen - Poznań, Polnov - Polanow, Ratibor - Racibórz, Rosenberg - Sush, Swinemünde - Svineuisce, Thorn - Torun, Hirschberg - Jelenia- Gura, Shlave - Glorious, Schneidemuhl - Saw, Stargard - Stargard, Stettin - Szczecin, Elbing - Elblag, Yauer - Javor.

That's how many cities, including large ones, Poland received thanks to Russia and Stalin. The historical (!)

region of Pomerania became known as Pomerania, the Frisch-Haf Bay - the Vistula Bay, the Neisse River - Nysa Luzhitskaya, and the Oder River - Odra.

To make this historical and geographical "leapfrog" more understandable, I will inform you that German Kulm, which has become Polish Chelmno, is the birthplace of the "best tanker of the Reich" Heinz Guderian, and his mother, and his father. And

his

grandfather. And even great-grandfather - Baron Hiller von Gertringen, who owned in district of Kulm with the estate of Gross-Klonya.

During the German-Polish war of 1939, **the German** Guderian liberated his hometown on **Polish** territory. Such were the "original Polish lands".

To be more precise, these were indeed ancient Slavic lands, but for a long time they had been populated mixed with Slavs and Germans. Moreover, the Germans settled more in cities and, perhaps, did more than the Poles for the development of these lands.

As the reader can see for himself, the historical and ethnic duality of the situation is well reflected in the phonetic proximity of the historical Polish and German names of the same cities and towns. Now, the Germans without exception

moved from their great-grandfather, settled over the centuries, places to various areas of defeated Germany. And although here one could really talk about the restoration of historical justice in relation to

Poland, in human terms, such **historical** justice turned out for millions of ordinary Germans, if not a tragedy, then a drama full of **life's** injustice.

However, Stalin went for it - both counting on the lasting security of the western borders of Russia, and counting on the eternal gratitude and gratitude of the Poles towards the Soviet and Russian peoples, who retained Poland's right to freedom and future. Stalin, of course, also counted on

the fact that all the efforts of Russia for the military liberation of Poland and for the political support of Polish territorial interests would lay a solid foundation for indestructible Soviet-Polish friendship, which had outlived centuries of mutual claims and sins. If there is a state leader of one state in world

history who deserves a golden monument to himself in the central square of the capital of another state, then this is Stalin. It is to him that the Poles - if they were capable of a sense of historical and human gratitude - should have erected a majestic monument in Warsaw. Put...

Who dismembered Germany?

On July 18, 1945, at the second meeting of the heads of government at the Berlin Conference, Churchill asked a question that initiated an interesting discussion, the essence of which I will bring to the attention of the reader once again by transcript:

"Churchill . I want to put just one question. I notice that the word "Germany" is used here. What does "Germany" mean now?.. **Truman.** How does the

Soviet delegation understand this question? **Stalin.**

Germany is what she became after the war. No there is no other Germany now. This is how I understand this question.

(...)

Truman. Yes, but some definition of "Germany" must be given. I believe that Germany in 1886 or 1937 is not what Germany is now in 1945.

Stalin. She changed as a result of the war, so we her and accept. (...)

Truman ... How do we define the concept of "Germany"?

Stalin. Let us define the western borders of Poland, and then the question of Germany will become clearer. It is very difficult for me to say what Germany is now. This is a country that has no government, that has no definite borders, because the borders are not drawn up by our troops. Germany does not have any troops, including border troops, it is divided into occupation zones. So define what Germany is. This is a broken country ... "

However, Germany existed, although it was in distress. Moreover, they lived poorly not only in the Soviet zone of occupation. In the western zones, life for ordinary Germans was also not sugar. Yes, and how it was not! A brief chronology on the

topic is as follows. After the defeat in

1945, Germany was divided into four occupation zones: American, British, French and Soviet.

In December 1946, the Anglo-Saxons merged their zones into Bizonia (not from the buffaloes destroyed by the Yankees, but from the "double zone").

At the London meeting, which took place from February to June 1948, the United States, Britain and France decided to annex the French zone of occupation to Bizonia. And in April 1949, this merger took place with the formation of Trizonia under the control of the tripartite Supreme Allied Commission. Further, the process of unification of the zones did not go, and then a unified Germany did not work out. The process of disengagement prevailed,

and in September 1949 this process culminated in the formation of the pro-Western Federal Republic of Germany. A counterbalance to the creation of the FRG was the proclamation of the German Democratic Republic, the GDR, on October 7, 1949. That is, after the creation of the FRG by the allies.

Already this brief chronology makes it possible to understand who led the cause to consolidate the dismemberment of Germany after 1945. We can also recall the plans for the dismemberment of Germany, developed in 1945 by Henry Morgenthau - I wrote about them at the beginning of the book.

At the same time, one should also know that Stalin always leaned towards the option of a demilitarized **united** Germany without blocs, albeit a bourgeois-democratic one. By the way, Beria also thought the same way.

However, the development of this topic will take us far enough from 1945, so let's return to the starting point, for which we will take the discussion of the problem at the Moscow Conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, USA and Great Britain on October 19-30, 1943

of the year.

Then US Secretary of State Cordell Hull presented the document "Basic Principles for the Surrender of Germany", and on October 25, 1943, at a meeting that began at 16:12 and ended at 18:54, the question of the post-war status of Germany was raised. Eden was the most persistent at that time. Hull - having "thrown" the document - remained silent more, and Molotov very skillfully evaded unequivocal answers

that would have tied us ahead of time. Reading

the full record shows well the skill of Molotov as a negotiator, but here I will, of course, give only a few

extract from the transcript:

“Eden. Concerning the permanent status of Germany. We would like the division of Germany into separate states, in particular. We would like Prussia to separate from the rest of Germany. We would therefore like to encourage ... separatist movements in Germany ... It would be interesting to know the opinion of the Soviet government on this issue ...

Molotov. I answer Mr. Eden and Mr. Hull: in all Allied measures aimed at the maximum neutralization of Germany as an aggressive state, the Soviet Government supports Great Britain and the United States of America. Is this enough or not enough?

Eden. I would like to know what you, Mr. Molotov, think about the question we are discussing. In London ... we came to the conclusion that it would be exclusively to know your **opinion** and the opinion of Marshal Stalin regarding the dismemberment of Germany ... The problem is whether force should be used tightly ... "As you can see, the very concept

of "dismemberment" came into the dictionary of negotiations from the Anglo-Saxons. At the same time, Eden really wanted to know whether Moscow agreed to a **forcible** dismemberment, and Molotov referred to the fact that "the Soviet government is probably somewhat behind in studying this issue," and explained this by the fact that "our leaders are now more busy with military problems" .

However, Molotov nevertheless stated that "we do not consider such measures

excluded." Soon the issue was discussed already by the "Big Three" - at the Tehran Conference, held in the capital of Iran from November 28 to December 1, 1943. "Towards the end,"

on December 1, at 3:20 p.m., Roosevelt, in a private conversation with Stalin between breakfast and a round table, asked: "Are we going to discuss the question of the fragmentation of Germany?"

Stalin replied: "I don't mind." And

when the round table began at 4 pm, Roosevelt immediately stated that he would like to discuss questions about Poland and Germany.

At first, the conversation turned to Poland, but then Stalin asked what other proposals there were. Roosevelt immediately responded: "The dismemberment of Germany."

It can be seen that the American president was very interested in this issue, and especially in Stalin's point of view on it. She was also interested, as we remember, in London.

Further - according to the shorthand record:

“Churchill. I am for the dismemberment of Germany. But I would like to consider the question of the dismemberment of Prussia. I am for the separation of Bavaria and other provinces from Germany.

Roosevelt... I would like to present the plan I personally drew up two months ago for the division of Germany into five (!! - S.K.) states. **Churchill....** The root of

evil in Germany is Prussia. I especially draw the reader's attention to the fact that already in 1943 the Anglo-Saxons were not just planning the creation of several temporary occupation zones in Germany, but were making plans for the state fragmentation of united Germany into a number of dwarf states. In fact, this was the idea of the new Peace of Westphalia of 1648, which for more than three hundred years excluded the Germans - as a single great people - from European history. It took the will and genius of a number of leaders like Bismarck to translate into reality the aspirations and aspirations of the many millions of German masses for a united homeland. Now the Anglo-Saxons were planning a new division of Germany. Roosevelt... Prussia must be weakened and

reduced in... dimensions... In the second part... Hanover and the northwestern regions of Germany must be included. The third part is Saxony and the Leipzig region. The fourth part is the province of Hesse, Darmstadt, Kassel and areas located south of the Rhine, as well as the old cities of Westphalia. The fifth part is Bavaria, Baden, Württemberg. Each of these five parts will represent an independent state. In addition, the areas of the Kiel Canal and Hamburg should be separated from Germany ...

Churchill. You have stated a “mouthful of everything”... I believe that there are two issues: one is destructive and the other is constructive. I have two thoughts: the first is the isolation of Prussia...; the second is the separation of the southern provinces of Germany - Bavaria, Baden, Württemberg, the Palatinate from the Saar to Saxony inclusive ... I believe that the southern provinces can be easily torn off from Prussia and included in the Danube confederation ... "

Stalin calmly listened to all these projects and was silent. And only when Roosevelt and Churchill blurted out, and Churchill also blurted out that he would like to have some kind of southern confederation (of course loyal to the British), Stalin considered it necessary intervene.

"Stalin. I don't like the plan for new unifications (***Stalin meant, of course, artificial, "patchwork" "unifications. — S.K.)*** of states... No matter how we approach the question of the dismemberment of Germany, there is no need to create an unviable unification of the Danube states. Hungary and Austria must exist separately from each other...

Roosevelt. I agree with Marshal Stalin... **Churchill.**

I do not want to be interpreted as if I am not for the dismemberment of Germany. But I wanted to say that if Germany is divided into several parts, then, as Marshal Stalin said, the time will come when the Germans will unite.

Stalin. There are no measures to prevent

the possibility of the unification of Germany (***emphasis mine.*** - S./S.).

Churchill. Marshal Stalin prefers a fragmented Europe? **Stalin.** Why is Europe

here? I do not know whether it is necessary to create four, five or six independent German states. This issue needs to be discussed. But it is clear to me that there is no need to create new associations..." Stalin was restrained in Tehran for

a number of reasons. There was a war going on, and if the Germans had been informed that the allies, in addition to ensuring the defeat and surrender of Germany, intended to dismember it later, then the resistance of the Germans, already fierce, would have intensified.

Russia, waging a real war against Germany alone, did not need it. But Stalin did not

immediately support the idea of dismemberment in principle. He loudly said to the whole world: "Hitlers come and go, but Germany, and the German people remain," and this was not just a resounding formula, but also Stalin's conviction.

However, at the end of 1943, it was still far from the practical formulation of the question of the fate of post-war Germany.

But time passed, Germany suffered defeat after defeat, Soviet troops entered Europe and Germany. It became clear that the plans to bleed and weaken Russia in the conflict provoked by the Anglo-Saxons with Germany failed. On the contrary, Russia was definitely becoming the most significant European power in the future. And the plans for the dismemberment of

Germany began to recede for the Allies into the background and more distant plan. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff of the United Kingdom, Alan Brooke, wrote in his diary:

“Should we dismember Germany, or gradually turn her into an ally in order to repulse the threat from the Russians, which already exists twenty years later? I suggested the second and was sure that from now on we should look at Germany from a completely different point of view. The dominant power in Europe is no longer Germany, but Russia ... Therefore, save Germany, gradually restore it and include it in the Western European Union.

The general direction of the idea is quite clearly stated here. Just as there could be no two opinions about the meaning of the following statement in Brooke's diary:

“Unfortunately, all this has to be done under the guise of a sacred alliance between England, Russia and America. Politics is not easy...”

It seems that Stalin quickly caught on to such changes in the position of the Anglo-Saxons regarding the future of Germany, and at the Crimean (Yalta) Conference, not Roosevelt and Churchill, but Stalin returned to the problem of the expediency of dismembering Germany over and over again. But not so much in order to support this idea, but in order to make it clear to yourself - what do our "sworn" allies breathe in this direction?

Not without reason, on the very first day of the Crimean Conference, February 4, 1945, in response to Churchill's proposal to appoint a meeting on political issues for February 5, “namely,” as Churchill specified, “about the future of Germany, if she

or the future," Stalin answered briefly and weightily: "Germany will have a future." In Yalta,

Stalin very cleverly and skillfully revealed the essence of the attitude of Roosevelt and Churchill to the problem of the organization of post-war Germany and declared that "if the Allies propose to dismember Germany, then it must be said so."

Churchill (more precisely, the English elite, of course) already saw Germany as a future partner against Russia, which is confirmed by Brooke's diary.

Roosevelt (more precisely, the US elite) at that moment was still inclined towards the maximum weakening of Germany. In the end, the Yankees started the Second World War, including in order to get rid of Germany as the most dangerous economic competitor.

Therefore, Churchill expressed himself more and more vaguely, but Roosevelt also bent his own in Yalta, stating, for example, on February 5, 1945, that in the "current conditions" he "sees no other way out than dismemberment." Roosevelt asked at the same time: "How many parts? Six or seven or less? Even in Yalta,

Stalin did not really mind when he heard the word "dismemberment" from his partners. And formally, at the Crimean Conference, a decision was made on such a change in the terms of the surrender of Germany, in which the number of measures for the implementation of the allied supreme power in Germany would include measures not only for the complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany, but

also for its dismemberment. However, already on March 26, 1945, when, in accordance with the decisions taken in Yalta, the commission for the dismemberment of Germany began work in London, the Soviet representative in the commission F.T. Gusev, on behalf of the Soviet government, sent a letter to the chairman of the commission, Yen, where it was said:

"The Soviet government understands the decision of the Crimean Conference on the dismemberment of Germany not as a mandatory plan for the dismemberment of Germany, but as a possible prospect for putting pressure on Germany in order to secure it if other means prove insufficient."

In this direction, Stalin gradually advanced in the course of the Potsdam Conference. On the penultimate day of the Conference, he twice spoke directly about the need for "some kind of central administrative apparatus in Germany", without which "it is difficult to carry out a general policy towards Germany."

On the same day, when the issue of preserving the Ruhr industrial region as part of Germany was being decided, Stalin proposed that the final document of the Conference state that the Ruhr region remains part of Germany. The British Foreign Minister, Bevin, asked why this

question was being raised, and Stalin explained that "the idea of separating the Ruhr region arose from the thesis of the dismemberment of Germany", and went on to say:

"After that, there was a change in views on this issue. Germany remains a single state. The Soviet delegation raises the question: do you agree that the Ruhr area should be left in Germany. That's why this question stood here."

Truman immediately agreed. Bevin (London really wanted to lay his paw on the Ruhr) referred to the need for consultations with his government and added:

"We propose for a certain time no
not to create a central German government."

Even then, Stalin did not object harshly - the situation was very difficult. However, it was the Russian leader who raised the question of restoring the centralization of the administration of a united Germany. And the Anglo-Saxons began to sabotage this issue.

And neither the Russians nor the Germans should forget about this. Actually, Stalin expressed the principled position of the USSR regarding a united Germany as early as May 9, 1945 in an address to the Soviet people on the day of Victory over Germany:

"Germany is utterly defeated. German troops capitulate. The Soviet Union triumphs in victory, although it

and is not going to dismember or destroy Germany."

So who dismembered Germany?

Who liberated Europe - the Russians or the Yankees?

Among the vile myths about the end of the war, gradually moving from the pages of the "democratic" media to the pages of "Russian" school textbooks, there is also the myth of the outstanding contribution of the Anglo-Saxons, and above all the Yankees, to the liberation of Europe. Actually, today they are trying to present 1945 as a year of brilliant triumphs of allied weapons, completely overshadowing the mediocre advance across Europe of the Russians, who littered their way with the corpses of their own soldiers. Well, let's dwell on this for a bit, starting, perhaps, not with

beginning, but from the end, or from almost the end.

During Stalin's correspondence with Roosevelt about the English American separate negotiations with the representative of Marshal Kesselring in Bern Stalin in a letter to Roosevelt dated April 3, 1945 wrote:

"I understand that there are certain advantages for the Anglo-American troops as a result of these separate negotiations in Bern or somewhere else, since the Anglo-American troops get the opportunity to move deep into Germany almost without any resistance from the Germans, but why should it was necessary to hide this from the Russians, and why did they not warn their allies, the Russians, about this? And so it turns out that at this moment the Germans on the western front have in fact stopped the war against England and America (***emphasis mine. - S.K.***). At the same time, the

Germans continue the war with Russia - with an ally of England and the United States. Stalin knew what he was writing. And he wrote the truth - the Germans in the spring of 1945 almost did not fight with the allies, but fiercely resisted the Soviet troops. Roosevelt (for all his political dexterity, he did not have a special brilliance of

mind), without realizing it, confirmed the validity of the hardest - if you think about it - accusations of Stalin already in his reply message of April 5, 1945.

In this message, Roosevelt expressed "extreme indignation" towards Stalin's informants, "whoever they may be", in connection with "such a vile, incorrect description of my actions or the actions of my trusted subordinates", but in the middle of the letter

wrote this:

"In the interests of our joint military efforts against Germany, which now open up the bright prospect of rapid success in the disintegration of the German troops (***emphasis mine.*** - S. / S.), I must continue to assume that you have the same high confidence in my honesty and reliability..." and so on.

However, the brilliant prospects for rapid success in the disintegration of the German troops by the beginning of April 1945 were observed only on the Western Front and only for the Anglo-Americans!

Undoubtedly, their advance across Europe and Germany, as in exercises, gave Roosevelt euphoria and the opinion that on the Eastern Front, the Russians, things were just as rosy and brilliant and that the German troops were just as engulfed in disintegration on the fronts of the Red Army as this happens on the fronts of Eisenhower, Montgomery and Alexander. Roosevelt, of

course, was mistaken about the situation at the beginning of April 1945 on the Eastern Front, but his psychological state at the beginning of April 1945, due to the situation on the Western Front, speaks for itself and proves that by that time the Germans had actually not conducted military operations against the Allies. , continuing the war only with the Russians.

What Stalin wrote to Roosevelt. What has already been said above shows that the Russians ***liberated*** Europe, and the Yankees mainly ***occupied***

it. I hope the reader catches the difference in the sense of the last two verbs in the previous phrase?

Now let's go back to the very beginning of 1945.

After the Soviet strike in the east of Central Europe saved the strategic situation in the west of Europe, almost failed by the Allies as a result of their "Ardennes" collapse, the Anglo-American troops began to prepare for a new offensive. From January 30 to February 2, 1945, a

dress rehearsal was held in Malta for the actions of the American and British

delegations at the forthcoming Crimean (Yalta) conference. And there, in Malta, on February 2, 1945, at a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff, where Roosevelt and Churchill were present, a plan was adopted for the final Allied offensive.

The main blow was to be delivered on the northern sector of the Western Front in the direction of the Ruhr, the auxiliary - in the direction of Frankfurt am Main - Kassel. This offensive

began on 8 February. While the Anglo-

Saxons judged and judged, the Red Army was already advancing - powerfully and successfully. Therefore, as noted by the English historian J. Ehrman in the official English history of the war, "Grand Strategy" (volume for October 1944 - August 1945), the Allies wanted to start their operation "as soon as possible, until the Russian offensive on the Eastern Front ended in complete defeat Germans."

After all, the Anglo-Saxon wrote it,

not me. And he wrote after the war, when it was not necessary to lick "these Russians" so that they would start their offensive ahead of time and save the Britons and Yankees from complete defeat.

Besides, it is written by a serious historian in a serious study about the war. What follows

from what Erman said? Although, of course, his opinion is not was the only one interpreting the problem in this way. Here's what... Let's

do a thought experiment. Suppose

the allies would not have received support in the form of accelerating the Soviet offensive, and the Germans would have seriously beaten them in the Ardennes and in general in the west. And we would have launched a comprehensively prepared offensive at the previously determined time - half a month later than we started.

After all, this would mean, among other things, the absence of a large number of German troops on the Soviet-German front, bogged down in a number of operations to finally defeat the still very strong allied grouping. And above all, this

would mean the absence of excellent tank formations of the Reich inspired by the success of the Ardennes in front of our offensive.

Even so, in conditions of an incompletely prepared offensive and opposition from German units and formations hastily transferred from west to east, we advanced almost continuously and quickly. Up to thirty kilometers a day! Almost like the Germans in the summer of 1941. And if everything with us was completely planned -

as it was conceived from the very beginning? Look, we would not only be the first to reach Berlin, but also the Ruhr and Kassel. And our losses might not have been so excessive - after all, German

opposition would not have been as powerful as it turned out to be after the strengthening of the eastern group of Germans by western reinforcements. In the west, the Germans would still have to fight: the forces of the allies were still huge - millions

of only Americans landed on the continent. And if we had not helped the Allies in January 1945, the fighting in the west would most likely have become protracted and would have gone on with varying success. On the one hand, this would not allow the Allies to move very quickly - the Germans, inspired by the successes, would hardly have surrendered to them as

massively as they actually surrendered. On the other hand, the Germans would not move troops to the east, seeing that not all is lost in the west. In addition, in the west, the enemy was opposed to them by an unstable one, which means that success against him was more likely. That is, instead of the triumphant (due to

the opening of the front by the Germans and their wholesale surrender) advance of the allies in Germany, it would very

likely have been their marking time, waste, local successes either by the allies or by the Germans. But in general - mutual exhaustion against the backdrop of incessant

Soviet offensive.

And this is my assumption in the framework of a thought experiment by no means lightweight. The already mentioned J. Ehrman admitted:

"... the general situation in the winter of 1944/45 was characterized not only by the fact that the Allies had reached a dead end on the western front, but also by the fact that all their operational plans in Europe were under threat of failure."

What the hell - "operational"! If it were not for the timely, disinterested and noble Russian help, **the strategic** plans of the Anglo-Saxons in Europe could be in jeopardy ! And, very likely, they would have turned out

to be ... So who liberated Europe? I will

repeat myself, but once again

I will cite a fragment already known to the reader from the report of the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, General of the Army Antonov, at the Crimean Conference. On February 4, 1945, Antonov reported on the progress of the Soviet offensive and reported that by February 4, we had defeated 45 German divisions.

Further he said:

"The Germans will defend Berlin, for which they will try to delay the advance of Soviet troops at the turn of the Oder River, organizing defense here at the expense of retreating troops and reserves transferred from Germany (allocations **are mine everywhere. - S.K.**), Western Europe and Italy.

... The Germans will probably cover the Vienna direction more firmly, strengthening it at the expense of the troops operating in Italy.

... The transfer of enemy troops: a)

The following have already appeared

on our front: from the central regions of Germany - 9

divisions; from the Western European front - 6

divisions; from Italy - 1

division. Total 16

divisions b) Are in the transfer:

4 tank divisions; 1

motorized division; Total 5

divisions. C)

Probably, up to 30-35 divisions will be transferred at the expense of the Western European front, Norway, Italy and reserves located in Germany. Thus, on our front

can additionally

35-40 divisions will appear.

And Antonov's estimates regarding the strengthening of the Germans in the east were confirmed even more than expected, because the Germans were increasingly exposing the front in the west in order to strengthen the front in the east.

Antonov at the same time expressed the desire to speed up the start of the Allied offensive, which, as he rightly noted, was facilitated by "the defeat of the Germans on the Eastern Front; the defeat of the German group in the Ardennes; weakening of German forces in the west due to the transfer of their reserves to the

east. The Allies started the offensive, and at the time we wanted, but the help of the Red Army was not very great from this. The Germans in the west resisted sluggishly, and the Allies fought without military pressure, and all their successes were due to the unwillingness of the Germans to continue the fight

in the west. The Germans began to hope for a separate peace and, in any case, they preferred to fall into Allied captivity, and not into Russian. Hence the euphoria of

Roosevelt! The Allies were "advancing", but the Wehrmacht not only did not transfer reserves to the West, but, on the contrary, constantly removed combat-ready formations from the Western Front and threw them into the meat grinder

of the Eastern Front. Alas, this meat grinder grinded not only German, but also Soviet troops. War is war. Especially when both opponents are fighting for real. No

doubt, the Allies had a huge advantage in ground technology, not to mention aviation. But even in April 1945, the real fighting spirit of the Allied forces was not so great.

As for the superiority in aviation, the "carpet" bombing of troops, not cities, has never been very effective. "Thumping in the squares" is a little successful occupation. It is useful once

again to make a brief comparison of the behavior of the Allies and Russians in 1945 during the powerful January attack of the Germans on the Allies in the West, and during the powerful March German attack on us in the area of Lake Balaton in Hungary. The allies

immediately collapsed and immediately asked for help from Stalin. And the Russians coped with the situation themselves. Moreover, in Hungary the situat

it was much harder - the front was wider, the blow was delivered from three sides, etc.

As is known, the Allies defeated and captured 176 divisions of the countries of the German bloc, and the Soviet Armed Forces - 607 divisions and destroyed 75% of the enemy's military equipment. And this ratio shows who and what contributed to the liberation of Europe.

You can, however, calculate in numbers. $176 + 607 = 783$. Dividing 176 by 783, we get 0.22. That is, the contribution of the Anglo-Saxons amounted to about a fifth of the contribution of Russia. And

even less, given that the Germans fought against us even at the very end of the war fiercely, capitulating reluctantly, which is evidenced by Budapest, Koenigsberg, Schneidemühl, Berlin ... about the Italians, who also went to the "general standings" of the Anglo-American "successes".

And you think today - maybe we really shouldn't have attacked very aggressively in 1945, so immediately and not fully prepared? Maybe it was worth giving the Germans the opportunity to arrange a second Dunkirk for the Anglo-Saxons, and only *then* hit the Germans exhausted by this success with all their might?

Look, we would not have reached the Spree, but the English Channel. Maybe maybe it would be more reliable?

But what can you do - Stalin was a man of indestructible inner nobility and hoped that at least a drop of the same nobility would be found, if not in the hearts of politicians like Churchill, then at least in the hearts of the peoples of Europe, above all to the Soviet Union, who owe their liberation.

Everyone after all judges others on itself. And, as I understand it, Stalin, sacrificing the tempting possibilities of liberating Europe and defeating the Reich on his own terms, hoped for the grateful memory of the peoples. He, as I understand it, hoped that

Europe and the whole world would forever remember the secondary example of the military and political nobility of the Russians, who in 1945 provided the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition with the "miracle in the Ardennes" after the feat of Russian soldiers in World War I the war was ensured by the "miracle on the Marne" for our then allies in the Entente.

Alas, Europe has forgotten both these noble allied acts of Russia. Grandfathers and fathers, liberated by the Russians and welcoming the Russians, could not pass the baton of gratitude to their grandchildren and great-grandchildren. The Europeans turned out to be unworthy of Stalin's hopes.

Instead of a grateful memory - petty rubbish vile lies, the meanness of historical forgetfulness, and as a result - the current accusations of Europe against both Stalin himself and the State he created and glorified. That Power that liberated Europe in a cruel and bloody struggle with the enemy. However, let's put the pathos aside and

once again turn to the documents. Let me remind you that when at the Crimean (Yalta) Conference Churchill expressed his gratitude to the Red Army for the winter offensive of 1945, Stalin remarked that it was "the fulfillment of a comradely duty", and that "according to the decisions taken at the Tehran Conference, the Soviet government was not obliged to take winter offensive. Stalin emphasized that the Soviet government "considered it its duty, the duty of an ally, although it had no formal

obligations in this regard", and that he, Stalin, "wants the leaders of the allied powers to take into account that the Soviet leaders not only fulfill their obligations but are also ready to fulfill their moral duty to the best of their ability." The tactful Stalin used the formula "to the best of his ability", but in 1945 (as, indeed, in 1944, and in 1943, and in 1942, and 1941) we carried out our allied duty

most often **beyond** all reasonable possibilities.

At the same Crimean conference on the same day, February 4, 1945, such speeches were made at the negotiating table that when I read the transcript of February 4, I did not know whether to laugh or

be angry. However, let the reader

judge for himself. Stalin, after expressing his wishes as to how the Allied armies could help the Soviet troops, asked what wishes the Allies had for the Soviet troops. For the Anglo-Saxons, the concept of "moral duty" in relation to strangers (and the Russians for the Anglo-Saxons have always been strangers) is abstract and has no real meaning. Therefore, Stalin's wishes remained basically wishes. What's up

wishes to **Stalin**, Stalin informed Roosevelt and Churchill that the Deputy Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force in the European Theater of Operations, Air Chief Marshal Tedder, "expressed the wish that the Soviet troops should not stop the offensive until the end of March."

Reporting this, the Soviet Supreme Commander said: "We will continue our offensive if the weather permits and if the roads are passable." We continued our offensive - as Stalin promised.

But 1945 is not 1941. In 1945, all types and branches of the Red Army troops were saturated with effective military equipment, and the ongoing offensive in bad weather and mudslides reduced the effectiveness of aviation, armored forces, heavy artillery units, and even motorized infantry. And yet we were advancing - due to, among other things, the moral

allied debt. Roosevelt

ranted about his understanding that "each Ally is morally obligated to move as fast as possible" and Churchill placidly stated that the reason the Allies in Tehran did not conclude an agreement with the Soviet Union on future operations was "their confidence in the Soviet Union and its

military."

That is, the Anglo-Saxons "pulled the rubber" with the opening of the Second Front until June 1944, because they were confident that they could calmly prepare for the "liberation" of Europe behind a rampart of Russian corpses, who alone were holding back the "Teutons" in grueling battles. After that, it's

free for any "democratic" riff-raff to tell that we, they say, simply filled up the Germans with our corpses! .. Yes, our losses were great. But they would have been

so huge if Roosevelt, not in words, but in deeds, and not in 1945, but in 1942 or, at least, in 1943, realized that each ally is morally obliged to move towards Victory with the **possible more** speed? However, on February 4, 1945, Roosevelt, perhaps out of joy that the Russians would continue to divert the main

German forces to

himself, - threw out such a verbal "volt" that one wonders how one could be so either naive or shameless. He stated that the Tehran Conference took place before his re-election, and it was de "it remains to be seen whether the American people will be on his side, Roosevelt." Therefore, they say, "it was difficult to draw up general military plans." A very interesting confession! After all, a

curious conclusion logically

followed from the words of Roosevelt: if the American people had not been on the side of Roosevelt and had not re-elected him, then America could have left Europe alone with Hitler, giving Russia the honor of smashing Germany alone. Is not it? And this recognition of the American

president

illuminates the history of the "liberation" of Europe by the Americans from another, unexpected, but real side.

Who tested whom in Potsdam?

Starting from this section, I will from time to time also refer to the "atomic" cases of 1945. After all, this year was not only the year of the Victory over Nazi Germany and militaristic Japan, but also the year of the arrival of the Bomb

in the world. The "atomic" history of 1945 is full of myths even more than its purely military history. So, the "atomic" myth is still persistent that Stalin allegedly did not understand the significance of the Atomic problem even after he was "enlightened" on this subject by US President Truman at the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference in 1945.

The creator of the myth was, perhaps, Churchill, who described this incident in his memoirs about the war. On the other hand, this myth was able to take root because the main documents of the initial history of the Soviet Atomic Project were published only after 1991, and in the USSR they never became public. Without digressing into the question of why this was so, I will say that by the 1980s, in any case, much of what became known by the end of the 20th century could and should have been decisively declassified and made part of the country's general history. And now

let's fast forward to Potsdam, in the summer of 1945 - in those days when the British delegation was headed by

Churchill. On July 16, 1945, the first atomic explosion in the history of the world with a capacity of 21,000 tons of TNT was successfully carried out at the test site in Alamogordo (New Mexico).

President Truman, who was in Potsdam, was immediately notified of this and informed Churchill that the British were actively working in the American "Manhattan Project" of the Bomb.

And immediately before Truman and Churchill the question arose - should they inform Stalin about the new weapon? And if you report, then how - orally or in writing, at a formal meeting or during one of the conversations after the

meeting? It was decided to do so ... On July 24, 1945, after the end of the plenary session, when everyone got up from their seats and stood around the table in two or three people, Truman approached Stalin, and they

started talking alone. Churchill, from a distance of about four meters, carefully observed what impression the president's message would make on Stalin. Churchill later wrote with aplomb:

“... I was sure that he did not represent the full significance of what he was told. It is quite obvious that in his hard work and care there was no place for the atomic bomb. If he had had even the slightest idea of the revolution in international affairs that was taking place, it would have been immediately noticeable. Nothing would stop him from saying, “Thank you for letting me know about the new bomb. I do not have the necessary knowledge, but can I send my expert in nuclear science to your expert? But on his face, a cheerful and benevolent expression was preserved ... ”

Ultimately, a person judges by himself ... Churchill did not know how to control himself - from an early age he was, as they say, a "master", who grew into a gentleman, whose feigned democracy could only deceive the electoral "cattle", and even then not always. Stalin was absolutely in control of himself. Therefore, his lack of reaction to Truman's stunning message was seen by both

Anglo-Saxons as a misunderstanding.

Churchill recalled:

“When we were waiting for our cars, I approached Truman. “Well, how did it go?” I asked. “He didn’t ask me a single question,” the president replied. Thus, I was convinced that at that moment Stalin was not particularly aware of the huge process of scientific research in which the United States and England were engaged for such a long time and on which the United States, taking a heroic risk, spent more than 400 million pounds sterling. ... ”

However, Churchill hit the sky with his finger, as did his colleague Truman. In 1945, Stalin was not only aware of ongoing in the United States

atomic work. By the summer of 1945, he signed a number of decrees of the State Defense Committee and government decrees that determined the course and pace of **Soviet** nuclear work. In the USSR, only one, indirect evidence on this matter slipped through, and it was, perhaps, an apocrypha, that is, in this case, a history composed in hindsight. Marshal Zhukov's "Memoirs and Reflections" says the following:

"I don't remember exactly what date Truman told I.V. Stalin about the presence of an unusually large bomb in the United States, without calling it an atomic weapon. At the time of this information, as they later wrote abroad, W. Churchill dug into the face of I.V. Stalin, watching his reaction. But he did not betray his feelings in any way ... Both Churchill and many other Anglo-American authors believed that, probably, Stalin ... did not understand the meaning of the message made to him.

In fact... I.V. Stalin, in my presence, told V.M. Molotov about the conversation with Truman. V.M. Molotov immediately said: "They're inflating their worth." I.V. Stalin laughed: "Let them stuff them." Will have to talk to Kurchatov about speeding up our work. I realized that it was about the atomic bomb ... ".

The conversation transmitted by Zhukov certainly took place, and I do not exclude that Zhukov was present at it. But it's unlikely that in real time the marshal really understood that it was about the atomic bomb. At that time, the problem was so classified everywhere, and the power of the new weapon was so much beyond anything that the mind of a military man could imagine, that it seems unlikely that Zhukov then understood **everything**. Most likely, he understood

everything much later. As for the essence, the now declassified Soviet documents relating to the beginning of the Soviet Atomic Project date back to 1939.

Nevertheless, it is unlikely, I repeat, that Zhukov could understand something at that time - he was then not even close to the information on our atomic work. And the name of Kurchatov hardly meant anything to Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov then. However,

in addition to Marshal Zhukov, there was another Marshal of the Soviet Union in Potsdam, and although he is not mentioned in Zhukov's memoirs, the name Kurchatov was familiar to him. Moreover, this marshal had known Academician Kurchatov for more than a year, and less than a month after the end of the Potsdam Conference, they would begin to work together in general - tightly and fruitfully.

This Marshal of the Soviet Union was Beria, who was responsible in Potsdam for the protection of the Soviet delegation, without being directly part of the delegation. However, not formally being a delegate, Beria remained Deputy Chairman of the GKO, and for this reason alone, Stalin, informing Molotov about the conversation with Truman, could not but inform Truman and Beria about

the information. Actually, Stalin was even obliged to do this, because on December 3, 1944, he himself approved GKO Decree No. 7069ss, the final paragraph of which read:

“Assign to Comrade Beria L.P. monitoring the development of work on uranium”.

And if Stalin discussed Truman's information with Molotov, who was directly related to the beginning of our work, but was later replaced by the energetic Beria, if Stalin - perhaps - did not hide this information from Zhukov, who had no direct relation to the matter, then The official Curator of the Soviet Atomic Problem, his deputy for the State Defense Committee and the Council of People's Commissars, Stalin could not help but discuss the situation. In real time. And, of course, discussed.

Maybe - in a general conversation with Molotov and Zhukov, or maybe - also separately. However, what is there to guess! Today, after the declassification of many documents of the Soviet Atomic Project, it is possible to report something concretely...

On July 10, 1945, Commissar of State Security of the 1st rank Merkulov, People's Commissar for State Security of the USSR, sent an urgent letter (outgoing No. 4305/m) to Deputy Chairman of the GKO Beria about the preparations for an atomic bomb test in the United States.

The letter, in particular, stated (in italics **handwritten**):

“From several reliable intelligence sources of the NKGB of the USSR, information was received that in the United States as of July this year. the first experimental explosion of an atomic bomb is scheduled . The explosion is expected to take place on July 10. The following

information is available about this bomb: **The bomb** is made of **element 94 (plutonium)**... **Plutonium** is taken in the form of a ball weighing 5

kilograms... (...) The total weight **of the bomb...** is about 3 tons. The estimated force of the bomb explosion is equivalent to the force of an explosion of 5 thousand **(actually 15-20 thousand. - S.K.)** tons of TNT **(trinitrotoluene. - S.K.) ... ”.**

Stalin left Moscow for Potsdam on July 16, 1945 at 5:30 pm, so Beria had more than enough time to convey this information to Stalin before leaving, in Moscow, and even more so on the way to Germany . So Truman has nothing particularly new for Stalin to tell that

could not.

Yes, and he said something, not so much. We are already familiar with Churchill's version, but here is Secretary of State Byrnes' version, recorded in 1958 by State Department official Face:

“Birns said that he had come to the conclusion that it would be catastrophic for the United States and China **(Chiang Kai-shek. - S.K.)** to include the Soviet Union in the war in the Pacific. Ego, in turn, led to the idea that it would be nice, if not stronger, to leave Stalin not fully informed about the potential of the atomic bomb. IN

otherwise, he could hasten the entry of the Soviet Union into the war. That is why it was decided to tell Stalin about the results of the tests, as if by the way, at the end of one of the meetings of the heads of government. Having agreed on the question of what should be said, Truman and Bohlen (***assistant secretary of state*** - S.K.) ..., who was supposed to be present as an interpreter, walked around the table and in the most casual manner told Stalin that he wanted to inform him about the creation in United States of a new and powerful weapon that we have decided to use against Japan. The entire conversation between Truman and Stalin, according to Byrnes, lasted no more than a minute.

In its place, we will have an occasion to talk about the entry of the USSR into the war with Japan in detail. But I will immediately note that it is unlikely that this act of the USSR was undesirable for Truman and Byrnes in 1945 to the extent that it follows from the words of Byrnes referring to 1958.

Then, in 1945, even at the peak of the "atomic" euphoria, the Yankees needed us. Although they, of course, became sad in advance at the thought that the participation of the USSR in the war with Japan would inevitably strengthen both the Pacific positions of the USSR and the position of the Chinese communists who opposed Chiang Kai-shek.

We are talking about this ahead of
us. But who checked whom in Potsdam?

Churchill was sure that Truman and he checked Stalin. However, in fact, the two Anglo-Saxons gave Stalin the opportunity to test them themselves. Due to the fact that Truman did not want to be completely frank with his main - the main power, in terms of role and importance in the upcoming war with Japan - ally, Stalin realized that the USSR could no longer have friendly relations with the United States.

Not to mention England.

Stalin already knew and understood that Truman and the circles behind him were not Roosevelt and the circles behind the unexpectedly (?) dead president. But the nature of Truman's "probe" on July 24, 1945 once again confirmed Stalin's confidence for the latter.

Therefore, Churchill was mistaken in the most amusing way - in an attempt to "split" Stalin, Churchill, together with Truman, put himself under the attentive study of Stalin's gaze. That is,

Churchill and Truman thought that they were testing Stalin - how, they say, he was aware of nuclear matters and understood the essence of the new

situation. But in fact, Stalin tested the loyalty and sincerity of the allies in relation to the USSR.

And now Stalin was not mistaken in his conclusions about the British prime minister and the American president.

About the “aggressive” Stalin, who “dreamed” of capturing Europe, and the “peace-loving” Churchill, who wanted Europe from S "save"

As a kind of saying to this section, I will cite a certain incident relating to the spring of 1945. On May 5, 1945, the first secretary of the USSR Embassy in Yugoslavia V.M. Sakharov spoke with Yugoslav Marshal Josip Broz Tito. The question of Trieste was also raised. Sakharov recorded in his office diary:

“Tito indignantly announced the “impudent act” of the British, who entered Trieste after its liberation by the Yugoslav army, and even announced the capture of prisoners. Perhaps, Tito said, in such a large city the Germans remained in some houses, it is possible that, hiding when the partisans appeared, they came out of hiding to surrender to the British. The British want Trieste, Tito declared, but

we won't give it up, we can't give it up.

According to Tito, the British are outrageous in some cities, supporting the demonstrations of the Nazis by force of arms, with their tanks, while preventing the intervention of the Yugoslav authorities and the army.

Perhaps the reader has not forgotten that I have already mentioned Trieste in this book. If we look at the map, we will see that now Trieste is a narrow part of Italian territory stretching along the Venetian Gulf of the Adriatic Sea with the large port of Trieste.

The ancient Romans founded the city as a colony of Tergeste. But since the place was strategically very convenient, Trieste was part of different states at different times - at one time even part of Napoleonic France, which formed the southern Illyrian provinces far from the metropolis. By the 20th century, these lands belonged to the Austro-

Hungary, and Trieste was the largest Austrian port. This is all despite the fact that Trieste has long been the economic and historical center of the Slavic Julian Krajina and gravitated towards Yugoslavia, more precisely, towards Slovenia. However, after the end of the First World War, this zone in 1919, according to the Treaty of Saint-Germain, went to Italy - despite the protests of the Slavs

and Yugoslavia. In 1943, Trieste was occupied by the Germans, on April 30, 1945, it was liberated by the partisans of Marshal Tito, and then events developed as described in the diary of V.M. Sakharova: Anglo-American troops have occupied Trieste.

And they occupied it for a long time - until 1954, when Trieste and the zone to the west of it went to Italy, and the zone to the east of Trieste - to Yugoslavia. Prior to that, there was a "Free Territory of Trieste" under the control of the UN Security Council, that is, at that time, under the

control of the United States. The Anglo-Saxons parted with part of the Trieste zone in 1954 out of necessity - they had to try to keep Yugoslavia with them, which, after several years of break, began to restore relations with the USSR. However, strategically, the most significant part of the Trieste zone went to Italy, that is, at that time - to the United States, if we have in mind not the formal state affiliation, but the military-political side of the matter.

However, I have gone too far, and it is time for us to return to 1945. Let me just remind you that I started with Trieste in order to illustrate with a specific example of 1945 how brazenly, rudely, trampling on history, and the natural law of peoples, and the principles of freedom, the Anglo-Saxons acted when they did not meet equivalent opposition. And it has always

been like this - ever since the time when the unforgettable Fyodor Ushakov stormed the island of Medusa and the Republic of the Ionian Islands. That is why the Britons did not like Ushakov - for his mind and strength. But Ushakov was bound by pro-English Petersburg in his actions.

Now Russia did not look at London. So how could the descendants of Admiral Nelson and Lady Hamilton in 1945 not love and - what is there - simply hate the mighty and not

dependent on no one but the people he leads, the Russian leader Stalin?!
They

hated him, of course. And because they could not yet do without Stalin and Russia, they hated Stalin and Russia even more. But for now, it's hidden.

Almost immediately
after the end of the war, disagreements began between the allies and the Soviet Union. Actually, harnessing a Russian bear, an American elephant with a donkey and a British lion into one cart was a little promising and unreliable business even during the war. Now, when Russia came to the center of Europe, when the Russians completely controlled Poland, Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, part of Austria and Germany, the Anglo-Saxons on both sides of the Atlantic began to feel uncomfortable.

After all, they are accustomed to hosting in Europe with impunity and undivided.

And then there are the Russians. Moreover, with their crazy ideas that Labor will be the ruler of the world, that the fruits of the labor of the peoples should belong to the peoples, and not to the "better part

of the nation". Therefore, already in 1945, the British - it concerned them in the first place, and with them the Yankees, began to create a myth about Stalin's "aggressiveness" and the need to "protect" Europe

from him. Myths, however, are created for the public. The mythmakers themselves guided by plans.

They guided them. On the eve of the Crimean (Yalta) conference, another conference took place - the allies conferred separately on the island of Malta. It was there, on February 1, 1945, that British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden made a frank (what to be embarrassed about - only his own!) confession:

"The Russians will have very big demands; we don't have much to offer them, but we need a lot from them. Therefore, we should agree to put together everything we want and everything we have to give. This would extend to the Far East as well."

And so, Churchill and Eden, or rather, the British ruling circles, having not yet done away with the Germans, were already considering the question of how to deceive the Russians and hand them their rotten goods for their good quality?

Perhaps a good commentary on this position could be the opinion of Roosevelt, expressed by him three days later - on February 4, 1945, already in the Crimea in a conversation with Stalin:

“The English are strange people. They want to eat the pie and they want that pie to stay whole in their hand.”

Stalin replied that this was well said. It was said really well, but the main thing is for sure. Who, if not the president of America, would know the appetites and inclinations of his older, but younger in position "brothers" from the Old World? However, Roosevelt's assessment could be

addressed to

yankees.

Funny moment! In Yalta, Churchill suddenly began to cry! During a meeting on February 5, he first reminisced about the situation after the First World War and said that "reparations were then a great disappointment", that they managed to get "only 1 billion pounds" from Germany, and even that would not have been received if "The United States and England did not invest money in Germany."

According to Churchill, it turned out that England took from the Germans only "a few old ocean-going steamers", but "with the money that Germany received from England, she built herself a new fleet." Like, "at the end of the last war, the British also dreamed of astronomical figures, but what happened?" Was it worth defeating the Teutons?

Bearing in mind the present day,

Churchill declared that if he, Churchill, "considered it possible to support the British economy by collecting reparations from Germany, he would resolutely follow this path." But he de "doubts about success."

In general, Churchill tried in advance to set Stalin on the fact that after the victory, Russia should not count on anything significant from Germany. However, Sir Winston forgot that in the face

Stalin is by no means dealing with an English parliamentarian. Here is part of their dialogue at that meeting...

"Churchill. What will happen to Germany? The ghost of starving Germany with its 80 million people rises before my eyes. Who will feed her? And who will pay for it? Will it not come out in the end that we will have to at least partially cover the reparations from our own pocket? **Stalin.** All these questions,

of course, will arise sooner or later. **Churchill.** If you want to ride a

horse, you need it
feed hay and oats.

Stalin. But the horse must not charge at us.

Churchill. I acknowledge the failure of the metaphor. But if you put a car instead of a horse for comparison, then it will still turn out that it needs gasoline. **Stalin.**

There is no analogy. Germans are not machines,
but people. **Churchill.** Agree..."

That is, on all these complaints to Churchill, as they say, "did not break off." Although he was not lying when he stated that Great Britain had suffered greatly in the current war, that she owed large sums in addition to Lend-Lease and her total debt was 3 billion pounds. But here Churchill

himself was to blame - it was he who got England involved not in a "strange war", like Chamberlain, but in a real cruel air "Battle for Britain" in the name of the future hegemony in Europe and in England of the United States. The Britons owed money to

the Yankees. The funniest thing was

"soaked" after Churchill by Roosevelt. According to him, America also only lost in that **first** war, almost benefiting Germany at the same time. A reader familiar with the essence of the matter may not believe me, but here is the exact protocol entry dated February 5, 1945:

“Roosevelt declares that he also remembers the last war well and remembers that the United States lost a huge amount of money (***emphasis mine. - S.K.***). They lent Germany more than 10 billion dollars, but this time they will not repeat their previous mistakes ... ”

Nevertheless, the Yalta interlocutors of Stalin turned out to be amazing “benefactors” of mankind and “altruists”! They started two world wars solely to “teach the Teutons a lesson.” Well, the fact that, as a result of the First World War, more than two-thirds of the world's gold ended up in the United States, was a trifle that was not worth either the Anglo-Saxon or anyone else's attention.

I must say that Stalin and his staff did not shed tears over the “losses” of the Britons and the Yankees - it was not dapper Yeltsinoids who came to Yalta from Moscow, but outstanding politicians and outstanding patriots. Therefore, a member of the Soviet delegation, Ivan Maisky, Moscow's ambassador to London, left no stone unturned from the “arguments” of Churchill and Roosevelt. Maisky

explained that the failure with reparations in that war was due not to their excess, but to the fact that “the allies demanded reparations from Germany, not in kind, but mainly in money.”

“If the Allies were ready to receive reparations in kind,—
Maisky added, “no complications would have come of it.”

Maisky - of course, in agreement with Stalin - showed that the reparation demands of the USSR were not excessive, but rather modest. At the same time, Maisky noted (I quote from the minutes of the February 5 meeting):

“The Soviet government does not at all set itself the goal of turning Germany into a hungry, undressed and barefoot country. On the contrary, when developing its reparation plan, the Soviet government always had in mind to create conditions under which the German people could exist on the basis of an average European standard of living ... Germany has every chance to build its post-war economy based on the expansion of agriculture and light industry.

Maisky was right, of course, in recalling, moreover, that "post-war Germany will be completely free from spending on armaments" and "this will bring great savings."

Even Churchill was forced to respond: "Yes, this is a very important consideration!" It was

difficult to object to the Russians on the merits in 1945. And not because they stood in the center of Europe, but because they were right.

And at the same time, of course, they are also powerful. Let us return to Eden's statement in Malta. Having studied it, we will understand that Eden and the allied leadership in general, internally, "inwardly", understood **how much** the Russians had done for the common cause, **how great** their merits and, accordingly, how

great their **right** to demand a lot and get a lot. I already wrote that when Churchill on February 6, 1945, declared in the Livadia Palace that "the question of Poland is a matter of honor for the British Government," Stalin immediately agreed with this, but added that "for the Russians, the question of Poland is not only a question honor, but also a matter of security."

What objection could have been made to these stern and precise words by Churchill, a parliamentary talker, or his Foreign Minister, Eden, who knew how to call a shovel "an object well known to all of us from gardening"? For the USSR,

the question of Poland was indeed a matter of **security first and foremost**. And for

England, it was not even a matter of honor - what an honor! For England, the "Polish" question was a matter of **profit**. Such a seductive advantage that Churchill did not hesitate to bless the bloody adventure of the Warsaw Uprising in 1944, if only to preserve at least a ghostly chance of maintaining British influence in Poland. And the Balkans - the old fiefdom of the

British, where they competed with the Germans, defeated in 1945 and taken out of the game as competitors? And Hungary? And Romania?

Returning them to the sphere of Anglo-Saxon influence was a matter of benefit for

England and the USA. Their transition to the Soviet sphere of influence was not only a question for the USSR - yes! benefits, but also a matter of external security.

Could anyone, ***in conscience and honor***, deny the right of the USSR to have such neighbors as Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, which would naturally be loyal to the USSR and would not be a source of anxiety and potential military danger for it - as happened in the Second world war - but as a guarantor of the security of the borders and territory of the

USSR? Not to mention Poland - the eternal Russian headache due to the behavior of the Poles themselves, who are ready to "be friends" with anyone before the Second World War, if only - against Russia!

Interesting fact! The author of Sir Anthony Eden, already known to the reader, Alan Campbell-Johnson, reports that at a dinner on March 15, 1943, Eden and Roosevelt Harry Hopkins made a demonstrative record. Hopkins noted that Eden then "twice expressed himself in the sense that the Russians did not want to take on too many obligations in Europe at the end of the war," and that Stalin "would want significant contingents of British and American troops to remain on the continent." Eden spoke the absolute truth—all Stalin's actions to ensure

the decisive influence of the USSR in one European country or another were determined by the weight and influence of the ***national*** left forces in that country. This was true of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, and even Poland, although the latter was a special case. Let's move on... I have written more than once about the Ardennes

syndrome of Allied

politics and will return to it again — the falsity of the myth about Stalin's alleged desire to "conquer" all of Europe and subjugate it to Stalin's boot is very clearly manifested here. Let us recall the German Ardennes offensive and its unfortunate

connection with the acceleration of our offensive in Poland. If Stalin wanted to "conquer" everything himself, he would have begun to help out the allies in

critical situation? After all, Stalin could have refused help then - following the example of those who repeatedly did this to him

Anglo-Saxons.

Yes, the war, most likely, would have lasted a few months longer, extra blood would have flowed. But what - according to the assurances of the creators of dirty myths - was human blood for the "cannibal" Stalin. After all, he, according to the assurances of the myth-makers of "living history", drank it instead of lemonade.

By complicating the situation for the Allies by refusing to force the Soviet offensive in 1945, Stalin might have had a chance at greater post-war influence in Europe.

By the way, perhaps our losses would not have increased as a result, but would even have turned out to be smaller. However, unlike

the Britons and the Yankees, Stalin did not seek to dictate in Europe. In addition, Stalin proceeded from the fact that the wealth and power of national states should belong to the peoples who created these states, and not to those who subjugate these states with cunning and the dollar, and then rob them. It was a state morality, completely opposite to the bourgeois "state" "morality". The author of the "strategic and tactical review" of World War II undertaken in "hot pursuit" Major General John Frederick Charles Fuller, referring

to the German Ardennes attack and their subsequent resistance in the west in 1945, lamented in 1948:

“Politically, it would probably be best (for ***the Germans, according to Fuller. - S.K.***) to leave the Western Front completely and concentrate all forces against the Russians. With this, the Germans would hand over all of Germany and Austria to the Americans and the British and deal a crushing blow to the prestige of the Russians.

A refined English gentleman who started as a junior officer in the suppression of the Boers in Africa, graduated from the General Staff Academy in 1915, during the First World War -

the chief of staff of the tank corps, in 1929 - the brigade commander, wrote this and did not blush. He

was convinced that if the Germans, without hiding, would have opened the front to the Allies, that is, unilaterally, in fact, would have gone for a separate surrender to the Anglo-Saxons and surrendered all of Germany and Austria to the Americans and the British already in February 1945, then this would have been inflicted a crushing blow not to the military and political prestige of the Yankees and the British, but to the prestige of the Russians.

Sorry, but I will not comment on such "reasoning in a noble family", since the Russian literary norm is clearly not enough here. And he is not inclined to master in print the new Russian normative vocabulary, which was previously unprinted.

At Yalta in February 1945, Roosevelt declared that the United States "does not intend to use German labor" and that the United States "does not want German machine tools."

At first, it seemed to be so. Let me remind you of the directive of the joint chiefs of staff of the United States and England to General Eisenhower No. 1067 of May 11, 1945. I have already quoted it, and now I will quote a fragment from it again:

"a) prohibit and prevent the production of iron and steel, chemicals, non-ferrous metals, machine tools, radio and electrical equipment, automobiles, heavy machinery ... except for the purpose of preventing famine or disorder or disease that could threaten the occupying forces (emphasis mine. - **C.TO.**)..."

But the bottom line was, firstly, that even before the war, and even during the war, a large part of the German labor force and German machine tools was legally owned by the United States, since even in the Third Reich, American citizens owned plants and factories. This is well known.

Secondly, the West did not need a demilitarized Germany. And so, very soon, Directive No. 1067 turned into a simple piece of paper. Thirdly, the

development of the peaceful sectors of the German economy was of no use to the Yankees - German manufactured goods before the war

successfully competed in world markets with the American ones and the States were not going to revive a dangerous competitor. Directive

No. 1067, dated May 11, 1945, was the fruit of the efforts of the American Jewish financier Henry Morgenthau, Secretary of the Treasury in the Roosevelt cabinet, and was supported by the even more influential Jewish American financier Baruch. However, it was soon decided to return everything to normal, and Richard Sasuli, known to us, wrote in 1947:

“... A year after the end of the war, an agreed
the policy of occupying Germany dissipated like smoke.

...what could be seen inside the American zone...was bad enough in itself. What is known about the situation in the British zone makes the picture of the situation even more bleak. Despite vigorously worded statements... the

fact remains that the Nazis were not eliminated from various spheres of public life in the American occupation

zone...

In relation to the British zone, accusations were made that large organized formations of the German armed forces remained there. This accusation was almost never denied and, in any case, not refuted.

Sesyuli knew what he was writing. Let me also remind you that immediately after the end of hostilities in 1945, Churchill instructed Field Marshal Montgomery "to carefully collect German weapons and fold them so that they could be more easily distributed again to German soldiers with whom we would have to cooperate if the Soviet offensive continued" .

The expression "if the Soviet offensive continued" was here a euphemism, the true essence of which was expressed by other words: "if **we** had to launch a joint offensive with the Germans **against the Soviets.**" Such were Churchill's "peaceful" plans.

“Aggressiveness” is attributed to Russia and Stalin.

Stalin knew about the English tricks. And it was not for nothing that on July 25, 1945, when Churchill represented England at the Potsdam Conference, in response to the latter's complaints that there were difficulties with coal in England, since, they say, "the coal miners have not yet been demobilized," reasonably remarked:

"There are enough prisoners. We have prisoners working on coal, it would be difficult without them ... 400 thousand German soldiers are sitting with you in Norway, they are not even disarmed, and it is not known what they are waiting for. That's your labor force."

However, Churchill needed German prisoners of war not as a labor force, but as a possible "cannon fodder" against the Russians. And on the same day, July 25, 1945, the USSR delegation was forced to send a memo to the British delegation, which said:

"The Soviet government received information that the surrender regime was not fully applied to the German troops stationed on the territory of Norway ...

It is reported that the German troops stationed in the area between the cities of Meaux and Trondheim in the amount of about 260 thousand people and in the Tromsø area - 140 thousand people, have their own weapons and military equipment. The personnel of these troops are not interned and enjoy freedom of movement ... "

You read and do not believe that it could have been in July 1945.
But it was! In

order to cover up their own aggressiveness and their own desire to control Europe, the Anglo-Saxons launched a "duck" about Stalin's aggressiveness. This "duck" dropped feathers over different countries and continents, and cunning "publicists" wrote their opuses with its feathers, confirming the anti-Stalinist myth. So, the defector Grigory Klimov, already known to the reader, reported in his "Berlin Kremlin" some

details gleaned by his hero (actually, Klimov himself) from conversations in

Moscow with a certain mythical high-ranking general Anna Petrovna. According to her, after May 9, 1945, Stalin promised her husband, the general, that he would soon become a marshal.

When Captain Klimov was surprised - how can a general become a marshal if the war with Germany is over, and if there is a war with Japan, it will not last long? - the general's wife sighed and replied that her husband did not talk much about politics with her, but the last time, after returning from the Kremlin, "he was so flustered."

Having told the West this "Kremlin secret" of 1945, Klimov further wrote that he later realized that it was about Stalin's aggressive plans. And the former major of the Soviet Army, in a book paid for in dollars, was horrified by the bloodthirstiness of Stalin and the Kremlin:

"It seemed absurd to think about some kind of military plans, when only yesterday the monstrous world massacre ended and the whole world is frantically reaching for peace. It seemed incredible and implausible..."

That's right, but it was precisely about the new military plans that very powerful forces were already thinking in 1945. However, they thought not in Moscow, but in Washington: the first plan **for a preventive** atomic bombing of the USSR dates back to the end of 1945. As

for the "authenticity" of Klimov's story, his mythical "rooster"-general, supposedly the future marshal, according to Klimov, "on May 10, 1945 ... together with the Red Army generals attended a solemn reception in the Kremlin given by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks) in honor of the victory over Germany.

Having written this, the former major of the Red Army once again showed that he was a provocateur, though cunning, but not very smart.

The point is not even that the ceremonial receptions were given by the Government, and not by the highest party body, and not that the entire color of the Red Army generals on May 10, 1945 was not in Moscow, but in various European capitals ...

The fact is that May 10, 1945, as well as May 8, May 9, May 11, 12, etc., was an ordinary working day for Stalin. In particular, on May 10, his reception in the Kremlin office was limited to five persons: Voroshilov, Malenkov and Beria entered the office at 20.15

and left at 22.45. From 8:50 p.m., Vyshinsky was also in the office - for an hour, and from half past nine to 10:20 p.m. General Shtemenko was also in the office - the only Soviet general received by Stalin on May 10, 1945. That's the whole price of the "revelations" of the former major. Not far from Klimov, General Fuller, who wrote in 1948, referring to the situation in the spring of 1945, left in his assessment of Stalin's post-war policy:

“On April 7, Malinovsky broke into the eastern suburbs of the Austrian capital ... On April 11 and 12, the Germans and Hungarians were driven back across the Danube, and the next day the city was completely in the hands of Russian troops. Thus

the Russians achieved their political goal, and since Dr. Beneš and Marshal Tito were already in the hands of the Soviets, Russia now pushed her political frontier forward, drawing it in the southern part of Central Europe from Prague to Trieste. Now it remains for Russia to advance from the Oder to the Elbe, and then it was possible to create it (**living space. - S.K.**), if not completely, then at least temporarily. Lebensraum

Everything that I have just quoted is an unconditional provocation, starting with the deliberate and unlawful use of the concept of Lebensraum in relation to the policy of the USSR, taken from the dictionary of German aggressive geopolitics.

Aggressors start wars or pursue an aggressive policy in order to obtain from such a policy primarily material benefits after the occupation of the conquered countries. But did the Soviet Union exploit the peoples and resources of Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria after the war? However, what could the Anglo-Saxons do but slander us?

The “hot” war, started, among other things, in order to bring down Russia, Russia won. Now the West was left with nothing but a cold war. And "shells" and "bombs" here were supposed to be opuses like Klimovsky and theses like Fuller's.

And also - anti-Soviet myths, including the myth of the allegedly "aggressive" Stalin.

About "humane" allies and the European rehearsal of Hiroshima

Another widespread "atomic" myth of 1945 is the myth that the first cities in the world to experience the horrors of the inhuman total bombardment were Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In fact, the Yankees started in Europe.

Everyone knows about the destroyed Hiroshima. It is also known that a bomb with a capacity of approximately 15 kilotons was dropped on Hiroshima. Photos of Hiroshima are often reproduced in literature. And it is very rare to see photographs of the results of the Anglo-American bombing of German cities in the final period of the Second World War. But, for example, a panorama ... However,

with the definition of what is

shown in the photo, which I mean, I will find it difficult. Perhaps the most accurate would be the following definition: "the panorama of the place where the German city of Wesel ***used to be*** ." Yes, the panorama ***of the former*** Wesel, as well as

photographs of Dresden burned by the Allies and other similar photos, are no less, if not more terrifying, than the view of the former Hiroshima. Looking at the photo of Hiroshima, you still see that these are the ruins of the city. The view of the destroyed Yankee Wesel is completely unrealistic and resembles a lunar landscape due to dozens of craters merging with their edges from bomb explosions.

The Western reader, although sparingly, was still familiar with such photographic documents. In the USSR, unfortunately, they were virtually unavailable, and not even because they really undermined the reputation of the allies in the war. Just against the background of the tragedy of the civilian population of Germany, which was absolutely unnecessary from a military point of view, even the terrible tragedy of the citizens of Russia to some extent

became less unique. And it was not customary for us

to feel sorry for the Germans. One bomb with a TNT equivalent of an explosive force of 15,000 tons was dropped on the Asian Hiroshima. In Hiroshima, 70-80 thousand people were killed and went missing.

And on the European Hamburg for the last week of July 1943 7,500 tons of bombs were dropped - half the Hiroshima "norm".

In the report of the Office for the Study of the Results of Strategic Bombing (the Allies had this too), it was reported that Hamburg was destroyed by 55–60%, completely burned out on an area of 12.5 square meters. miles (that is, about 30 square kilometers). Between 60,000 and

100,000 people died. The column of hot air from the fires rose to a height of more than 2.5 miles and had a diameter of up to one and a half miles. Only two days later it was possible

to approach the fire zone. The aiming points during such bombing "in the squares" fell on the center of cities, and museums, libraries, and art treasures perished in bomb explosions. At the same time, the volume of military production in Germany practically did not decrease.

The English military writer, Major General J. Fuller, believed that "the strategic bombing launched at the initiative of Churchill ... was not justified by military considerations, but politically meant suicide." And Fuller was right that the Allied air terror against Germany did not have an adequate military effect.

Alas, Fuller was mistaken in another. This terror did not become political suicide either for Churchill or for the Allies in general. But in political terms, the bombing of Germany was an obvious genocide, a massacre.

In the course of this assassination, Anglo-American aircraft dropped bomb cargo on Germany: - in 1943,

about 150 thousand tons; - in March

1944, more than 50 thousand tons; - in

May 1944, over 160 thousand tons; 200 (!)

thousand tons. That is, only in March 1945,

Germany received from the Yankees almost a dozen Hiroshima in, so to speak, installments. But why? For what? There

was no

military

need for the genocide of Germany. What was

the need? She was!

She couldn't be, right?

Fuller wrote about the cause of terror, about cadocracy - the power of an uneducated mob, mob. Fuller marveled that the "return to wars of primitive savagery" was carried out by England and the United States - "two great democratic factions of the kadocracy" and not by Germany and Russia - "two great despotic factions of the same cult"...

Well, one can and should argue about Russia as a "fraction of the kadocracy". But here it is interesting that the Anglo-Saxons were severely condemned by himself Anglo-Saxon.

Another well-known Anglo-Saxon military writer, Liddell Garth, compared what "English pilots were pleased to call "higher strategy" with the actions of the Mongols in the 13th century.

Such recognition is worth a lot! But why did the civilized Anglo-Saxon politicians give their own military theorists a reason to compare themselves with the Mongols? Why did America and Britain need to demonstrate their cruelty so clearly? Perhaps that's why ... After the end of the war, Germany lay in horrific ruins, and the

sight of these ruins was easily accessible to millions of Europeans. The ruins of Stalingrad, Sevastopol, Kerch were far from Western Europeans, beyond the direct European gaze. And therefore, the impact of the

sight of these ruins on the psychology and psyche of Europeans was relatively small.

Hiroshima shocked with the instantaneous destruction, but was even further from Europe than Stalingrad. And her impression was therefore rather speculative.

And the former Dresden, Hamburg, Wesel - it was, as they say, before our eyes! Moreover, in front of millions of not only Europeans, but also millions of American soldiers who landed in Europe and then occupied it. And it is unlikely that the psychological shock from the appearance of the atomic bomb in the world would have been so deafening for Europe and the United States, if not for the "lunar" "landscapes" of Germany.

After Hiroshima - far from Europe and the United States - these German "landscapes" became for millions of ordinary Europeans and millions

ordinary Americans who came to Europe, as if an effective "visual aid" on the topic "future world war".

Instantaneously disappeared Hiroshima, really destroyed Germany in the brain of theorists like Fuller and in the minds of the general world community began to connect with visions of a possible future already **nuclear** Apocalypse. Confusion arose in the West and a characteristic bifurcation

public consciousness.

And this is what the Golden Elite of the world needed. She needed a crazy and intimidated post-war world. In humans, a split

consciousness is characterized unequivocally: schizophrenia. And the public perception of the new nuclear factor by the Western public could indeed be defined as a kind of military-political schizophrenia and paranoia at the same time. And this was exactly what was necessary for those who did not need a lasting peace in the world. To those who, not having time to skim off the cream of the just ended war, were again preparing the world, if not a new war, then new grandiose military spending. And after all, the expenses had to be justified in the eyes of the "electoral cattle" somehow. That's why, on the one

hand, Wesel's "lunar" craters were needed, and on the other, newspaper articles about Stalin's "aggressiveness". The Western world is intimidated, and it's in the bag. I mean, new profits in your pocket! This, perhaps, was the underlying reason for the barbaric "strategic"

bombing of Germany by the Allies in the second half of World War II, and especially in the spring of 1945. The horror of "carpet" "conventional" bombing should have prepared the way for the imminent mass "atomic" social schizophrenia.

And this was a particularly disgusting act of those who conceived and carried out the Second World "hot" war and started the "cold" war.

It is a pity that this is not understood by the world to this day. John Frederick Charles Fuller, the author of one of the first strategic and tactical reviews of the recent war, The Second World War 1939-1945, which I have already mentioned more than once, emotionally exclaimed:

"In the course of 50-100, and perhaps more years, the destroyed cities of Germany will stand as monuments to the barbarism of its conquerors."

It does not hurt to clarify, however: its **Western** winners.

The ruins of Germany seemed to Fuller more durable factor than even "the memory of the horrors of the concentration camps"!

Alas, after a little more than half a century, it turned out that the Germans and Europe do not remember what the modern Mongols in tailcoats did to it in 1945, but "remember" the supposedly two million German women allegedly raped by the "Bolshevik hordes".

And they put an equal sign between Hitler and Stalin, shifting even the blame for the start of World War II to Russia. But we have strong counterarguments. And it presents them to us, firstly, the real history of that war, started not by us, but by the Elite of the Anglo-Saxon world.

Secondly, the true face of this Elite and its trusted "leading" persons is revealed by the Anglo-Saxon post-war military thought itself, which branded Churchill and Roosevelt as Genghis Khans of the 20th century.

The atomic bomb: against Japan or against Russia?

The "carpet" bombing of Germany, which became the European "rehearsal" of Hiroshima, only preceded the real nuclear Hiroshima. But if the air

terror of the Allies against the Germans was not justified by anything and had no military expediency, then things are not so simple with the Japanese nuclear tragedy.

On the one hand, it is believed that the atomic bombing of Japan immediately broke her spirit and dramatically accelerated the surrender of Japan. Churchill, in his memoirs, recalling his reaction to Truman's report of the successful bomb test at Alamogordo, wrote:

“In order to crush the resistance of the Japanese and conquer the country meter by meter, it was necessary to sacrifice a million lives of Americans and half of that number of British lives ... Now all this nightmarish prospect has disappeared. Instead, a beautiful ... picture of the end of the entire war with one or two strong blows was drawn.

So, according to Churchill, the bomb against Japan was needed. On the other hand, one can recall the opinion of the French publicist Michel Rouze, who stated in 1962:

“Scientists did not know that Japan had already lost the war, at least potentially. And most importantly, they did not know that the fight against fascism was not the main goal of Washington's policy, that the bomb ... would be an instrument of intimidation, which ... was actually directed against the Soviet Union.

Ruze reports that, according to some historians who studied documents of that period, by exploding an atomic bomb, the United States wanted to win a lightning victory, to prevent the entry of the USSR into

war and thereby eliminate him from the final settlements in the Far East.
At the same time,

the American S. Lehne in his 1977 work "The Day
before Doomsday, wrote:

"No historian today insists that the atomic bombing was
necessary to put Japan
on knees".

Yes, historians! There is an official report by the German-Japanese
Strategic Bombing Evaluation Group, in which the famous John C.
Galbraith played a prominent role. The report was ready in 1946, and this
is what it stated:

"Based on a thorough investigation of all the facts and the
testimonies of the Japanese leaders involved, the Group
believes that Japan would definitely have surrendered before
December 31, 1945, and in all likelihood before November 1,
1945, even if the atomic bombs were not dropped, even if
Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion of
Japanese territory had been planned or contemplated.

So for what purposes were two atomic bombs used in Japan - for the
military, to speed up the end of the war, or for political purposes - to
intimidate the Soviet Union? Did America make the Bomb primarily in
order to psychologically bring Russia to its knees?..

I am least of all inclined to the role of a lawyer for President
Truman, the US military-industrial nuclear complex and US imperialism
(at one time, by the way, the Americans themselves saw the last word
not as an annihilating sentence, but simply as a statement of the
globalization of US interests by the beginning of the 20th century).
However, I am not inclined to replace facts and logic with emotions or propaganda.

Being on the basis of facts, one cannot but admit that the atomic
bombing was a factor of no less importance for ensuring the rapid
surrender of Japan than the entry into the war of the USSR.

Historians like Lens, publicists like Ruse and analysts like Galbraith for some reason do not take into account the exceptional tenacity and stoicism, as well as the exceptional fanaticism and obedience of the Japanese. For example, in the Red Army, and in the German army, by the way, too, during the war there were frequent cases of both mass and individual heroism, and even sacrifice. However, the institution of "kamikaze" **as an element of operational planning** was typical only for Japan. This alone could make the war

protracted, although, unconditionally and unambiguously, losing for Japan. Hiroshima process

accelerated qualitatively. I will give a representative example. Here is what we find in the very first paragraph of the book "Made in Japan" by Sony founder Akio Morita, written in the 80s:

"I was having lunch (at **noon on August 7. - S.K.**) with my fellow sailors when the incredible news came about the atomic bombing of Hiroshima Many months have passed since I realized that Japan was losing the war and it was useless to continue it, but I also knew that the military wanted to fight to the last soldier. .. **And** now, after Hiroshima, it became clear to me that time was up."

This is the reaction of a developed Japanese. And before the entry into the war of the USSR there were still two days

left. Here is more

evidence ... Commander of the 4th Separate Japanese Army, Lieutenant General Uemura Mikio:

"I assume that the reasons that predetermined the surrender of Japan were the following: 1. The armed forces of our ally Germany were defeated by the Red Army and the allies ... The use of the atomic bomb by the Americans ... Of course, due to the use of atomic bombs alone, Japan would not have capitulated, but on This was reflected in the morale of the people.

3 ... Japan could not fight against the Red Army and against the armies of the whole world. This is the main reason...”

Commander of the 1st Front of Japan, General Kita Seichi:

“In my opinion, the surrender was caused by two circumstances: 1. The use of ... the atomic bomb ... 2. The Soviet Union started a war against Japan ...”

A number of similar assessments can be made, but, perhaps, these are enough.

Having received the news of the beginning of the offensive of the Soviet troops in the Far East, Japanese Prime Minister K Suzuki said at a meeting of the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War: “The entry into the war of the Soviet Union this morning puts us completely in a hopeless situation and makes it impossible to continue the war.” That is, Japan was **finally** put in a hopeless situation by a combination of both factors - "Soviet" and

nuclear. At the same time, by the time of the surrender, there were 2.2 million troops directly on the Japanese islands and about 700 thousand in Manchuria against the USSR. And another 4 million soldiers and officers were scattered throughout the Asia-Pacific theater of operations. That is, the reserves of resistance were objectively large, and if it were not for the “nuclear” shock from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, then one entry of the USSR into the war to ensure a quick and almost bloodless surrender might not have been enough.

As for the conclusions of the Bombing Assessment Group, the conclusions of other analysts and historians about the alleged redundancy of atomic strikes against Japan and even about the redundancy of the USSR entering the war, when getting acquainted with such an analysis, the words of Shota Rustaveli, which I have already quoted, are recalled: “Everyone fancies himself a strategist, seeing the fight from the side.

After all, it was precisely such “analysts” who in August 1941 reported to the top leadership of the United States that Russia, they say,

broken irrevocably and helping her is pointless.

According to Dr. Arthur C. Compton, Truman emphasized that he deliberately adjusted the time for the combat demonstration of the atomic bomb to match the time for the USSR to enter the war with Japan.

It is unlikely that Truman did not also have in mind the aspect of the threat to the Soviet Union - there is enough evidence for this. However, the purely "Japanese" aspect in the decision on the actual use of the bomb, I

think, then prevailed. The combination of the Russian offensive with the atomic bombing would, in Truman's opinion, have the maximum effect in order to ensure a quick and bloodless surrender. And, I think, Compton conveyed everything correctly, and Truman did

not play the soul. All this is very similar to the truth. But what about the assertions of the already Soviet "nuclear" historiography that the United States created its own nuclear weapons to fight primarily against the Soviet Union, that the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was a warning to us, and not to the

Japanese? Well, the US Manhattan Project certainly had a strong anti-Soviet aspect. What more, if the head of nuclear work in the United States, General Groves himself, stated in a commission of the US Congress:

“Already two weeks after I took over the leadership of the Manhattan Project, I had no doubt that Russia was the enemy in this case and that the project was carried out precisely on the basis of this premise.”

And nuclear work in the United States began in 1942. We then fought with the Germans near Stalingrad.

However, the post-war "revelations" of Groves must be taken critical.

First, Groves was certainly anti-Soviet, but he was not an intellectual. Scientists, whom he called "long-haired", he hated. And professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology B. Feld spoke in 1983 to the Soviet

historian V.G. Trukhanovsky that the Germans should have erected a monument to Groves, because if not for him, the bomb would have been made faster and it would have been used in the war against Germany.

Already for the last reason, after the war it was profitable for Groves to press on the "anti-Soviet" aspect of the project. Like, from the very beginning, the Bomba was made against the Soviets, but the fact that they did not have time to

make it against Hitler, well ... anti-communism in the USA. Groves probably didn't even lie. He simply imperceptibly gave out what he wanted after 1945 for what was planned in 1942.

Of course, the motives for the deployment of nuclear work in the West were far from unambiguous, but in their initial phase, in any case, these reasons were not only anti-Soviet.

Suffice it to recall the history of the beginning of English atomic work ... The Peierls-Frisch memorandum (by no means British, but emigrants from Germany), the MOU committee, the Tube Alloys project are all a reaction to the threat of German aggression, and not plans for new English crusades against the "Soviets ". Although later similar plans appeared in England. The actual use of the

bomb against Japan was determined primarily by military necessity. And the bomb against Japan was needed in 1945.

However, it is not worth discounting what Groves said. Already by the autumn of the same 1945, all US atomic efforts had as their **only** goal the provision of atomic diktat in relation to the USSR, and even the destruction of the USSR.

Therefore, it would be most correct to say that the American Bomba was considered by the West in 1945 as an absolute weapon against both Japan and Russia. And by

the fall of 1945, they were already against only Russia.

About the "vile" USSR that "stabbed in the back" the "noble" land of the rising sun

When Churchill in Potsdam learned from Truman of the success of the first US atomic test, he went into a state of euphoria and painted for himself, as we know, a "beautiful" picture of "ending the whole war with one or two strong blows." "Besides, we won't need Russians,"

he added at the time.
and continued:

"The end of the war with Japan no longer depended on the participation of their numerous (***Churchill forgot to say: "beautifully armed and experienced."*** - S.K.) armies in the final and, possibly, protracted battles. We didn't have to ask them for favors."

Many American officials spoke in the same spirit at that time, but all this was a plot on the topic: "But the grapes are green." Without the participation of the USSR in the war against Japan, the situation could not only be protracted, but also not so victorious for the Anglo-Saxons.

Let's do a little virtual history exercise. Germany is defeated - this is a fact of real history. But then let's imagine the following... Let's say the allies would officially release the

USSR from its obligations to enter the war with Japan, or would make it clear that they did not insist on this and were preparing to end the war themselves - "with one or two strong blows."

It must be said right away that such strikes, even nuclear ones, would require not one or two, but at least two or three dozen, and this would take time - plutonium and uranium-235 were not yet produced in tons.

And where to strike? At that time, up to 4 million Japanese soldiers were in different places in the Pacific theater of operations. Moreover, strikes against troops would be less effective than against cities.

On the other hand, let us imagine that in a new (today virtual) situation, Japan, say, in June or early July 1945, makes a number of such wide and reasonable concessions to the USSR that completely remove our legitimate long-term claims against Japan. In return, Japan is receiving military equipment from us en masse, including high-altitude air defense interceptors, oil and other military materials. We would have had the right to do so. At the same time, the powerful Kwantung Army is completely transferred to the Pacific theater of operations. Imagine also that Japan

normalizes (and why not in a force majeure situation for it?) Relations with China. In response to the first US atomic bombings, the Japanese publicly declare their readiness to use their bacteriological weapons (BW) against their allies, and above all on US territory. At that time, its serious developments were carried out only in Japan, and it achieved considerable success here, creating real ammunition, technology, and so on. All this was based mainly in Manchuria and, due to a powerful and quick Soviet strike, was not evacuated to the mother country, but we are considering a virtual version, when all the structures of bacteriological warfare in Japan were preserved.

Recall that in real history, both the Allies and Germany had huge stocks of chemical weapons (CW), but even on the eve of the defeat, Hitler did not dare to chemical warfare, because he knew and was warned that in response the Allies would flood the Reich with chemical warfare agents. *In fact,*

although this is still not realized even by "notebook" political scientists, this was the first case of mutual strategic deterrence - not yet atomic, but quite effective. Japan, not broken by the entry of the USSR into

the war, could apply the principle of deterrence already in Asia and on another military technological base. In Europe, the Germans were deterred from using CW by the threat of CW use by the Allies. Now the threat of the use of BW by the Japanese could contain the escalation of the US nuclear war against Japan. How would you like it, gentlemen? The

nuclear nightmare of Hiroshima would have justified the Great Plague of 1945 in San

Francisco and New York... For

some reason, we forget about the exceptional cruelty of the Japanese during the Second World War. Horrible photographs of the victims of Hiroshima obscure the terrible ones, for example, photographs of the heads of Chinese patriots cold-bloodedly chopped off by the Japanese. What about "medical" experiments on people who were opened alive?

But cruelty reinforced fanaticism. And mass fanaticism, equipped with a jet-powered aerial man-torpedo, could also be an important factor.

I don't know to what extent the real Anglo-Saxon strategists took into account the virtual version described above and everything else in their calculations in 1945, but I think that they could not ignore something like that. The Anglo-Saxons have always been masters **of short-range** strategy. By the way... There is no

need to speak about their ability to a genuine, that is, a planetary smart and far-sighted strategy, because here the Anglo-Saxons proved to be just blind, putting the world of the late 20th and early 21st centuries in a fetid poisonous puddle of imperialist "gold billion" globalization "mass media » debility. But this is by the way... So, the Anglo-Saxons never owned a strategy for the constructive development of the

And

Planet and did not

even think about it - the world has always been nothing more than a "Great Chessboard" for them. However, they have always mastered the "tactical", so to speak, strategy of "playing" on the world "chessboard". Accordingly, no matter what retired Anglo-Saxon politicians like Churchill wrote in their memoirs, competent Anglo-Saxon analysts in real time were able

to think systematically, although, alas, they thought within the framework of the strategy not of Life, but of the Game. But if they thought systematically, then they could not help but realize the importance of the soonest connection to the war in the Far East of the Soviet Union. If his participation in the war in Washington was

not given special importance, then the United States would not really draw us into the war, just because in the event of a **joint** victory over Japan, Russia in the Far East would unequivocally strengthen and

powerfully. Then we would have returned South Sakhalin to ourselves and would have received the Kuril Islands, which actually happened.

The strategic position of the USSR immediately became qualitatively different, moreover, in relation to the United States. Should it have been the Yankees? Of course not. But without the participation of Russia, an early victory over Japan became problematic, despite all the atomic bombs, moreover, a few more. That is why, at the Potsdam Conference, Truman behind

the scenes more than once asked Stalin the question "about the timing," and he replied that August 8, 1945, was the earliest date. The Soviet Union, by the way, should not have dragged out

the situation either. In winter, it is not very easy to cross the Greater Khingan. And in general, it was necessary to quickly solve all military problems and move on to peaceful tasks.

Again, to this day it is not realized that the date of the first atomic strike on Japan was actually determined not in Washington - no matter how much Anglo-Saxon evidence was given to us in this regard, but in Moscow. Everything was determined by the

readiness for war of the USSR. If the Yankees had destroyed Hiroshima before the start of the Soviet offensive, then the psychological effect would have been much weaker. Japan would still have hope, albeit illusory, but hope. Another thing is when the atomic "fist" knocked out Japan, which had already received a "Manchurian" knockdown from Russia. This is about whether the United States needed Russia to ensure

success in the war with Japan. But the myth that the Anglo-Saxons allegedly did not need Russia to defeat Japan pales against the

backdrop of an even more vile and stupid myth that the supposedly "mean" USSR "stabbed in the back" the "noble" Land of the Rising Sun, the entire war of Russia with Germany strictly observing loyalty and neutrality towards Russia.

It is also alleged that by entering the war with Japan earlier than April 13, 1946, the Soviet Union allegedly violated the regime stipulated by the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact of April 13, 1941.

Well, then we will deal with this myth. And let's start with the fact that since the beginning of the war between Japan and the United States of America (with which the USSR was bound by allied obligations), incidents at sea with Soviet ships have become common in relations between the USSR and Japan (with which we signed a Neutrality Pact).

Moreover, the fact that Japan was at war with America, and we traded with America, did not justify Japanese unfriendly actions. Soviet ships could not carry military cargo to the United States - what could we give the United States then that they did not have? And any cargo that Soviet ships carried to the USSR from the USA could not be used against Japan, with which the USSR was not at war.

Why was it necessary to escalate an already difficult situation - if you are faithful to

neutrality? .. Nevertheless, already in December 1941, despite the identification marks, the Japanese fired on the Soviet merchant ships Krechet, Svirstroy, which were under repair in Hong Kong, "Sergei Lazo" and "Simferopol". In December of the same 1941, Japanese aircraft sank the Soviet steamers Perekop and Maikop, and in April 1942, a Japanese destroyer detained our steamer Sergei Kirov. For 35 days, the Japanese detained the steamer "Dvina", mocking the crew, in May 1943 the "Ingul" and "Kamenets-Podolsky" were detained ...

In total, in 1941-1944, the Japanese detained 178 Soviet ships. Moreover, we are not talking about stops and inspections of ships, which was somehow justified and which was almost constant on the routes of our ships carrying goods from the USA to the USSR. We are talking about detentions,

each time unfounded. Precisely **unfounded**, because here no reference is made to the fact that many of our cargo ships were American-built and provided to us by America under Lend-Lease (the same, for example, "Sergey Kirov" was built in 1942 in Portland and was originally called Charles Gordon

Curtis). First, although the contours of the Lend-Lease ships were American, the flags on them were Soviet. Secondly, during the war between the United States and Japan, on courses leading to Vladivostok and

Petropavlovsk-on-Kamchatka, from a certain place on the route, only Soviet civilian ships sailed. Except Japanese, of course.

The modern Japanologist Vasily Molodyakov, who is now very closely connected with Japan, calls all this "various incidents that are inevitable during the years of war between neighboring neutral countries if they belong to the warring coalitions."

Oh is

it? In fact, **neutrality** and belonging to **warring** coalitions are things that do not agree well with each other. And those who wish even in such a situation to be perceived by the other side as actually maintaining neutrality must be especially scrupulous in terms of ill-considered, and even more so, obviously intentional unfriendly actions. This is how we behaved. The Japanese, for example, on May 11, 1942,

the USSR People's

Commissariat

of Foreign Affairs sent a memorandum to the Japanese Embassy in Kuibyshev regarding the torpedoing of the Soviet steamship Angarstroy by a Japanese submarine. The ship was attacked and sank southwest of Kyushu. The Japanese standardly blamed the sinking on US submarines cruising off the Japanese coast. However, Japanese submariners sank Angarstroy, just like on February 17, 1943 in the morning, at 7 hours 45 minutes, in clear and calm weather, they sank the cargo ship Ilmen, sailing from Vladivostok to Petropavlovsk-on-Kamchatka. They sank after Japanese surface ships were inspecting the ship.

The explosion killed 7 team members. On

March 20, 1943, the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs sent another memorandum to Tokyo on this matter, and on April 10, the Japanese embassy, in a memorandum in response, again denied the sinking. We could not say anything for sure - attacking submarines do not raise flags, but all the circumstances pointed to Japanese sailors. Although everything happened,

and even today to figure it out

"everyone" is sometimes difficult.

So, on June 3, 1943, the NKID of the USSR, in a memorandum to the Japanese Embassy in the USSR, reported on the circumstances of the sinking

Soviet steamship "Kola" presumably a Japanese submarine. The note of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs reported that "Kola" left the port of Vladivostok on the morning of February 13, 1943 for the port of Petropavlovsk-on-Kamchatka for cargo; 2 minutes sunk. Of the 64 crew members and 9 passengers - women with children, 41 people escaped on two boats. Four sailors were picked up by the Japanese and

for more than a week they tried to squeeze out of them a statement that the Cola was torpedoed by an American submarine.

On June 3, 1943, the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, describing the incident in his memorandum, highlighted the fact of pressure from Japanese

gendarmes on Soviet sailors. On August 12, 1943, the Japanese replied that the Kola was sunk, de "not at all by a Japanese submarine, but by a submarine of countries hostile to Japan." As for the rest, the answer was is:

"... 2) The statement of the Soviet side about the treatment of the Japanese authorities with 4 rescued Soviet sailors is also not true, because the sailors, on the contrary, expressed their gratitude for the kind treatment of the Japanese authorities, who took care of them and provided them with every assistance."

It was, of course, polite impudence, just as the last phrase of the Japanese memorial note about the fate of 30 Soviet citizens from the Kola who died on February 17, 1943 was a mockery. **Six months** after the incident, on August 12, 1943, the Japanese wrote the following:

"... the search has so far been in vain. Thus, an assumption is made about the suffering (**as in the text. - S.K.**) of disaster by them.

You will not say anything, it is expressed very diplomatically. But this did not clarify the situation.

The dry-cargo ship "Kola", built in 1919 in the USA, was formerly called Satartia. On February 14, 1942, it was received in Seattle by the Soviet Purchasing Commission, and the State Flag of the USSR was raised on it. As for the death

of the "Cola", then, as stated in a very serious reference book "The Fleet of the USSR. Lend-Lease Ships and Vessels" by such an authoritative author as S.S. Berezhnaya, "Kola" was torpedoed on the passage from Vladivostok to the USA (not to Kamchatka) on February 12, 1943 by the US Navy submarine Sofish. So, in this case,

the Japanese have nothing to do with it? Perhaps, but oddities remain. In the date of the death of the "Cola", indicated by S.S. Berezhny (February 12 instead of February 17), there could be a simple typo. But after all, his destination is fundamentally different from that indicated in the note of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the USSR! In fact, going from Vladivostok to Petropavlovsk-on-Kamchatka is more convenient not through the Tsushima Strait, but through the La Perouse Strait. However, February clogs the last strait with ice, so the Kola route is quite understandable. And how to explain the persistence with which the Japanese gendarmes tried to knock out from the rescued Soviet sailors confirmation of the torpedoing of the Cola

by the Americans? Perhaps such persistence can be explained by the fact that the Japanese, both before the Kola and after the Kola, sank Soviet cargo ships, and in a situation where they were sure that the Kola incident was not on them, they really wanted unambiguous evidence of the guilt of the Yankees. After all, then other sinkings could be blamed on them.

According to official Soviet data from the 1970s, in total, 18 Soviet ships were sunk by the Japanese in 1941-1945, and the total losses of Soviet shipping during this time amounted to 637 million rubles. Not a few

worthwhile Putin's "rubles", but full-fledged Stalinist!

The last, as I understand it, the torpedoing of a Soviet ship by Japanese submariners took place on June 13, 1945. The steamer "Transbalt", sailing from the USA to Vladivostok, was attacked at 03:36 in the Sea of Japan after passing the La Perouse Strait! Nothing could be attributed to the Americans here. On July 7, 1945, the People's Commissar of the Navy of the USSR Shirshov reported this to the Chairman of the GKO

Stalin, saying that a ship with 9800 tons of food cargo was sunk by two torpedoes, 5 people died. Such was the case with Japanese

"neutrality" at sea. As for the violations by the Japanese of air and land borders with the USSR and provocative shelling of Soviet territory with periodic casualties on our part, these - by the definition of V. Molodyakov - "various incidents" have accumulated a great many over the four years of "neutrality". However, all this does not close the main question - did the Soviet Union violate the Soviet-Japanese

Neutrality Pact of April 13, 1941 or not? Vasily Molodyakov, who graduated from Moscow State University for free, has been living and working in Tokyo

since 1995 and defended his doctoral dissertation in 2003 again in Moscow, Vasily Molodyakov claims that the USSR violated the Pact by entering the war with Japan.

The same is said by many in Japan. Like, Stalin did not appreciate the "restraint of the Japanese" who never attacked the USSR after the German attack, and repaid them with supposedly black ingratitude by declaring war on Japan instead of accepting in 1945 Tokyo's offer to mediate between Japan and the allies.

Well, since Vasily Molodyakov can be considered today, on the one hand, one of the most zealous "Russian" defenders of Japanese interests, and on the other hand, one of the most striking such defenders, it is worth dwelling on his arguments. And we need to start by clarifying whether it is possible to speak of Japanese policy towards the USSR in 1941-1945 as a policy of neutrality? In the book "Russia and Japan: a Sword on the Scales", Molodyakov

writes: "Let's return to the main question: was the decision taken in Japan during these years **(1941-1945 - S.K.)** to attack the USSR or not? And if so, what kind? However, here there is a substitution of the essence of the matter! The

main question on the topic is different: ***"Did Japan's policy towards the USSR contribute to easing Germany's position on the Soviet-German front?"*** And if so, to what extent?

But the answer here is unequivocal: "Yes, it contributed!"

And it contributed to such a significant extent that if the USSR had not been forced to keep a large group of troops on the border with "neutral" Japan ***until the autumn of 1943***, the war in Europe could have ended for the USSR much earlier and with fewer losses. And now - a few

facts ... A little because I'm not writing a separate book about the Soviet-Japanese war of 1945, although it would be worth writing it. I am writing only a brief outline of the events of 1945, in which the Japanese aspect was - ***against the backdrop of everything else*** - whatever one may say, of secondary importance. But something can be reported ...

And it is

necessary. For example, on July 5, 1941, Ribbentrop informed the German ambassador in Tokyo, Ott, in code, about the statement of the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka, made in a conversation with Ribbentrop on March 26, 1941, in Berlin. Matsuoka, discussing with his German colleague the prospects for concluding the Soviet-Japanese Pact, said then:

“No Japanese Prime Minister or Foreign Minister will be able to force Japan to remain neutral if a conflict arises between Germany and the Soviet Union. In this case, Japan will naturally be forced to attack Russia on the side of Germany. No pact of neutrality will help here.”

Ribbentrop informed Ott about the four-month-old conversation so that Ott could, on occasion, "delicately" remind the Japanese of this "advance" by Matsuoka - albeit not officially recorded. “But Japan did not attack the

USSR either in 1941 or later,” someone might object.

And he

objects. Thus, in the early 1990s, in the amusing newspaper Izvestia, the one in which, according to the old anecdote, there was no truth just as there was no news in Brezhnev's Pravda, a certain V. Rudnev and A. Illesh asked a reasonable, according to V. Molodyakov, a question.

They say that accusing Japan of aggression against the USSR can be based only on the plans of the Japanese, and not on their actions, which, they say, did not exist. "But is it possible to judge an unrealized plan to the fullest extent of the law?" - ask V. Rudnev, A. Illesh and V. Molodyakov.

However, even here we are dealing with something like logical and historical cheating. This is not about intentions, but about the direct and large-scale **complicity** of the Japanese to the Germans! And it **really** made a difference.

Even without a direct attack by Japan on the USSR. At the same time, V. Molodyakov, in a 2005 book, claims that evidence of Japan's aggressive plans allegedly comes from incompetent minor Japanese generals, whose names are continually repeated in "Soviet scientific and popular science (? - S.K.) literature . " I don't know why our

Japanologist ignores the evidence of a completely first person, which became widely available no later than 1997. Here are brief extracts from the extensive handwritten testimony of the commander of the Kwantung Army, General Yamada Otozo, dated April 8–9, 1946:

“... The facts say that Japan seized a significant part of the Soviet Far East by armed force **(the general began with a historical review from the moment of the Meiji Revolution of 1867 and in this case meant the civil war. - S.K.)**. There is no need to say whether it was right or wrong during the brutal murder of Lazo ... it was a wrong act (...) Below I give the figures for the increase in troops in Manchuria: after the Russo-

Japanese War - 1 division, 1 independent security detachment; 1937 - 3 divisions ...; 1938 - 7 divisions ...; 1939–1940 - 12 divisions ...; 1941 - 14 divisions ...; 1942 - 15 divisions ...; 1944 - (beginning of the year) - 15 divisions ...

The just indicated increase in troops in Manchuria is a breach of the Treaty of Portsmouth...”

The former commander of the Kwantung Army wrote like this:

"The length of time between 1941 and 1943. was the period of the greatest flowering of the power of the Kwantung Army. Moreover, according to the Kantokuen plan (***Special Maneuvers of the Kwantung Army. S.K.***), after July 1941, the Kwantung Army was deployed to states close to wartime. The Kantokuen plan was not an operational war plan. It was a plan of measures to prepare for an offensive war against the USSR ... "

Who, if not the commander of the Kwantung Army, which has been completely and for a long time oriented towards the Soviet Far East, has priority in assessing the role and direction of this Japanese grouping? Japan really did not

have a war with the USSR as a primary goal. The calculation here was correct - if the Reich irrevocably defeat Russia in Europe, then until the Germans get to Baikal, in any case, the Japanese will be the first there. And for the sake of such an option, it will be possible to ease the pressure on the Yankees in the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, then America would urgently need to save the situation in Europe, and she would not be up to Japan.

Therefore, the "neutrality" of Japan was a source of constant headache both for Stalin and for the commander of the troops of the Far Eastern Front, General of the Army Apanasenko. In December 1941, against 24 Japanese infantry divisions, 3939 guns, 885 tanks and approximately 1200 aircraft, Apanasenko had 19 rifle divisions and 7 rifle brigades with 3659 guns, 1381 tanks and 1800 aircraft. Such a balance of forces, with the possibility for Japan to quickly increase them, forced the Soviet troops in the Far East to be in constant combat readiness - as Apanasenko wrote to Stalin - "for all sorts of surprises." And the Japanese constantly increased the power of the Kwantung Army, bringing its strength to

almost a million people, which accounted for almost a quarter of the ground armed forces of Japan. Good "neutrality"!

I remind you that I am not writing the history of the Soviet-Japanese war, Henceforth I will confine myself to a few considerations.

The truth is this ...

The Pact of April 13, 1941 was concluded for a period of five years, and in Article Three of it was said:

“... if none of the Contracting Parties denounces the Pact - one year before the expiration of the period, it will be considered automatically extended for the next five years”.

That is, our attitude to the extension or denunciation of the Pact, we had to express at least until April 13, 1945.

Heavy fighting was still going on in Europe, when on April 5, 1945, at 3 o'clock in the afternoon, Molotov invited the Japanese ambassador Sato to his place and announced to him that since the 1941 Pact was concluded, "the situation has changed radically."

A statement by the Soviet government, published on 6 April 1945 in Pravda, further stated:

“... Germany attacked the USSR, and Japan, an ally of Germany, helps the latter in its war against the USSR. In addition, Japan is at war with the United States and England, which are allies of the Soviet Union.

In this situation, the Neutrality Pact between Japan and the USSR lost its meaning and the extension of this Pact became impossible.

By virtue of the foregoing and in accordance with Article 3 of the aforementioned Pact, which provides for the right to denounce one year before the expiration of the five-year term of the Pact, the Soviet Government to the hereby declares Government of Japan about its desire to denounce the Pact of April 13, 1941.

It would seem, what is clearer? This was not yet a declaration of war, but it was a clear statement that the USSR, **at any time after April 13, 1945**, could oppose Japan on the side of the United States and England. And, in any case, after the end of the war in Europe

the question of the USSR's action against Japan, taking into account the denunciation of the Pact by us, became a matter of a

few months. Everyone understood this very well, and the Western press, together with officials, welcoming the decision of the USSR, directly noted that the upcoming entry of the USSR into the war against Japan "eliminates the need for the Americans and the British to fight the Kwantung Army."

However, the current lawyers of "peace-loving" (by the spring of 1945!) Japan are starting an unworthy fuss, referring to some words allegedly said by Molotov in a conversation with Sato, from which it could supposedly be

concluded that the Pact would be observed by the Soviet Union to the end of the period agreed in 1941, that is, until April 13, 1946.

Then the "lawyers" declare that the USSR, having not clearly and "timely" defined its position, allegedly "deceived" the "simple-minded" Japanese and allegedly gave them reason to hope that the Soviet Union would remain neutral for a long time to come.

I don't know who such "lawyers" are trying to present as political vdiots - Stalin and Molotov, Sato and the Japanese, or themselves?

On the contrary, in 1945, the Japanese could not but understand that already in 1945 they would definitely have to fight with Russia if they did not make super efforts on the basis of Russia's super concessions. The full understanding **by the then** Japanese leadership of the essence of the situation **in real time** can already be seen from the fact that on April 5, 1945, immediately after Molotov's announcement of the denunciation of the 1941 Pact, the current Koisu government resigned (the new government was headed by 78-year-

old Admiral Suzuki). In a sense, the situation of 1939 was repeated, when the conclusion of the Soviet-German Pact of August 23, 1939, which was unexpected for the Japanese, led to the resignation of the cabinet of Baron Kiichiro Hiranuma (he was replaced by General Nobuyuki Abe).

However, this time the Japanese could not regard Moscow's move as unexpected. On the contrary, in the situation of 1945, he was the only one expected not only in Japan, **but throughout the world!** The Pact on "neutrality" has instructed us in four years of various kinds of "bruises".

For us, the Pact was supposed to be a factor in ensuring the security of the Far Eastern borders, but it never became this factor in full measure. For the Japanese, in the context of the outbreak of war between Germany and Russia, the Pact became a means of preparing their own attack on the USSR ***at a convenient time for the Japanese.***

A little-known detail today ... When signing the Soviet-Japanese Pact of April 13, 1941, it was agreed that within six months, that is, until mid-October 1941, the issue of terminating Japanese concessions in Northern Sakhalin would be resolved. In March 1941, Matsuoka confirmed this to Molotov.

obligation. However, it was completed only in the spring of 1944.

Bearing in mind the differences between the strategic situation in which Russia found itself in October 1941 and the strategic situation in which it found itself in the spring of 1944, only one conclusion can be drawn as to why Japan did not resolve the issue of eliminating the concessions by October 1941 and why this issue was nevertheless resolved in the spring of 1944. And this detail well highlights the essence of the Japanese

"neutrality" during the war. And what about the Japanese response to the question of the

Soviet Ambassador Smetanin, asked by him in Tokyo at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War? When he directly asked if Japan would comply with the Neutrality Pact, he was also unequivocally answered that the basis of Japan's policy was the Tripartite Pact (with Germany and Italy), and if the Neutrality Pact was in conflict with this basis, it would not have strength. And what about the creation in the autumn of 1941 at the headquarters of the Kwantung Army of a

department for studying the problems of the future occupation regime in the Soviet territories? And what about the constant increase in the size of the Kwantung Army? By

January 1, 1942, it numbered 1,100 thousand people, only by the spring of 1944 they abandoned plans for an attack on the Soviet Far East and were forced to move on to developing plans for a defensive war. At the same time, its numbers decreased somewhat - the Japanese needed troops to fight in the Pacific.

And what about the closure of the convenient Sangara Strait (Tsugaru Strait) for Soviet navigation, not to mention the searches and sinkings of our ships known to the reader? Is it worth

continuing? No, after

April 5, 1945, the Japanese had no **reason** to doubt that if they did not stop hostilities and capitulate immediately after April 5, 1945, or at least after the surrender of Germany, then in the short term they would have the USSR as another enemy.

It was even possible to roughly estimate the period of the USSR's entry into the war against Japan. The starting point is the date of the surrender of Germany. Then it was necessary to estimate the time required for the transfer of troops to the Far East, and consider the date of completion of the transfer as a possible date for declaring war.

After May 9, 1945, this hypothetical date became almost exact. Having ended the war in the West, the Soviet Union should have sought to secure itself in the East **as soon as possible** - why waste time if the troops are mobilized, have the necessary training and fighting spirit? Yes, and industry had to be transferred as soon as possible to "peaceful rails", and for this it was necessary to finally put an end to the war.

The beginning of the war between the USSR and Japan was also determined by weather conditions. It was possible to transfer a lot of troops and equipment in two to three months, which meant that the USSR was ready to start large-scale and victorious military operations no later than mid-August 1945. By this time, the weather in the Far Eastern theater of operations should have been quite optimal.

Actually, back in mid-April 1945, employees of the military attache of the Japanese embassy in Moscow reported to Tokyo:

“Every day, from 12 to 15 trains pass along the Trans-Siberian Railway ... At present, the entry of the Soviet Union into the war with Japan is inevitable. It will take about two months to transfer about 20 divisions.

Therefore, all sorts of rantings about Japan allegedly “deceived” by “insidious” and “dishonest” Russians are anti-historical and not even vile and arrogant, but stupid and ridiculous. And, for example, a presentation of the dynamics of changes in Soviet-Japanese relations in the spring and summer of 1945 by one of the Japanese historians, a participant in that war, Colonel Hattori Takushiro, is impossible to read without a smile. Japan's public actions after the Soviet

announcement of the denunciation of the Pact on April 13, 1941, can hardly be called anything other than "prudence on the stairs" (by analogy with "wit on the stairs"). On April 7, 1945, the Mainichi Shimbun newspaper stated: "Japan maintains relations with the Soviet Union on the basis of pervasive honesty." No more and no less. “Penetratingly honest” Japan made sense to offer peace to the allies *immediately*

after the surrender of the Reich on the terms of the mediation of the USSR and, if ready, without negotiations, to transfer to the USSR at least South Sakhalin and the Kuriles. However, Japan behaved recklessly towards the USSR for decades, and when it faced the fact of a close war with the USSR, it behaved so undignified that it was both laughter and sin. In fact, the Japanese were so confused that they began to "lose face."

However, let the reader judge for himself. Here's a specific

example... As the Americans bombed Tokyo intensively, foreign diplomats were evacuated to the resort town of Hakone. On June 3, 1945, an acquaintance of his, a former adviser to the Japanese embassy in Moscow, Kameyama, came to the hotel to the Soviet Ambassador Yakov Malik. And seemingly by chance he said that Koki Hirota settled next to Malik, whose house in Tokyo "also burned

down." 67-year-old Hirota was considered in Japan a specialist in Russian affairs, and in 1930-1932 he was ambassador to Moscow. He had been both foreign minister and prime minister, and now he was being considered as a possible replacement for the Moscow ambassador Sato.

Kameyama hinted to Malik that, according to Japanese custom, a person who settled in a new place should pay visits to three

nearest neighbors - opposite, to the right and to the left. And therefore, they say, Hirota would like to pay a visit to Malik. Next door, so to speak.

All this, as well as the "accidental" proximity of Hirota to Malik, was, of course, sewn with white thread. Therefore, Malik excused himself by saying that, according to **Russian** custom, a guest should be treated to vodka, and she should be in the hotel No.

It would seem that here, too, everything was clear. Nevertheless, half an hour later Hirota showed up to Malik as an uninvited guest. And he began - for lack of vodka - to shed water and tears, declaring that Japan was waging a great war against the Anglo-Saxons "for the liberation and independence of Asia" and that the problem of Asia's security could be solved "only by the Soviet Union, China and Japan as the main countries of Asia ". Everything was said here correctly, Stalin talked

about the same Matsuoka in April 1941, but in June 1945, in the mouth of one of the apologists for Japanese extremism and anti-Sovietism, such a call for "unity" was, of course, empty chatter. 39-year-old Malik understood this very well and reported to Moscow:

"The unexpectedness and suddenness of Hirota's meeting with me was staged rudely and clumsily. The Japanese soil is burning under their feet, time does not endure, it is hot, and therefore they now have no time for external forms and plausible pretexts. It would be more likely to achieve substance, to ensure the strength of relations with the USSR ... Such a fawning of the Japanese before the Soviet Union is quite logical and natural in the light of the international situation and the unpromising military situation of the difficult, Japan ... "

For Malik, this was not the first such conversation. The Japanese began courting him as early as February 1945, when on February 15 another "old acquaintance" of his, the Japanese Consul General in Harbin, a former adviser to the Japanese embassy in Moscow, Miyakawa, visited the Soviet ambassador.

Miyakawa talked about how, they say, "the moment has come in the development of the war when one of the most prominent

international figures, who enjoys sufficient prestige, authority and has the necessary power to be convincing, should act as a peacemaker, demand that all countries stop the war. Miyakawa "did not hide" that he saw only "Marshal Stalin" in this role,

and explained: "If he had made such an offer, then Hitler would have stopped the war, and Roosevelt and Churchill would not have dared to object to such a proposal by Stalin." Well, what can I say? Not Miyakawa, but the Fox from the fable of Ivan Andreevich Krylov.

However, neither

Malik, nor even Stalin, played the role of the Crow.

approached.

By the way, when Malik pointed out that the misunderstandings in the history of Japanese-Soviet relations were by no means our fault, Miyakawa asked warily: "Do you think so?" Malik replied that he was

sure of it. Miyakawa was silent. On

March 4, 1945, a

representative of the Nichiro fishing company Tanakamaru came to Malik and also recommended that Stalin become something like Neptune from Virgil's Aeneid, who threatened the rebellious winds: "Quos ego!" ("I'll!"). It seems that Mr. Tanakamaru really wanted to continue to

fish within the Soviet coastal waters in accordance with unequal fishing conventions. By the way, Tanakamaru came to call on Malik's eyes again - on June 20, 1945, when he cheekily stated that Japan would like to receive combat aircraft from the USSR, which are already "unnecessary for the Soviet Union."

On April 20, 1945, official soundings began, and he himself Foreign Minister Togo told the Soviet ambassador:

"Japanese-Soviet friendly relations were the only bright spot, and I hope that this bright spot will disperse the clouds and become the core through which world peace will come."

The Japanese really wanted the initiative to come not from them, but from the USSR. They were already recklessly "losing face", and at the same time stubbornly

clung to the illusion that they still retained it. So, during a conversation with Malik on April 20, 1945, Togo expressed not an official, but only a "personal desire emanating from his personal feelings" to see Molotov if he supposedly returns from a conference in San Francisco through Siberia.

At the same time, Togo, as Malik reported, started talking about the desirability of such a meeting already at the very end of the conversation - standing up, "confused and with numerous reservations and pauses, literally squeezing out the words."

Losing himself is pathetic.

But doubly pitiful is the one who is afraid to admit even to himself that everything has already been lost, and honor

to boot. The Japanese did not want to take the official initiative, and on June 3, 1945, as we already know, a new "unofficial" Japanese representative, Hirota, came to the official Soviet representative Malik. And he also said that the public of Japan stands for friendly relations with the USSR. Malik nodded his head politely. What else was there for him to do? Let's go back a little... On

April 22, 1945, Japanese Foreign Minister Togo told the Headquarters that if Japan succeeds in winning the ongoing battle on the island of Okinawa, then "the USSR will be convinced that Japan still has significant military power." And this, they say, will encourage Russia to look for diplomatic rather than military ways to resolve the conflict. Either stupidity, or naivete, or self-confidence of this statement is amazing! However, the same can be said in general about the views of the Japanese on an increasingly "peak"

situation for them. Thus, two days before Togo's announcement, the Japanese Supreme Council for the Direction of the War adopted the "General Principles for Measures in the Event of Germany's Surrender", the essence of which was as follows:

1. Take measures to prevent fermentation inside the country. 2. Strive to expedite the implementation of measures against the USSR and "by skillful propaganda to divide the USSR, the USA and England."
3. Urgently take measures to preserve the spirit of self-sacrifice and faith in the need for victory among the people.

At the same time, the Japanese began to frantically search for a suitable mediator, trying to attract Sweden, Switzerland and Portugal to protect their interests. However, in the spring of 1945, they tried to negotiate with America directly, including through the well-known Allen Dulles - our "shooter" has ripened here too. In general,

Tokyo's "ability" to completely ignore reality at that time can only be compared with a similar "statesmanship" of pre-war Warsaw in the summer of 1939. The Poles, two months before their complete military collapse, denied the USSR even airfields for the participation of Soviet aviation in possible military operations against Germany. The Japanese, at the meetings of the Supreme Military Council in mid-May 1945, seriously discussed the need to discuss the issue of deliveries of military materials, including oil, during negotiations (?) with the USSR. This was reminiscent of a joke about a small-town Jew who

boasted that he was going to marry his son to the daughter of Rothschild. In response to the question - is it possible? - the future "matchmaker" of the banker replied carelessly: "Oh, yes! There was nothing left - to agree with Rothschild. At the same time,

it was decided in Japan to make a number of concessions to the Soviet Union "in exchange for the resumption of friendly relations."

However, nothing concrete has been said so far, and soon the tragicomedy of Malik's "probing" by the "unfortunate fire victim" Hirota

began. On May 29, 1945, Molotov met with Sato and directly asked him - how long is Japan going to wage war? Sato tried to avoid answering, to which Molotov stated:

"The war in the Far East has been going on for a very long time. The USSR is not a belligerent, and its task is to ensure a lasting peace.

After all, this was also a polite, but quite definite hint to the Japanese. Like, the USSR is ready for peace, but if peace does not come soon, the USSR is ready for war in the name of accelerating its end.

On June 6, 1945, the Supreme Council of Japan again discussed the conduct of the war, and it was recognized that "a necessary condition for the continuation of the war against the United States is the maintenance of peaceful relations with the Soviet Union."

They thought right, they acted stupidly. More precisely, the stupidity lay in the fact that ***there were no*** real actions, real and significant steps taken by Japan in the name of maintaining peaceful relations with the Soviet Union .

Did not

have! Only after June 22, 1945, when, at the initiative of the emperor, the question of an early end to the war was raised, the Japanese gave birth to a specific list of "concessions", in exchange for which Russia was supposed to save Japan from complete defeat.

The reader who is well acquainted with the history of Russian-Japanese and Soviet-Japanese relations, remembering also the great Victory in Europe just won by Russia, may not believe me when I report on the "concessions" offered to us by Japan at the turn of June-July 1945. However, their list is taken from Japanese, and not from Soviet "agitprop" (in the words of Doctor of Science V. Molodyakov) sources. So, here they are, these "great concessions":

- neutralization of

Manchukuo; - rejection of fishing

conventions in exchange for oil

supplies; - consideration of other items at the request of the Soviet

Union. That was it! ***Even the return of South Sakhalin to Russia in the original***

the agenda of the Japanese was not! Even by the end of June 1945!!

Until the complete "neutralization of Manchukuo" by Soviet troops there was a month and a half

left. As for the predatory fishing conventions, the first of which was concluded in 1907 after Russia's failure in the Russo-Japanese War, even under the more restrained convention of 1927, Japanese subjects received, among other things, the right to "catch, collect and process all types of fish and products seas, except for fur seals and sea beavers" along the coasts of the possessions of the USSR off the coast of the Japan, Okhotsk and Bering Seas. And now Japan was ready to "pervadingly

honestly" abandon these conventions, which also had a month and a half left to exist. On June 29, 1945, Yakov Malik's "neighbour" Koku Hirota handed over (to

sense - imposed) the corresponding document to the Soviet ambassador.

That, as I guess, was amused by Stalin and Molotov in Moscow, getting acquainted with these "proposals" from Tokyo, going to a conference in Berlin.

Yes, the behavior of the Land of the Rising Sun in the spring and summer of 1945 in relation to us was difficult to define otherwise than stupid, short-sighted, stingy, two-faced, self-serving and crafty. And this - with

the already absolute "transparency" of the situation. The Japanese could not but see it, but they were afraid of the inevitable, programmed by their own long-term arrogant policy towards Russia.

The denunciation of the 1941 Pact was completely transparent, both then and now. The very use by Molotov, or rather, officially and publicly by the Soviet Government, of this completely unambiguous term of international law, in fact, immediately, in real time, put an end to the Pact.

"Denunciation", as the Diplomatic Dictionary of 1985 informs us, for example, is "a duly formalized refusal of a state from an international treaty it has concluded ..."

Refusal! And the word "refusal" cannot be understood ambiguously. On May 28, 1945, Stalin spoke with the personal representative of the US President Harry Hopkins and US Ambassador Averell Harriman. The essence of the talks was not publicly disclosed then, but was it not clear that they were talking about the imminent entry of the USSR into the

war against Japan? In mid-July 1945, Japan's last supposedly "diplomatic" convulsions fell. On July 12, Prince Konoe was summoned to the imperial palace for briefings, and the Moscow ambassador Sato undertook to obtain a Soviet visa for Konoe. A transport plane was ready to deliver the representative of the Japanese emperor to the capital of the USSR. On July

13, 1945, Sato unsuccessfully tried to meet with Molotov, but did not even get to Vyshinsky. The Japanese ambassador was received by Deputy People's Commissar Lozovsky, who remained "on the farm" after the departure of Molotov, Vyshinsky, and two other deputy people's commissars, Kavtaradze and Maisky, to a conference in Berlin.

On July 18, 1945, the USSR responded to Japan in the form of *a personal* letter from Lozovsky, stating that "the considerations expressed in the message of the Emperor of Japan have a general form and do not contain any specific proposals", that the purpose of the trip of the special envoy Prince Konoe is unclear, and the Soviet government "sees no way to give any definite answer to the emperor's message, and also to Konoe's mission."

Translated from diplomatic to ordinary language, this meant: "Leave me alone!" Nevertheless, the Japanese were persistent, like the "blind" Panikovsky, who begged for a million from the underground millionaire Koreiko. And on July 21, 1945, a new telegram for Lozovsky left Tokyo: they say that the prince "carries out the will of the emperor", should ask the Soviet Government "for mediation in the matter of ending the war" and "discuss the issue of establishing cooperation relations between Japan and the Soviet Union". On July 25, 1945, Sato again came to Lozovsky. Colonel Hattori Takushiro, already mentioned by

me, talking about this in his book, reports that Lozovsky promised to inform the Soviet government about the Japanese proposals, realizing de "their extreme (uh-huh! - S.K.) *importance* ." But by the end of July 1945, the essence of Japan's position, if it was *important* for someone, then only for Japan itself. The very fact that the USSR evaded a specific answer was

an answer, especially considering that a conference of the three heads of the allied states was held in Potsdam.

A week before the official declaration of war - on August 3, 1945, Izvestia (then still a truthful print organ of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR) published a Report on the results of the Potsdam Conference, which began on July 17 and ended on August 2, 1945

of the year.

Paragraph XIV of the Communication stated:

"During the Conference there were meetings of the Chiefs of Staff of the three Governments on military matters of common interest."

What could the Chiefs of the General Staffs of the three governments discuss in July-August 1945, apart from the upcoming *joint* military operations against Japan?

Actually, finally - if something was not clear before that - everything should have become clear to the Japanese after the TASS report at the end of July. With reference to the Reuters agency, the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union reported that on July 26, 1945, on behalf of Churchill, Truman and Chiang Kai-shek, an appeal was published to the Japanese, urging them to "declare unconditional surrender or witness the complete ruin of their country."

There were 5 days left before the declaration of war. In Tokyo, they could link their last request in Moscow on July 25 with the publication of the tripartite appeal on July 26, adopted in Potsdam, where Stalin was also with Truman and Churchill. But they didn't. But

even then, for Japan, not everything was still, perhaps, lost - with a loyal attitude towards Russia. And it is precisely the situation that arose in real time around the Declaration of July 26 that gives grounds for thinking this way. I will cite in extracts

the exact beginning of the recording of the conversation between Molotov and US Secretary of State Byrnes on July 27, 1945:

Byrnes states that only this morning he heard about Molotov's request to postpone the publication of the declaration on Japan. He, Byrnes, wants to say a few words to Molotov on this subject. For political reasons, the president decided that it would be wise to publish such a statement before the troops were ordered to begin the invasion of Japan ... Two days before that, he asked for Churchill's opinion, and Churchill answered him that the president could publish a declaration also from him, Churchill, name ... In connection with the counting of votes in England, the president decided to immediately publish a declaration. The declaration was not presented to Molotov earlier, since the Soviet Union is not at war with Japan and the president did not want to create difficulties for the Soviet government ... "

The counting of votes in England, which Byrnes spoke of, was carried out after the parliamentary elections on July 26, 1945. By election day, Prime Minister of England Churchill had left for London, and after the election he became ex-premier, and was replaced in Potsdam by Labor Attlee. Therefore, Truman's haste was, it would seem, understandable - he wanted to have Churchill's sonorous signature under a serious document. It was not entirely clear why we were not informed of Truman's intention in advance, which Molotov pointed out. By shorthand records:

“Molotov says that the Soviet delegation conveyed its request **(to postpone the publication of the declaration. - S.K.)** immediately after receiving the declaration.

Byrnes replies that the text of the declaration was handed over to the press yesterday at 7 pm. Molotov says that the Soviet delegation received the text of the declaration after 7 pm...”

This story was continued the next day, July 28, 1945. Almost immediately after Truman opened the tenth meeting of heads of government, Stalin took the floor. Here's what's in the shorthand:

"Stalin. I wanted to inform you that we, the Russian delegation, have received a new proposal from Japan. Although we are not properly informed when a document is drawn up about Japan **(this hairpin was addressed, of course, to Truman - S.K.)**, we nevertheless believe that we should inform each other about new proposals. (Japan's note on mediation is announced in English.) There is nothing new in this document. There is only one proposal: Japan offers us cooperation **(Stalin knew how to ironically. - S.K.)**. We are thinking of answering them in the same vein as it was last time (in **Lozovsky's letter of July 18 - S./S.)**.

Truman. We don't mind.
Eggly. We agree.

Stalin. My information is over."

Stalin's mocking summary "There is nothing new in this document. There is only one proposal: Japan offers us cooperation" accurately reflected the essence of Japan's position towards the USSR — in fact, nothing changed in it. Japan, instead of a complete revision of its "Russian" policy, was cunning and tricky.

What if there was something new in the note of Japan? And not just "what that, but the weighty and essential new? would become

Stalin then only publicly ironic about this particular new? And would he have given up on this new one right off the bat, immediately reading the Japanese note at a meeting of heads of government? After all, Truman was also cunning. Churchill's signature was

famous, but after July 26, 1945, the modest signature of the little-known Attlee, behind whom now, and not behind Churchill, stood the might of the British Empire, had **real weight** in world politics.

That is, Truman could wait a day or two. And consult with Stalin at the same time. And Truman simply put Stalin before the fact. And he excused himself by saying that Stalin, they say, while he is not waging a war, it means that he doesn't even need to know what the Yankees are doing to end this war. On the one hand, such a step by America

- taking into account the fact that it was made in a place where Stalin was also present - made Russia, as it were, almost made public and almost an official ally of the USA and England in actions against Japan. What hasn't happened yet.

On the other hand, the absence of references to Russia in the Declaration, as it were, hinted at militaristic Japan - capitulate to the ideologically close West, so that the West would not have to again - as against Hitler - take Russian communists into the company.

But the stick is always about two ends. If Truman behaved in this way, then Stalin could have said: "Since you are not consulting with us about Japan on the grounds that we are not at war with her yet, then maybe we shouldn't start a war at all?" However, the Russian leader could and would have the

right to say so, or **think** so, only if he had not the abstract "will of the emperor" in his hands, but such business proposals

Japan, whose potential could **keep** the USSR from entering the war on the side of the allies.

Japan, instead of doing business, bred turuses on wheels. Even at the end of July

1945. So what do Russia and Stalin

have to do with it? On the evening of August 8, 1945, at 5:00 pm Moscow time, Molotov received the Japanese ambassador Shigemitsu and informed him that from tomorrow, that is, from August 9, the Soviet Union would consider itself in a state of war with Japan.

In the Far East, August 9 began at 18.00 Moscow time, that is, in an hour. At 1:00 a.m. Trans-Baikal time on the night of August 8-9, the Soviet Armed Forces opened combat operations on land, at sea and in the air along a front with a total length of 5130 kilometers. The blows were delivered simultaneously from Transbaikalia, Amur and Primorye. In total, the 13 Soviet armies and the cavalry-

mechanized group of the Soviet-Mongolian troops of General Pliev had 27 corps (85 divisions). It was impossible to resist this force.

The 1st Far Eastern Front under the command of Marshal Meretskov was the first to strike, and at 0430 hours Transbaikal time the Transbaikal Front under the command of Marshal Malinovsky moved forward. At the same time, the weather, alas, let us down - the offensive of the 1st Far Eastern Front began with thunderous torrential rains, which fettered the actions of aviation. Yes, we did

not give the Japanese time to "build up", but it also turned out to be a boon for them - the Soviet strike was so powerful and inevitable that the useless protracted resistance of the Kwantung Army would only increase the casualties on both sides without any positive result for the Japanese.

Actually, Japan should have expected the speeches of the Soviet Union from April 1945, after the denunciation of the Neutrality Pact. Once again I remind

the reader that I am not writing the history of that war. Therefore, I will not describe the course of hostilities here, but simply give a few excerpts from combat documents. From the final combat report

of the commander of the troops of the 1st Far Eastern Front Marshal of the Soviet

Union Meretskov to the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Forces in the Far East, Marshal of the Soviet Union Vasilevsky on the first day of the offensive on August 10, 1945:

"First. The troops of the 1st Far Eastern Front, following the order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, at 1.00 09.8.45 went on the offensive and, overcoming the resistance of the enemy border troops, reinforced by his field troops, defending themselves on heavily fortified defensive lines and fortified areas prepared in advance, in impenetrable taiga , mountain-wooded and swampy areas and in adverse weather (thunderstorm), broke through the enemy's border defense line in the main direction along the front up to 60 km and to a depth of 20 km ...

(...)

Seventh. On August 10, I continue the offensive with all forces."

From the report on the combat activities of the troops of the Trans-Baikal Front in offensive operation in August 1945:

"... In 15 days of the operation, the troops of the army (**6th Guards Tank. - S.K.**) covered over 1100 km with an average daily rate of movement of more than 70 km ...

The experience of the operations of the [6th Guards] Tank Army showed that large formations of BT and MB (**armored vehicles and motorized troops. - S.K.**) are capable of operating in an unprepared and uncultured theater of war, as well as the patency of the B[b] Ridge [large] Khingan even in the rainiest period ... "

From there:

"Results and

conclusions: ...9. Concentration on the direction of the main attack of up to 70% of infantry, up to 90% of tanks, artillery and aviation ensured the creation of a large penetration force, which served

the key to the successful defeat of the enemy, if he offered resistance, and the deep operational formation of battle formations of both the armies and the front made it possible to increase the force of the strike from the depths and maneuver along the front ... "

How did all this differ from the former "brilliant" "ideas" of Tukhachevsky and Co., according to which from the 17,000th division only six hundred and forty fighters were to attack in the first echelon, and the rest had to wait for the defense to break through to "develop success" ... And advance rates? Even the

Wehrmacht did not dream of such in May 1940 in France and, alas, in June 1941 in Russia.

And the confident fighting language of Soviet military leaders - pupils of the Stalin era and the Stalinist military school!

We have not published many memoirs about the war with Japan, but in any case I could not devote much space to them in this book. And therefore, even from the very interesting memoirs of the former commander of the 1st Red Banner Army of the 1st Far Eastern Front, twice Hero of the Soviet Union, General of the Army Afanasy Pavlentyevich Beloborodov, I will cite only the place that immediately concerns both the Manchurian strategic operation and the nuclear factor in that war:

"It is alleged that it was the atomic bombing that proved to everyone in Japan, including the military leadership, the hopelessness of further resistance. In this regard, I note the following. In August 1945, I had the opportunity to interrogate the commander of the 5th Japanese Army (**General Noritsune Shimizu. - S.K.**) and many other generals. During the interrogations, which often concerned the morale of the Japanese troops, not a single general mentioned the atomic bomb. Even casually. And recently, while working with the archives of the 1st Red Banner Army, I again re-read the protocols of these interrogations ... No, my memory has not betrayed me ... But about the moral impact exerted on the Japanese military by the capture by Soviet troops

Berlin, the probable entry of the Soviet Union into the war with Japan (***emphasis mine.*** - ***S.K.***) and, finally, the beginning of the Manchurian strategic operation - all the prisoners talked about this. And the generals, and officers, and soldiers claimed that ... the idea of the imminent and inevitable defeat of Japan was always and everywhere associated with the possibility of a "Russian offensive in Manchuria" ... ".

By the way, General Beloborodov reasonably notes that the Anglo-Americans stormed one or the other island in the Pacific Ocean for weeks, or even months. And on the mainland, in the Manchurian and Korean theaters of operations - just where the Red Army was advancing - the Yankees could get stuck all the more. And get stuck for a long time - according to some estimates, until 1947 and even until 1948.

And what? If the USSR had not entered the war (which led to its quick end), the Yankees would have found themselves in an "interesting position": atomic bombs would have been needed against both the real enemy - the Japanese, and against the potential enemy - the Russians. And I remind you that in 1945-1946 there were not so many of these bombs in the USA. Moreover, the use of the then nuclear weapons on the battlefield would not have been as effective as for area targets such as cities.

And how would the "conquerors of Okinawa" fought in Manchuria - this is what my grandmother said in two. But we won back there quickly and "on five".

Yes, one could write about a lot more and make more than one series of comparisons. However, I will end, perhaps, with this ... On

March 6, 1944, the English Daily Mail reported that a group of financiers, industrialists and Tory parliamentarians had opened a campaign for a compromise peace with Japan, arguing that Japan should become a stronghold of anti-communism in Asia. And on May 1, 1945, at a cabinet meeting,

US Secretary of the Navy Forrestal raised the question: "How expedient is it for us to finish off Japan? .. What is our policy regarding Russian influence in the Far East? What are we going to oppose to this influence - China or Japan?"

The question was almost rhetorical, because China could not be a counterbalance to Russia, both because of its obvious weakness and because of the growing

“reddening”, and Japan, after the inevitable heavy defeat, would also not be able to resist Russia. At the same time, Japan was much more convenient than China as an object for the presence of the United States, which intended to become a decisive force in the Asia-Pacific region.

Japan could have

resisted US pressure in an alliance with Russia, but at the beginning of the 20th century it rejected such an alliance and only verbally recognized its beneficence for Japan in 1945.

As a result, we again came in 1945 to Port Arthur and Dalniy, we regained completely Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands naturally belonging to Russia, we gained influence in Korea and China, but all this did not change the obvious fact that in the case of a smart **policy Japan in relations with the USSR**, we could get all this **without a war with** Japan, which we had to enter into in alliance with the self-serving, ruthless and aggressive Anglo-Saxons due to the policy of Japan itself. Japan could, having outlived its

aggressiveness in relations with Russia, maintain its position **as a complex** (including militarily) leading Asian power, friendly to Russia. Now Japan could only roll along the American "rut",

exchanging an original great destiny for video players and a plastic Mickey Mouse. In October 1945, already after the signing of the Act of Surrender on board the

battleship Missouri on September 2, the new Japanese cabinet was formed by Baron Shidehara, a supporter of American orientation, a monarchist and a relative of the leaders of the Mitsubishi concern.

And off we go ...

The USSR did not receive its occupation zone on the territory of Japan, although it was originally intended, but in Japan the occupation authorities of the United States took power. In 1950, a united Allied Council still formally existed, but on December 21, 1950, Izvestia published a lengthy statement by a member of the Allied Council for Japan from the USSR, Major General A. Kislenko.

It followed from it that by the end of 1950 in Japan, after the issuance of the directive of the supreme commander of the occupying forces, General MacArthur, to close the newspaper of the Japanese Communist Party Akahata, the Japanese authorities banned another 1200 print publications,

dismissals of progressively minded university professors and teachers began, and the expulsion of students. More than

one hundred students.

On the other hand, on October 13, 1950, at the direction of the American occupation authorities, the Japanese government restored to political rights more than ten thousand active leaders of militaristic organizations, heads of monopoly concerns, former career officers of the army and navy, and officials of the Japanese secret police.

It was a good practical commentary on the Declaration of the Heads of Government of the United States, the United Kingdom and China on Japan of July 26, 1945, where paragraph 6 stated:

“... The power and influence of those who deceived and misled the people of Japan, forcing them to follow the path of world conquest must be forever eliminated ...”,

and in paragraph 10:

“... The Japanese government must remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, religion and thought will be established...”

In Korea at that time there was already a new war started by the Yankees, and a new period began in the recent history of Japan. And he, like all the previous ones, had an anti-Soviet and anti-Russian color, which, alas, persists to this day. Finally, the last...

In his post-war memoirs, Shigenori Togo (1882–1950), a career diplomat from 1913 and a former interlocutor of Adam Malik, regretted that the Japanese hesitated for too long to "interest" the Russians in serious proposals. And Togo was right. Back in September 1944, the Japanese Foreign Ministry compiled a list of possible concessions to the USSR, and it was such that everything could have turned out differently for Japan if this list had been brought to the attention of the USSR at the same time, in real time. Here

is the list:

- permission for the passage of Soviet merchant ships through the strait Tsugaru (**Sangarsky, between the islands of Hokkaido and Honshu. - S.K.**);
- the conclusion between Japan, Manchukuo and the USSR trade agreements;
- the expansion of Soviet influence in China and Asia; - demilitarization of the Soviet-Manchurian border (**that is - complete evacuation of the Kwantung Army. - S.K.**),
- use by the Soviet Union of the North-Manchurian Railway (**former CER. - S.K.**); - recognition of the Soviet sphere of interests in Manchuria;
- Japan's refusal from the fishing convention; - return of South Sakhalin; - cession of the Kuril Islands; - the abolition of the Anti-Comintern Pact; - the abolition of the Tripartite Pact (**that is, the rejection of the alliance with Germany. - S.K.**). The Japanese did not dare to offer us this list, compiled **by them**, either in 1944, or even on the eve of their imminent collapse. But if this became a reality in the fall of 1944, or even better in the fall of 1942 or 1943, or even better before the start of the war between Germany and the USSR, the history of the three great powers and peoples - Soviet, German and Japanese - could take shape in the 20th and 21st centuries. completely different. And not only the history of these three peoples.

And once again about Churchill, Fuller and the atomic bomb

In the days of the last - 130th anniversary - of Stalin's anniversary, friends introduced me to the brilliant essay "The Final Solution to the Stalinist Question" by blogger Avraam Boleslav Pokoy that appeared on the Internet. Previously unfamiliar with his work, I was delighted with both the style of A.B. Peace (I don't know if this is a pseudonym or not), and the essence of the essay. I think it would be appropriate to cite part of this essay in a book. So:

“...“What do you think — was Stalin good or bad? That's good or bad, huh?” they ask me. “Stalin is the guy who smoked a pipe and drank wine,” I answer, grinning at something of my own. “Under him, they defeated Hitler and invented Pinocchio.” The fact is that such a question immediately resurrects in my memory a distant February evening of 1945 in the Crimea ... Standing with cognac, surrounded by various diplomats, spies who pretend to be journalists, and journalists who pretend to be spies, I carefully watched the chuckling trio of winners (Stalin , **Roosevelt and Churchill. - S.K.**). Next to me, someone sighed and said: “I don't understand how they can talk with this executioner of nations.” I turned around. The speaker was swarthy and bespectacled - later I repeatedly visited him at the University of Bombay to exchange experiences. “You yourself understand, my dear, that I am not ready to carry on a conversation about my leader in such a tone,”

I answered.

- Where is your leader? the Indian was surprised. - I'm talking about

Churchill. I was also surprised: all I knew about Churchill was that he was an uncle who smokes cigars, drinks cognac and brings up

bulldog, and also - that under him they defeated Hitler and came up with Winnie the Pooh.

But the doctor told me that the real Churchill is somewhat wider than his image ... "

According to A.B. Pokoya, Dr. Kumar from Bombay told him things really little known in Europe. So, the famine of 1943 claimed the lives of one and a half to two and a half million Hindus in Bengal, and the British authorities prevented the starving people from fleeing to more prosperous areas ... And when Churchill became Under-Secretary for the Colonies at the beginning of the century, Britain stopped publishing data on the victims of the famine, and there was a reason - only in India, up to 80 (eighty) million people died of starvation.

However, Dr. Kumar was not surprised by *this* Churchill, noting: "But he started with the blood of innocents, he is no stranger to it." And further, in an essay by Abraham Boleslav Pokoy, an impressive track record of a convinced punisher was set out:

"The young aristocrat began his career with the suppression of the uprising of Jose Marti in Cuba **(to be precise, he provided the Spaniards "only" moral support there, as a journalist. - S.K.)** and punitive operations in Sudan ... Then he participated in the genocide of the Boers. Then, as best he could, he strangled the Irish, Somalis, Rhodesians and Indians. Diving and emerging from power, he drove hungry Kenyans from the land, sent thousands of English homeless children to Australian labor colonies, bombed refugees in Dresden ... "

Of the Indians, Churchill said: "A stupid race, saved only by its reproduction from the fate it deserved," and what he meant by "deserved fate" for the "colored" races could be understood from his statement in 1937: "I do not think that an injustice was done to the natives of Australia - a wiser, purer race came and occupied

their place."

"Churchill and his empire rob half a billion people, mutilate the conquered countries, kill by the millions, cut out the color of the local

nations, and you keep thinking that this is a cute cunning guy in a top hat," Dr. Kumar from Bombay said bitterly in 1945. And he, of course, knew what he was talking about - India was then still the "principal pearl" in the crown of the British Empire. I read a lot about Churchill, I myself wrote something about him, but his

characterization was more **concise and** talented than that of either the Bombay doctor Kumar, or A.B. himself. Peace, I have not met. Here all points are placed above the truth: Churchill and his circle are **the executioners** of peoples. Actually, if the reader remembers, in fact, Churchill was compared with Batu, Mamai and Genghis Khan even by his

own compatriots Liddell Hart and Fuller. That's right, however, in all such characteristics of Sir Winston, Churchill of the "atomic" era is completely absent, and therefore I will somewhat supplement the thoughts

of either Dr. Kumar, or A.B. himself. Peace, but at the same time I will allow myself to think a little and something else about

than and about whom.

The appearance of the Bomb in the world radically changed the problem of peace and war, and this was realized already in 1945. So, even then the English professor Woodward in his book "Some Political Consequences of the Atomic Bomb" ("Some Political Aspects of the Atomic Bomb") wrote:

"A war with the use of atomic bombs, which in 12 days can destroy the 12 largest cities of the North American continent or the 12 most important cities that are now left in Europe, may be too great a test for us. Humanity is not

will disappear, but people, having no help and material means to restore, will return back to something like the end of the Bronze Age.

Do not say anything - it was said right! However, the West could not abandon the idea of war as such, even under the threat of a return to the Bronze (or even Stone!) Age.

But from now on, it was impossible to look at the war through the eyes of theorists and practitioners of the past - now of **the pre-nuclear** past.

In its first phase, during the period of the Polish and French campaigns, the just ended World War II could be seen - in line with the views of the longtime German theorist Clausewitz - as "the continuation of politics by other means."

But after Stalingrad and Sevastopol, completely swept away by the war, after thousands of conflagrations in Belarus, Ukraine and Great Russia, after Hamburg and Dresden, after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the war began to be seen rather as the final and irrevocable completion of any civilized **policy**. Correctly grasping

this, J. Fuller nervously stated:

"To complete ... the moral collapse, an atomic bomb appeared, which, almost with magical suddenness, in a few seconds, made possible everything that Douai and Mitchell preached about (**apologists for the total "aviation" doctrines. - S.K.**) for many years. Without the atomic bomb, their theory was a dream. With it, their theory became the darkest reality that man has ever encountered.

And at the same time, the West, the same Fuller and Churchill, were accused of Stalin's "aggressiveness". Well, involuntarily comes to mind: "Doctor, heal yourself!" In 1945, Russia lay in much more horrifying ruins than Germany. No one in Russia - from a widow-soldier with many children to Generalissimo Joseph Stalin - aspired to a new war. Atomic weapons were at the disposal of the United States of America alone, which had "special" relations with England. In the USSR, the new First Main Directorate (PGU) was just beginning its work - the embryo of the future nuclear industry. Before the first test of the first Soviet atomic bomb

RDS-1, there were still four years, which at that time in the West, by the way, no one believed in, unambiguously extending this period by several years.

"Peace-loving" America made the first estimates of the first plans for the atomic bombing of the USSR. And the English professor was thinking - is it possible to pay with the danger of the collapse of civilization for the opportunity to "block the path of Stalin"?

In fact, where is the path? Was Stalin rushing to the English Channel and Dunkirk? Or was it Stalin who surrounded America with his military bases, as the Yankees did in relation to us? No,

already in 1945 the unwillingness of the West immediately, immediately after the appearance of the apocalyptic destructive force, to abandon the war in practice, was clearly manifested. For example, by way of general and controlled disarmament.

If the West wanted peace, it would have offered it - in the most guaranteed form of peace without weapons! If Stalin was "aggressive" and

the West was peace-loving, then why was the West not willing to put Stalin in a "moment of truth" situation and offer him complete phased disarmament? Already in 1945, after the surrender of Japan. Would the USSR go for it? I think so, if the West's refusal

to war was sincere and real, and not Jesuitical and Phariseal. Although it is not even

the point - would Stalin agree to such a variant of the world order or not? The bottom line is that in 1945 **the monopolistically** nuclear - in

1945 - West not only did not propose the complete disarmament of Russia, which was still nuclear-free, in the form of official state ideas,

but was unable to put forward such proposals, at least in the form of some journalistic proposals developed by thinkers of the West. Separate sound voices drowned in the choir of condemnation. Everyone - **and Churchill the first** - praised the Bomba as a guarantee against Stalin. And no one in the West said: "From now on, war is impossible. Let's offer Stalin - let him not develop his Bomb, ~~these~~ ^{these} with us to a world without ^{political} weapons. And in confirmation

of our peaceful intentions, let's return US troops overseas, let's start unilateral partial disarmament. After all, we **already have** an absolute weapon, but Stalin does not have it. If Stalin

shows real aggressiveness, then with a clear conscience we will use this weapon against Stalin, as we would use it against Hitler, as we used it against militaristic Japan. What if Stalin

accepts the idea of a reliable world, then in ten years such a world will become a reality. However,

nothing of the kind has been said in the West, even in the form of the ideas of university professors. Because the West itself was permanently aggressive and unwilling to give up, if not from war, then from military profits.

And only he.

The West has already staged two world wars for the peoples, which have turned out to be an increase in wealth, influence, power for the elite of the West and - let's not forget - ultimately rallying the national elites of various Western countries into a single cosmopolitan elite, whose main concern was the preservation of its unrighteous and undeserved privileges. Therefore, 1945, having

become the first year of peace, at the same time became the year the West began to prepare for a new war.

War, all the same - against Russia.

What was left for Russia but to speed up its own nuclear work as much as possible?

About the nuclear United States, the "benefactor of mankind" Bernard Baruch and the special committee of Lavrenty Beria

Yes, by the fall of 1945, US nuclear policy had become cynical adventure. And there is no overexposure in such a harsh assessment.

Let's think about what kind of nuclear policy would be rational for the United States? Obviously, one that would provide security, firstly, directly to the territory of the United States, and secondly, the territory of their allies.

With this approach, the existence, improvement and **reasonable** build-up of the US nuclear arsenal could be regarded as a logical decision, since the US did not offer the world large-scale disarmament.

However, the United States immediately began to build up the potential **of the first destructive** ("sudden disarming", etc.) strike against the USSR. This is well

known today. An unmotivated aggressive line was characteristic of the "nuclear" policy of the United States later, and it remains just as aggressive and vile towards Russia to this day. Then it all unfolded like this. In August

1945, the first and last combat nuclear explosions died down, and from September 11 to October 2, 1945, the first session of the Council of Foreign Ministers (CMFA) was held in London - a body that included ministers of the USSR, USA, Great Britain, France and China. US Secretary of War Stimson later recalled that after his

conversation with Secretary of State Byrnes on the eve of the London Ministerial Council session, the impression was that Byrnes expected that "a bomb in his pocket would be, so to speak, an excellent solution to the problem." However, the USSR turned out to be "intractable" (Byrnes's definition). And with the hands of Kuomintang China, Byrnes disrupted the session.

From December 16 to 26 of the same 1945, the Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain was held in Moscow. Among other things, the Meeting decided to submit to the 1st session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) a proposal to establish a commission "to consider the problems that have arisen in connection with the discovery of atomic energy and other related issues."

And here I have to go beyond the time frame of 1945 into the next - 1946. On January 24, 1946, at the 1st session of the UN General Assembly in London, the Atomic Energy Commission was established. She worked on draft conventions on the prohibition of atomic weapons and on the creation of a system of control over the use of atomic energy exclusively for

peaceful purposes. However, on June 14, 1946, at the very first meeting of the UN Atomic Energy Commission, US representative Bernard Baruch submitted to the Commission a plan that went down in history under his name. The essence of the plan was the creation of an international control body, not accountable to the UN Security Council, but having the broadest

powers of control and inspection. Baruch's plan wasn't all that cunning. But he

was

mean and cheeky. Still would! All nuclear facilities of all participating countries (actually, they were, of course, the USA and the USSR) were to be transferred under "international control" with the right of access to national territory, with the presence of representatives-inspectors on this territory, etc.

The prohibition of atomic weapons was not envisaged by the Baruch plan. The Baruch

Plan was seen in Russia from the outset as an attempt to consolidate the US nuclear monopoly through US control of Soviet nuclear work. And this assessment was the only consistent one.

Here is the proof... The Baruch Plan was preceded by a report by a group of experts: scientists, politicians and big industrialists, known as the Acheson-Lilienthal Report of March 28, 1946. According to the authors of the report, the question of when to stop

(this also meant, of course, "whether or not to stop") the production of atomic bombs, the United States will decide for itself, and this decision will not have a direct bearing on the American control plan.

Later, Dean Acheson, in a letter to Secretary of State Byrnes, confirmed the principle of the independence of American atomic weapons from the control agreement already in relation to the Baruch Plan.

The USSR, of course, could not agree to this, and the Baruch plan went into oblivion, and on July 29, 1949, the UN Commission itself followed it.

However, the very problem of nuclear weapons and their meaning remained because the world had nuclear weapons.

American....

Therefore, already in 1945, a conceptual understanding of the inevitable consequences and prospects associated with the discovery of a new type of energy began. A number of historians of the atomic problem agree that the memorandum of the physicist Leo Szilard, sent to the US President in March 1945, can be taken as a starting

point here. Well, if we keep in mind the first set of ideas about the possible development of the nuclear problem, taking into account the factor USSR, then this memorandum, perhaps, really name "staged".

Sometimes the Szilard memorandum is regarded as a document imbued only with the desire to prevent the military use of the practically ready atomic bomb. The report of June 11, 1945, prepared by a committee headed by the Nobel Prize-winning physicist J. Frank (plus two more physicists - Hughes and Szilard, and three chemists - Hognes, Seaborg and Rabinovich) is also evaluated. The report was entitled "The Social and Political Consequences of the Development of Atomic Energy" and was sent to Secretary of War Stimson.

However, Stimson also drew up his own memorandum to the President on April 25, 1945.

The intentions of both Szilard and Frank's group were far from being only pacifist. Everything was more complicated, and these documents cannot be called unambiguously constructive. If we discard the emotional turns ("monstrous weapon", "slightest careless step", "catastrophe", "save the situation", etc.), then it was possible to single out such main points in them.

1. The military use of nuclear weapons stimulates the nuclear arms race. At the same time, the future nuclear status of the USSR was of particular concern, in which sane authors do not doubted.

2. The way out was seen in a more or less (however, rather more than less) strict system of international control over all stages of nuclear activity, starting with the extraction of uranium ores. I will note in parentheses that he meant control, seemingly all over the world, but Szilard, for example, proposed **unlimited** inspections on the territory of the USSR for some reason specifically. He also owns the idea

of creating a kind of state of inspectors from among "secretly recruited Russian citizens with guarantees of personal immunity." This lengthy euphemism could be replaced by two words

- from among the "traitors and spies." In the Frank report, control was proposed at the stage of uranium mining

and enrichment, followed by a strict accounting of each pound and forced denaturation of pure uranium (that is, the introduction of hard-to-separate impurities into it, depriving the uranium of weapon-grade conditions). But the authors of the memorandums were silent about what to do with the

already
U.S.-made weapons-grade uranium and plutonium.

In fact, no one suggested abandoning the development of US nuclear efforts. On the contrary, the expansion of these efforts and the provision of world nuclear leadership by the United States (including in the military aspect) was assumed automatically.

That is, the main American conceptual ideas in the nuclear sphere were formed quite early. And in general, it was a course towards the US nuclear monopoly, attempts to establish control over Russia, as well as discrimination and limiting the possibilities of the Soviet Union to acquire a nuclear status. Moreover, in the "nuclear"

history of 1945 there is an interesting moment that became known not so long ago. The first nuclear explosion took

place at Alamogordo on **July** 16, 1945. And almost a month **before that**, the famous French physicist Frederic Joliot-Curie, having arrived in Moscow for the anniversary session of the Academy of Sciences in **June** 1945, addressed the President of the USSR Academy of Sciences

B.J.I. Komarov with a proposal to unite the atomic efforts of the USSR and France.

He first proposed this at the end of 1944 through the Soviet ambassador to France, A.E. Bogomolov. In a letter addressed to Komarov, Joliot Curie, briefly reporting on his own work and on large-scale work in the United States, wrote then:

“Practical implementation of them (***atomic work. - S.K.***) in a relatively short period of time is possible only in a large country that has raw materials and a developed industry. In France we have good specialists...”

At the same time, Joliot-Curie, in a conversation with Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences Ya.I. Frenkel expressed the opinion that "a practical solution to the problem of uranium is within the reach of only such large countries with huge resources of raw materials and highly developed

industry as the USA and the USSR." If not for the high reputation of the Frenchman - both in the world in general and in the eyes of the USSR - the action of Joliot-Curie could be regarded as a subtle reconnaissance sounding. But no one among us

regarded Joliot's intentions ***in this way***. However, taken by itself, his idea was doomed to futility, if only because: 1) its author had no intention of settling in the USSR without a break, and 2) he himself declared that de Gaulle would be against cooperation with the USSR.

It was in this spirit that L.P. Beria in September 1945 in a letter to I.V. Stalin. But for the topic

of our conversation, it is interesting that already in 1945 (even in 1944!), Even before Alamogordo, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the European Joliot-Curie did not doubt, firstly, the right of the USSR to its own nuclear weapons and emphasized that all his sympathies are on our side. He refused US offers to join their work and offered his own participation in the work of the USSR. Secondly, the French scientist in 1945 was clearly aware

that in the foreseeable future, only Russia can and, according to all indications, should and has the right to become the second nuclear power.

So why were the euphemisms of the American memorandums needed, if behind their words about "any other country", etc., there was actually one thing: "Russia"?

If scientists, military officers and politicians in the United States were thinking about a stable world, then after the acquisition and even more so after the first military use of nuclear weapons, the United States had, as later, two constructive options for behavior.

First. Not anyone, but the United States, should have proposed to the world and, above all, Russia, the following plan, for example, the same Szilard, which retained its formal structure, but was slightly corrected, let's say like this ... The

United States gives up its territory under unlimited international control with the granting of rights to the USSR secretly recruit U.S. citizens for inspectorial duties under "the guarantee of their personal integrity." Why not? An honest approach

implies equal rights for both parties. Further, the United States announces the

complete curtailment of nuclear work, curtails them, under the control of the USSR, blows up its nuclear arsenal in the desert regions of the Earth, and then agrees to a total inspection of all spheres of the economy and armaments so that the world is convinced of the complete ban on atomic "military" energy . And only after that (or

at the last stages of the implementation of this project) is the same comprehensive control over the curtailment of nuclear work in the USSR and the same strict total control over compliance with the ban introduced. On **such** a contractual basis, it was possible

to start reactivating atomic research, giving it an international and peaceful character. That's what America had to offer Russia to ensure a total nuclear-

free world. Or a nuclear world, but only with peaceful nuclear energy in the extraction and use of

uranium and other fissile materials under strict international control. The second option was also possible. The US retains atomic weapons. But then they create - without increasing

it further, **a small** nuclear arsenal, recognizing the USSR

the right to: a) carry out a full cycle of nuclear works; b) test their nuclear weapons; c) to create their own, too, **a small** nuclear arsenal.

Russia would then have to agree with the United States on a freeze on nuclear military efforts under tight international control. With a trend towards a steady aggravation

of the situation for one of the two powers on the part of third countries, the United States and Russia would have the right to a coordinated increase in their nuclear arsenals simultaneously or unilaterally - as they agree. However, the US and the West

needed only their nuclear monopoly directed against the Soviet Union. In 1945 the USA and the West

had such a monopoly. In 1949 they lost it, but that's a completely different story. And here I will only talk about its beginning, referring to 1945. The war largely destroyed the results of the creation of the thirties in the USSR. In economic terms, Russia in 1945 was thrown back significantly. In 1939 we produced 43.2 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity, in 1945 the same 43.3 billion.

We smelted 12.3 million tons of steel in 1945 against 17.6 million tons in 1939. Oil was extracted by 19.4 million tons instead of 30.3 million tons. The gross grain harvest in 1945 amounted to 47.3 million

tons against 97.4 million tons in 1937. In 1945, the Dneproges, Zaporizhstal, Krivorozhstal, Azovstal, Kharkov and Stalingrad tractor plants, the mines of Donbass, the oil

fields of Grozny and Drogobych had not yet been restored ... The fields of Belarus, Ukraine and the Russian Chernozem region were plowed instead of tractors by horse teams, and sometimes - and women harnessed to the plow

instead of horses and bulls burned in the fire of war. Then it was not in vain that a bitter ditty was born:

I am a horse, I am a bull, I
am a woman and a man...

What kind of "aggressiveness" of Russia could we talk about in these conditions?
After the

Victory, Russia and Stalin had one desired task - to quickly heal war wounds, restore the country, and feed the people. And it is not the fault of Russia and Stalin that, along with this task, immediately after the Victory we had to solve the second grandiose task - to protect the country from the threat of US atomic aggression. And it became quite possible. On October 31, 1945, the US Joint

Chiefs of Staff gave the first summary of "atomic" targets on the territory of the Soviet Union: Moscow, Leningrad, Gorky, Kuibyshev, Sverdlovsk, Novosibirsk, Omsk, Saratov, Kazan, Baku, Tashkent, Chelyabinsk, Nizhny Tagil, Magnitogorsk, Perm, Tbilisi, Novokuznetsk, Grozny, Irkutsk, Yaroslavl. Minsk, Kiev, Kharkov, Stalingrad, Sevastopol, Rostov, Zaporizhia, Nikolaev, Dnepropetrovsk, Mariupol, Odessa were not **yet** on this list for the sole reason that their industry was already destroyed by "ordinary"

German bombs. We had to create our own Bomb as soon as possible - how

US bomb warranty.

On September 4, 1945, the State Defense Committee (GKO or GOKO) was abolished. Now the former chairman of the GKO, Stalin, was again simply the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. Stalin's deputy for the State Defense Committee, Beria again became Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, while also remaining People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR. However, on December 29, 1945, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, he was relieved of his duties as the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of

the USSR. On January 10, 1946, Beria and the new People's Commissar Kruglov signed an act of acceptance and delivery of cases for the People's Commissariat, and on January 15, 1946, a brief message appeared in the Izvestia newspaper in the

"The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR granted the request of the Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR Comrade L.P. Beria to release him from the duties of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR due to the congestion of his other central

work. Comrade S.N. was appointed People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR. Kruglov.

Nothing was reported about the essence of the other "central work", and nothing could be reported, because the GOKO Decree of August 20, 1945 No. 9887ss / op "On the Special Committee under the GOKO", from which something concrete could be drawn stamp "Top Secret (Special Folder)". This Decree created a Special Committee with emergency powers to solve any problems of the "Uranium Project", headed by Chairman L.P. Beria.

Having won one war, Russia immediately had to strain its efforts in order to neutralize the threat of a new and even more terrible war. The war planned against Russia by

bow tie lover President Harry Truman, cigar lover Winston Churchill, secret power lover Bernard Baruch and other "nuclear" "benefactors" of humanity. As for the role of Beria in preventing an atomic war, I recently received very interesting information on this

score and I cannot resist the temptation to share it with the reader already in this book.

Finishing Myths of 1945, I met 85-year-old Lyudmila Dmitrievna Pavlova-Golovina (both surnames after two husbands), nee Kataeva. Lyudmila Dmitrievna is a most interesting person. And this is what she told me. She came to the "atomic" "Arzamas-16" in 1947

on Stalin's ticket as a young intelligent cardiologist. She treated the entire "Sarov" "top" of the Soviet Atomic Project: Academicians Khariton, Zeldovich, Sakharov, Negin, Pavlovsky, Professor Fishman and others, including the long-term director of the "Object", twice Hero of Socialist Labor Lieutenant General of the Engineering Service Boris Glebovich Muzrukov .

Muzrukov is a historical, legendary figure. He received his first Star during the war as the director of Uralmash, and he became one of the first twice Heroes in 1949 as the director of our first Plutonium Combine.

Lyudmila Dmitrievna was a friend of the family of Boris Glebovich, she knew him and his wife well. And already in the seventies, the doctor Golovin was called to Muzrukov, who felt bad. As a result, Lyudmila Dmitrievna had to bring him out of a state of clinical death. When everything had

already ended successfully and there was no need to be afraid for the life of Boris Glebovich, she decided to ask Muzrukov the question that had long tormented her: "Boris Glebovich, what is there to conceal at such a moment, please tell me how you feel about Stalin and Beria?"

Muzrukov was a member of the junior state cohort of Stalin, but he almost did not communicate with him "live", although he knew everything about Stalin not from word of mouth messages. With Beria, Muzrukov had to interact a lot even during the war, and after it, it was Beria who attracted Muzrukov to "atomic affairs".

And at a moment that was, of course, "the moment of truth", returning again from the other world to this one, Muzrukov answered as follows:

"Lyudmila Dmitrievna, don't listen to anyone, don't trust anyone ... Remember: the fact that we are talking with you now, that we live and that the country lives, we owe primarily to two people - Stalin and Beria."

So the man who himself did a lot to ensure that the day of May 9, 1945 became Victory Day for Russia, appreciated the contribution to the history of Russia of her two other sons, who did more for this Victory than anyone

else. However, Stalin and Beria were able to do so much because they did not separate their fate either from the fate of Russia, or from the fate and

future of its peoples. Yes, Russia was taken by surprise by the war, although it was not Stalin's fault. But Russia ended that war as an experienced and capable military power, and here the role of Stalin turned out to be

outstanding and paramount. Although

today they are trying to challenge this. Well, moving towards the end of the book.

About "bastard" Russia, which allegedly approved the victory "on the mountains of the corpses of its soldiers"

The standard "democratic" cliché is: "Stalin is not defeated Germany, and filled up the Germans with corpses.

At the same time, the numbers of our losses are called, as a rule, absurd. Perhaps the official "Gorbachev" figure, which raised Khrushchev's figure of 20 million dead during the war to 27 million, is also absurd. I wrote "absurd" even about the "Gorbachev"

figure because

I doubt that Stalin underestimated the scale of our losses in the war. Why did he need it?

But even if we accept the "perestroika" figure as reliable, we must take into account one circumstance, which, as a rule, is forgotten. The total figure of human losses of the USSR today

subconsciously identified - for this it is quite consciously

the falsifiers of history worked hard - with **the combat** losses of the Red Army. However,

in World War II, up to 60 percent or more of the casualties fell on the **civilian** population. And even if we multiply 27 by

0.4, we get 10.8 million of our dead soldiers for the entire time of the Great Patriotic War. At the same time, up to two million people died not on the battlefield, but in German captivity. That is, the direct combat losses of the Red Army amounted to no more than 8 million people, even according to "Gorbachev" (hardly conscientious) estimates. The losses of the Wehrmacht on the Soviet-

German front, according to various sources, are calculated in different ways - from 10 million people to less than 4 million people. But they must be added to the losses of the Italian, Hungarian, Romanian, Finnish, Slovak and even Spanish troops on the Soviet-German front. And even if we take the total figure of the losses

of the German bloc on the Soviet-German front as 4 million people, all the same, such a result proves that the Red Army fought in that war not "babblers", but in a Suvorov way: not by numbers, but by skill.

I already wrote about this in the book "USSR - Empire of Good", and now I will briefly repeat that the standard ratio of losses of attackers and defenders is three to one. And if the losses of the defeated, that is, the Germans, amounted to 4 million people, then the losses of the winners, that is, ours, justified by military science, are at the level of 12 million people.

But even Gorbachev's supporters actually indicated a lower figure. I can also cite the figures reported in January 2010 by the representative of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Major General A. Kirillin: the total human losses of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War are estimated at 26.6 million people, combat losses - 8.8 million. The total losses of Germany are estimated at 11-13 million people, combat losses are 5-5.5 million. General

Kirillin remarked that one should carefully read what Stalin said when he said that the Soviet Union lost 7 million people on the battlefields, referring only to combat losses.

If we accept not the Stalinist, but the "Kirillin" figure, accepting even the lower estimate of the total losses of Germany and dropping two million differences from the figure of the Wehrmacht's combat losses, then the ratio of our and German combat losses still falls short of the "3 to 1" ratio allowed military science for the winner. But after all, one must also take into account the losses of Germany's satellites, and they immediately reduce the overall ratio of losses to about 2:1. And this is with the most favorable figure of German combat losses for assessing the military skill of the

Germans. No, at least "twist twist", even "turn twist", and an analysis of the ratio of combat losses of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army clearly proves that, in general, the Red Army fought more skillfully in that war than its main "opponent". Not to mention the allies - both the allies of the USSR

and the allies of Germany. The German Panzer General Mellenthin wrote that the Russian infantry "fully preserved the great traditions of Suvorov and Skobelev", that the Russian artillery "is a very formidable branch of the army and fully deserves the high appraisal that Stalin gave it", that the Red Army tankmen "were tempered in the crucible of war", that "their skill has increased immeasurably" and that "such a transformation

must have required exceptionally high organization and unusually skillful planning and leadership. At the same time, Mellenthin

stated: "The Russian high command knows its business better than the command of any other army." So what kind of "incompetent" "filling up" of the Germans

with corpses can we talk about? In addition, the Germans clearly had more

corpses than those conventionally taken 4 million, which were mentioned above. And there are reasons to say so. For example, during the Crimean Conference on February 7, 1945, an interesting dialogue between Churchill and Stalin took place at the evening meeting of Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill in the Livadia Palace. It will not hurt us to remember this dialogue. The official entry says this about him:

“... Churchill, continuing, points out that ... there are circles in England who are frightened by the thought of evicting a large number of Germans. Churchill himself is not at all afraid of such a prospect. The results of the resettlement of Greeks and Turks after the last World War were quite satisfactory. Stalin says that in those parts of Germany

which

occupied by the Red Army, there is almost no German population.

Churchill notes that this, of course, makes the task easier. In addition, 6–7 million Germans have already been killed, and before the end of the war, probably at least 1–1.5 million more will be killed.

Stalin replies that Churchill's figures in general are correct.

Churchill declares that he does not propose

stop the destruction of the Germans ... "

So, in real time, an objective (I emphasize: objective, not propaganda!) English estimate of German losses in World War II ranged from 7 million to 8.5

million.

The average estimate is about 8 million. I note that according to some sources, the total losses of the German people amounted to

over 13 million people. Due to

the transience of hostilities in Germany, the civilian population suffered losses mainly due to the barbaric bombing attacks of Allied aircraft on German cities. The reader already knows about these European rehearsals of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But in Dresden, Hamburg, Berlin, along with the victims in other cities, hardly more than a million Germans died. On the Western Front - even two million more.

Even if we accept that the last two types of losses amounted to three million, up to 5 million people remain for the irretrievable combat losses of the Germans alone on the Soviet-German front. This, I emphasize, is according to English estimates, and not according to reports from the Sovinformburo, where enemy losses, as a rule, were seriously overestimated for understandable reasons and justified during the war.

So what kind of "mediocre" warfare by the Russians can we talk about? At a

scientific conference in 1946 following the results of the Berlin operation, Army General Vasily Danilovich Sokolovsky gave some clever and accurate comparison of two operations and two phenomena, and I will quote it below in full: The future Marshal

of the Soviet Union Sokolovsky said:

"The Berlin operation summed up the four-year struggle against Nazi Germany. Here, for the last time, our Soviet Stalinist strategy collided with the adventurist Hitlerite strategy. It is appropriate, therefore, to compare the two battles for the capitals - for Moscow and for Berlin. In November 1941, the enemy stood at the gates of Moscow.

Hitler had already called a "parade of victors" in Moscow. Moscow was already visible to the enemy through binoculars. The fascist troops were preparing to deliver the "final blow" and believed that with the capture of Moscow, the Soviet Union would be forced to unconditionally surrender to the mercy of the "winners".

In April 1945, the Red Army troops occupied positions at the turn of the Oder River, having bridgeheads on the western bank of the river. Berlin was not visible through binoculars, but the troops of the 1st

The Belorussian Front were preparing to deliver the final blow. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief knew, and the entire Red Army and the entire Soviet Union knew with him, that with the fall of Berlin, the enemy would be finally defeated and capitulate unconditionally.

The idea of the fascist command in the battle for Moscow was to inflict two strong deep blows on the flanks, bypassing Moscow, with the aim of bilateral coverage and encirclement of Moscow. This plan ignored the force opposing the Germans - the grouping of the Red Army troops on the Western Front, and at the same time, the formulaic plan of war and "double pincers" was clear to the Supreme High Command of the Red Army. The plan of the attack on Berlin stood out for its clarity and aspiration and

for its realistic assessment of the situation and enemy forces. There was no template, as you can see. The enemy was deprived of freedom of maneuver: his reserves were pinned down and his forces were dispersed over a wide front of about 275 kilometers, counting the front from the Baltic Sea to the Schwedt area, where the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front were operating, as well as the front occupied by the troops of the 1st Ukrainian front. For the attack on Moscow, the German command used its main best forces, including more than two-thirds of the tank forces.

For the Berlin offensive, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Generalissimo Comrade Stalin gave the 1st Belorussian Front alone nine combined-arms armies,

two tank armies, one air army, two cavalry corps - in total there were over 700,000 people, over 3,000 aircraft, over 3,000 tanks and self-propelled guns, and about 17,000 guns. In both cases, both sides created a deeply echeloned, strong fortified defense on the outskirts of their capitals. In both battles, there was a high degree of tension in the fighting and extreme determination on both sides.

Defending their homeland, the capital Moscow, every soldier of the Red Army knew that he was waging a just liberation war for the freedom and independence of his Fatherland. This lofty goal of the war inspired the Red Army to exploits and gave birth to thousands of heroes and heroines who were ready to go to death for the sake of the freedom of their homeland. In the battle for Berlin, the Germans fought with desperation, predatory, suicide bombers, who continue to wage an conquest against freedom, against democracy. imperialist war of And when there was nowhere to retreat, thousands began to surrender, since the morale of the troops at the most decisive moment cannot be supported by the goals of robbing and oppressing other peoples.

Today, fans of exaggerated "sensations" Mark Solonin and Rezun-"Suvorov" can only smirk about the latest statement by General Sokolovsky - they say, this is pure propaganda. The Germans in Germany also fought for their homeland and fought heroically almost to the end. But Sokolovsky was right. And how right! For the Germans, this war was originally precisely predatory and predatory. And even when it crossed into German territory, the essence of the war for the Germans did not change, because the Russians came to Germany not to capture and rob it, but in order to bring to the end their initially just and liberating war, confidently which could only be ended by taking Berlin. To this day, we have not thought about this ... And in the west of Germany and in the east of Germany, the Germans seemed to be fighting for their land. In the west against the allies, in the east against the Russians. But both there and there - for Germany.

But how differently they fought in the west and in the east. Why? After all, both there and there the struggle went on - it seems - for the German

land, and there, and there the Germans fought - it seems - for the Fatherland.

However, in the West they did not show much persistence, but in east...

Why?

Yes, just because they did not rob allies, and seeing Russians in front of them, they understood that the arrival of Russians in their homeland was retribution for the atrocities of the Germans in the Russian homeland.

Hence - and persistence, and mutually bloody resistance to us. And our losses were huge, not because of our "mediocrity", but because of the scale of the struggle. Sokolovsky ended his speech like this:

The German offensive against Moscow ended
shameful defeat of the enemy.

Our battle for Berlin went down in the history of wars as one of the brightest pages of the victories of the Red Army.

If something needs to be added to this statement, it is the words that the battle for Berlin has also become one of the pinnacles of the combat skill of the Red Army.

Someone can say that Sokolovsky's opinion is, they say, the evidence of the marshal. But here is the testimony of Sergeant Alexander Rodin, familiar to the reader. In his diary book he writes:

"From about the middle of 1943, the war began to enter into a normal, if you can apply this concept in relation to the war, track. We became scientists, we knew in advance what would happen, how and why. On vacation, regular classes were held ... "

However, not only on vacation. In the diary of Rodin's friend, Sergeant Nesterov, it was written: "The platoon commander was called to classes. And the German is a hundred meters away! .. "

The troops conducted classes on the topics "Fight in the environment", "Actions of the unit during the retreat." This is in 1943 and later, in conditions when the Red Army was already almost constantly advancing. But war is war: and the advancing army must be able to skillfully retreat if necessary. The matured Red Army understood this.

Sergeant Rodin also recalled this:

“A more or less clear order was established at the front, stipulated by the instructions ... when we were taken from the front line to rest or transferred to another sector of the front, we had to surrender (I don't know, according to the act?) The line of defense replacing us. The infantry found fault, did not want to accept, proving that not all the trenches and communication channels were dug out, and we urgently ... dug the missing. If earlier in defense the task was to hold the area at any cost ... now the front line was divided into sections, and one or another unit was responsible for each section.

That is, after the first failures and defeats, the war became **work** for the Red Army - hard military work. And the Russians have always been able to work. True - with the right guidance by them, as Napoleon correctly spoke about the best Russian soldier in the world.

So after all, the leadership in that war was, after all, on the level. And in order to once again convince the reader of this, I - almost at the end of this book - will cite an episode from the history of that war, referring to February 1945. On February 4, 1945, at

the Crimean Conference, after the report of General of the Army Antonov during the next meeting of the heads of the three governments, the Chief of Staff of the US Army, General of the Army J. Marshall, made a report. So, the transcript of the meeting recorded a completely professional exchange of opinions and assessments between the American Marshall and the Russian Marshal Stalin.

Stalin's questions to the professional military man were specific, precise, and also professional. Stalin discovered an excellent knowledge of the capabilities of the Red Army and the quantitative parameters of its combat equipment. Here is how he spoke, for example, about artillery (according to the transcript):

“Stalin says that the Soviet command has a great superiority in artillery. Maybe the Allies will be interested to know how the Soviet

artillery? We, says Stalin, as comrades-in-arms, can exchange experience with the allies. A year ago, the Soviet command created a special breakthrough artillery. This gave good results. An artillery division has from 300 to 400 guns. For example, Marshal Konev had six breakthrough artillery divisions on a front of 35–40 kilometers. Corps artillery was also attached to these divisions. As a result, there were about 230 guns for every kilometer of the breakthrough. After the artillery bombardment, many Germans were killed, others were stunned and could not recover for a long time. Thus, the gates were opened before the Red Army ... "

So - without papers, impromptu, said the one about whom the insignificant Khrushchev lied to the whole world, that he, this "talentless" Stalin, led the fronts "on the globe."

If we talk about the vile myth-making around the history of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 as a whole, then chronologically, the first vile myth about the first directly military day out of all 1418 days that made up the war was the Khrushchev myth about Stalin, who allegedly left on June 22, 1941 to drink on nearby cottage. This myth is tenacious - oddly enough - even now,

after all the publications of various documents and the journal of visits to Stalin's Kremlin office itself, in which the time of the start of Stalin's military work is clearly recorded - 5 hours 45 minutes on June 22, 1941

of the year.

One of the chronologically last vile near-war myths was the myth that the Victory was won by us at the expense of the "mountain of corpses". Well, the

author hopes that with his book he made a modest personal contribution to the debunking of such myths. Before finally putting

an end to it, it would be necessary to say and about one more, today, perhaps, the main myth of 1945.

However, about him - in a short afterword.

Short afterword: The main myth of the 45th year

This afterword will indeed be brief, just as the main myth of 1945 is also brief. Alas, the fact

that a certain generally accepted statement is nothing more than a myth became clear only over the

years. And this myth is the victory of Russia in 1945. It is believed - to this day - that in May 1945, Russia, together with the United States and Great Britain, defeated Germany. However, in reality, in those May days, the Anglo-Saxons, who had long ago arranged their "The Grand Chessboard" ("Great Chessboard") out of the Planet and twice pitted the Russians and Germans on this "board", defeated with the participation of Russia not only Germany, but also - in the long run, Russia itself.

I repeat: they and only they won **that** "game"! The myth of the victory of the Soviet people over fascist Germany collapsed in the autumn of 1991 and in the winter of 1992, when the great Soviet Union collapsed under the systemic blows of external forces and the internal "fifth column".

Readers of my books, especially the very first one, know that a long time ago, more than ten years ago, I first asked myself the question: "Was the first and second war between Russians and Germans inevitable?" After all, in the double deadly confrontation between the two great powers and peoples, both peoples suffered a major defeat.

Both! It would seem that Russia won an undeniable victory in 1945. But today it is clear that in the historical perspective this victory turned out to be Pyrrhic. Too much was destroyed in the Soviet Union during that war, too many active builders of the new Russia died defending their Motherland and liberating Europe. And too much rubbish survived in that war. If not for the war, then a new generation would have firmly settled in the USSR - qualitatively differently educated compared to its fathers and grandfathers, qualitatively more cultured.

The activities of these pupils of the Stalin era would create a real basis for socialist democracy, understood as an opportunity for the broad masses to control their own destiny.

June 22, 1941 crossed out a lot in Russia that had already been created in it, as well as the fact that the new Russia was only to be created.

As a result, as it became clear decades later, on May 9, 1945, we did not set a victorious point, but only a historical

ellipsis.

And

Germany? After all, Germany, despite the fact that it has now far outstripped its former victor, has **also** suffered a defeat in the historical perspective. She also missed her historical chance! After all, if it were not for her last "Drang nach Osten", she could rightfully be the second power in the world today - after the USSR. What is

Germany now? Successfully "globalized" spiritless space, gradually filled, like the whole of Western Europe, "colored". Does **such** a Germany have a national future?

And isn't it time for the Germans to think: with whom is their creative historical destiny connected - with the Anglo-Saxons or with the Russians?

I wrote about this ten years ago, and I am writing now - on the eve of the 65th anniversary of that Victory, the results of which have been almost destroyed by the last two decades of our modern history.

Today, the Yankees openly assert that the new world order will be built on the ruins of Russia, at the expense of Russia and against Russia. And this is sixty-five years after the Victory of 1945. So did we win

then? Of course not! Or rather, they did not win to

the end. And so our real Victory is still ahead! This is schizophrenia - to celebrate the 65th anniversary

of the Victory **of the Soviet** people in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 in a more dismembered than Hitler managed to do, in an anti-Soviet and anti-communist "SNGoviya" headed by a suicidal "Russians"!

What does the current "power" have to do with our Victory?
besides the fact that she destroyed the results of this Victory?

Under the tricolor supposedly "national" flag of the Russian
By 1913, the empire produced 4% of the world product.

Under the Red banner of Lenin-Stalin, the multinational Soviet Union
raised this share of ours to a third.

Ten times!

The current "Rossiania" under the "state" "flag" of "Vlasov" colors again
rolled up to 3 percent. So does the "Russian" geopolitical

bastard have the right to celebrate the anniversary of the Victory **of the
Soviet** people? And was that our Victory lasting? I

bow my head before blessed memory and
majestic
the feat of those who fought and won that war.

However, I bow my head **even lower** in shame for the fact that the
descendants of the winners destroyed their own victorious State decades
later. Eternal

glory to the heroes who died in the battles for the freedom and
independence of our Soviet Motherland!

Eternal shame to those who devalued and slandered their feat.

January 17, 2010

15 hours 35 minutes Moscow time